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The Pleasure of Punishment
Based on a reading of contemporary philosophical arguments, this book 
accounts for how punishment has provided audiences with pleasure in 
different historical contexts. Watching tragedies, contemplating hell, attending 
executions, or imagining prisons have generated pleasure, according to con-
temporary observers, in ancient Greece, in medieval Catholic Europe, in the 
early- modern absolutist states, and in the post- 1968 Western world.
The pleasure was often judged morally problematic, and raised questions 
about which desires were satisfied, and what the enjoyment was like. This 
book offers a research synthesis that ties together existing work on the 
pleasure of punishment. It considers how the shared joys of punishment 
gradually disappeared from the public view at a precise historic conjuncture, 
and explores whether arguments about the carnivalesque character of cruelty 
can provide support for the continued existence of penal pleasure. Towards 
the end of this book, the reader will discover, if  willing to go along and follow 
desire to places which are full of pain and suffering, that deeply entwined with 
the desire for punishment, there is also the desire for social justice.
An accessible and compelling read, this book will appeal to students and 
scholars of criminology, sociology, philosophy and all those interested in the 
pleasures of punishment.
Magnus Hörnqvist is Professor of Criminology at Stockholm University. In 
a series of research projects, he has investigated the productivity power in 
state- organised arenas and shown how normality and inequality are being 
created through interventions directed toward challenges of a conceived 
order. Publications in English include Risk, Power and the State (Routledge 
2010) and articles in journals such as Regulation & Governance, Philosophy & 
Social Criticism and Punishment & Society. Publications in Swedish include 
a monograph on the Foucauldian analysis of power (Carlsson 2012) and an 
introductory book on social class (Liber 2016). It is essential reading for those 
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This book has a long prehistory and I am grateful to all people who have 
offered input along the way, starting with David Scott, who, as the editor 
of the anthology “Why Prison?”, encouraged me to think further on the 
Foucauldian idea of the productivity of power, and thus initially set me on 
this track. It became a chapter on the pleasure of punishment, specifically 
focused on the prison and the middle class. When Tom Sutton at Routledge 
asked me to write a book on the theme a few years ago at a criminology confer-
ence, the task first struck me as too daunting. I also needed much more time, 
more material and a wider scope. My colleagues at the department of crim-
inology at Stockholm university have been a great support; especially thanks 
to Henrik Tham, Anders Nilsson and Janne Flyghed for useful comments 
on early drafts. Intelligibility has been the key challenge throughout, and 
they have reminded me of that. Being granted the RJ Sabbatical 2018, by 
Riksbankens Jubileumsfond (SAB18- 0161:1), to write a research synthesis on 
the pleasure of punishment, entirely relieved me of teaching obligations for 
a full year, which I spent re- reading works in the philosophical tradition and 
making notes. The grant also allowed me to spend the autumn of 2019 as a 
visiting professor at the Mannheim Centre for Criminology in the London 
School of Economics, generously invited by Tim Newburn, sharing office 
space and thoughts with Janet Foster and Alice Sampson. Thanks also to 
Johann Koehler and Mats Deland for enthusiasm and feedback on the histor-
ical. I am especially grateful to Vanessa Barker for innumerable coffee chats at 
all stages of the project, and for challenging me on the issue why it mattered. 
Mellika Melouani Melani, my life companion, presented me to the worlds of 
art and opera, and inspired me to think of desire as unrestrained and as some-




Articulating the problematic of desire
The main aim of this book is to generate a better understanding of how 
punishment has provided audiences with pleasure in different historical 
contexts. The question – how punishment produces pleasure – is understood 
against the background of the problematic of desire. It is a problematic 
defined by the inescapable tension between desire and enjoyment. The prob-
lematic of desire was brought to the world’s attention by Sigmund Freud. In a 
footnote, later added to the first of the Three Essays on Sexuality, he said that 
‘the only appropriate word’ in German – Lust – was inevitably ambiguous, 
and designated ‘the experience both of a need and of a gratification’ (Freud 
1953: 135 fn 2). The very word was ambiguous, and so was the corresponding 
conception. Freud’s conception of pleasure covered both desire and satisfac-
tion; on the one hand ‘wishing, wanting and desiring’ and on the other hand 
‘enjoyment and satisfaction’ (Schuster 2016:  101). In itself, the distinction 
was not new. It was central to the classic Platonic approach to pleasure. In 
Gorgias, Plato treated desire as distress and satisfaction as the relief  of dis-
tress, thereby posing the problem of transformation: how could experiences, 
ranging from acute pain to a mere sense of unease, transform into the very 
opposite, the experience of being at ease? Plato’s conception of pleasure was 
modelled after the satisfaction of bodily needs: hunger, thirst and sex. There 
is a perpetual movement back and forth: desire turns into satisfaction, which 
recedes into desire, a desire that may turn into renewed satisfaction, or not, 
and so forth. Freud discovered the tension, or the radical disjunction between 
desire and enjoyment. Desire and enjoyment were essentially irreconcilable. 
There can be no simple match, no carefree immersion in everyday life. It has 
been explicated as forces pulling in different directions; ‘desire goes one way, 
and satisfaction another’ (Schuster 2016:  122). I  prefer the metaphor of a 
gap to describe the relationship. Throughout the book, I will talk about the 
gap between desire and enjoyment. The word ‘gap’ emphasizes their essen-
tial irreconcilability, as well as the necessity to bridge the gap, by actions or 
interventions, to transform desire into enjoyment.
The pleasure of punishment may strike readers as an odd topic. Starting 
talking about ‘the pleasure of punishment’, I have noticed in the process of 






and with cruelty and pain as the primary cause of pleasure. While that may 
not be altogether off  the mark, the pleasure of punishment is far more 
ordinary than extraordinary, and closer to the everyday concerns of most of 
us. The topic deals with a central dimension of human experience: our lives 
as far as they involve notions of morality, of order and social esteem. The 
consumption of punishment is embedded in the socio- moral world simultan-
eously being enacted, and the perceived place of the audience in that world. 
It can have a soothing effect on desire, or produce intense excitation; yet only 
temporarily, as the tension between desire and enjoyment is inescapable.The 
underlying problematic can be approached from each side of the gap. Desire 
for recognition is located on one side. It pushes forward, driven by unease 
and guided by basic coordinates of status derived from social morality. The 
desire is volatile, transgressive, socially conditioned, and oriented toward 
others, striving to be fully part of the community while at the same time 
aspiring for distinction. On the other side of the gap, there is enjoyment. It is 
no less complex. Enjoyment can be conducive to individual well- being, and 
may be experienced as satisfactory, or even as the highest form of pleasure, 
as Nietzsche would argue, whereas psychoanalysis stressed that enjoyment 
is potentially harmful, necessarily partial, always precarious, and fundamen-
tally dependent on others.
The key question is how punishment produces pleasure, and how it does so 
in relation to an audience, as opposed to those who are immediately affected 
by an offence. Given the problematic of desire, the question can be seen to be 
composed of a series of more specific questions, concerning the character of 
desire, the experience of enjoyment and the dynamic involved. Which desire 
is activated by punishment? How does shared consumption bridge the gap in 
particular social settings? What kind of enjoyment is produced? What is the 
dynamic like? The questions are simultaneously historical and conceptual, 
and will be pursued in four different settings. Implicit in the problematic of 
desire is moreover the political question. Can punishment be replaced? Can 
the desires of the audience be satisfied just as well in other ways? The political 
question has to wait until the end. Only by understanding what kind of desire 
goes into punishment, the precarious dynamic between desire and enjoyment 
and how punishment operates, will we be in a position to discuss what else – 
which other kind of collective action, beliefs or practices – might fill the gap 
and provide audiences with a similar satisfaction. It takes a certain willingness 
to pursue the topic, to go along, also with some of the most opaque and reac-
tionary thinkers, to follow desire to places – in this case punishment – which 
are ugly, full of pain, suffering and misery. Yet like the owl which flies at dusk, 
or the treasure at the end of the rainbow, only at the very end of the journey 
will the reader discover that, deeply embedded and entwined with the desire 
for punishment, there is also the desire for social justice.
The study has been informed by a few basic considerations. I would like to 
briefly state them, for reasons of transparency. They include some notes on 
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methods, on the state of the art, on the claims of this study, and the stakes 
involved.
CENTRALITY OF PHILOSOPHY:  The audience experience was 
approached through the contemporary philosophical discussion. I worked my 
way back in history to find out what philosophers had said about the passions 
of punishment. Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Hobbes, Kant, Bentham and Hegel 
discussed the passions of punishment, mostly focusing on anger and venge-
fulness, as the most morally ambiguous, yet always considering pleasure at 
the margins. These discussions, as they were pursued in some of the most 
central works in the Western tradition of thought, such as the Republic, the 
Nicomachean Ethics, Summa Theologica, Leviathan, and the Philosophy of 
Right, or the Genealogy of Morals were read against the background of avail-
able knowledge on the social practices of punishment at the time, including 
the composition of the audience and the specific conditions at the scene of 
consumption. Besides the contemporary philosophers, I  was able to draw 
on the works of classicists on ancient Greek tragedies, research on medieval 
representations of the afterlife, historians of public executions, psychoana-
lytic approaches to law, and criminological studies of recent developments 
in criminal justice, each of which represented a research field with its par-
ticular state of the art. All these sources were used to reconstruct the audi-
ence experience in four historical periods: ancient Greece (the fifth and the 
fourth century BCE), medieval Europe (the thirteenth and the fourteenth 
century), early- modern Europe (mainly the eighteenth century), and in the 
post- 1968 Western world. Different arguments can be made for choosing to 
start with philosophy. With respect to antiquity and the middle ages, the cen-
tral role of philosophy is partly derived from the fact that it is one of the few 
preserved sources on desire and enjoyment of the contemporary audiences. 
Philosophers may also be credited with acute observations on the sentiment 
of later audiences; Kierkegaard (1962) diagnosed ressentiment as a social con-
dition in the mid- nineteenth century. Yet what above all makes philosophy 
useful are the concepts and the arguments. Starting with Plato’s arguments 
on a third element of the soul, positioned in between reason and passion, 
philosophy has produced the categories to discuss desire and enjoyment: cat-
egories which in some cases are fundamentally reinvented with the transitions 
between historical époques, and in other cases retain their validity despite 
historical change.
CONCEPTS: The categories emerge from the historical analysis. The con-
ceptual categories used to analyse the audience experience are not present 
from the start but emerge out of the analysis of the philosophical discussion. 
The problems which the philosophers sought to address could be explicitly 
concerned with the audience experience, such as the paradox of tragic pleasure, 
or how pleasure could be derived from the pain of others. The problems could 
also be organized around ethical concerns, for instance when striving to dis-
tinguish punishment from vengeance, how to avoid afterworldly punishment, 
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or how to prevent punishment from being subverted by passion. In their 
attempts to solve these problems, philosophers in each period articulated spe-
cific understandings of the pleasure of the audience. Some of the categories 
are context- specific, such as the early- modern concept of the sublime (Burke) 
or the modern concept of ressentiment (Nietzsche). Other categories recur in 
all four periods – with respect to the basic categories of desire and of enjoy-
ment. The objects of desire have shifted, along with the worlds inhabited by 
the audiences and the changing content of social morality. Yet the category 
of desire stayed the same. In the philosophical discussion, the desire for social 
esteem has in each period been treated as a volatile force of human motiv-
ation, always entwined with punishment. The desire has been celebrated as 
thumos in Ancient Greece (Plato 2013a; 2013b), condemned as pride in medi-
eval Europe (Aquinas 1941), described as the desire for recognition on the 
brink of modernity (Hegel 2018), and more recently pinned down as essen-
tially the desire to be fully part of society (Fraser 2000): hence, the absolute 
centrality of the desire for social esteem. On the other side of the gap, there 
are the Platonian and the Aristotelian paradigms. There does not seem to be 
any third alternative beyond these two paradigms (van Riel 2000). Enjoyment 
must be understood as either relief  of distress or as absorption in activity. 
The more specific features of the experience differ according to the historical 
period, to the position in which members of the audience find themselves, or 
due to other circumstances. But the need to distinguish between Platonian 
and Aristotelian pleasure is persistent in all four historical periods. The impli-
cation is clear:  the analysis should, in each period, focus on the desire for 
social esteem, as understood by contemporaries, and let the basic distinction 
between Platonian and Aristotelian structure the presentation.
SELECTIONS: Choosing the most influential. All three aspects of  the 
selection – the choice of  time periods, the choice of  philosophers and the 
choice of  punishment – are guided by the criteria of  influence. In ancient 
Greece, the idea of  rational punishment was discussed for the first known 
time by Plato, and the paradoxical pleasure of  watching tragedies, which 
portrayed the dominant form of  punishment at the time, was theorized 
by Aristotle. Together, they moreover present the two available paradigms 
of  pleasure. In medieval Europe, Aquinas and Dante represented the cul-
mination of  theological arguments and of  a literary genre, respectively, on 
punishments in the afterlife, and Aquinas explicitly addressed the problems 
attached to the pleasure of  its consumption. The excitement of  early- 
modern execution crowds stands out as the paradigmatic example of  the 
pleasure of  punishment, and should be included for that reason. Hegel was 
a natural choice due to his influence, his theorization of  the emergence 
of  criminal justice, and above all because of  his account of  the dynamics 
of  desire. Kant and Bentham were likewise influential and discussed 
the passions of  punishment from contrary perspectives, and Burke was 
included as the key theoretician of  the early- modern sublime. The current 







of  the desire for punishment, mainly channelled through the criminal 
justice system. Nietzsche was the first to articulate the disruptive char-
acter of  pleasure in relation to punishment, and was together with Scheler 
the most influential philosopher on ressentiment, whereas psychoanalytic 
authors, above all Freud, Lacan and Žižek, discussed the obscene enjoy-
ment of  transgressive punishment in a modern context. This selection can 
be questioned on several grounds: the criteria of  cultural intelligibility with 
respect to punishment, the lack of  continuity between time periods and the 
exclusive reliance on philosophers in the mainstream of  the Western trad-
ition. On a more technical note, the referencing system of  social science is 
far from ideal when applied to works with multiple editions and English 
translations. Instead, I follow the customary way to reference the works of 
Plato, Aristotle, Aeschylus, Aquinas and Dante which is used by scholars, 
who may prefer the old Greek or Latin original.
SHORT ANSWER:  Concise formula of pleasure production. How does 
punishment operate to transform distress related to social esteem  – as an 
acutely experienced loss of status, a vaguely experienced sense of unease, or 
as unfulfilled ambition to distinguish oneself  over against others – into a rad-
ically different experience, either soothing or exhilarating? The basic pleasure 
formula can be stated in the following manner: punishment across different 
ages operates in the gap between desire and enjoyment, by promising to satisfy 
the incessant and never fully satisfied desire for status recognition, at the same 
time as it provides enjoyment, by recognizing spectators as part of the com-
munity or, alternatively, through the excitement of taking part in collective 
self- assertion. The elemental pleasure formula plays out differently depending 
on the historical and social setting. The categories allow for much variety. 
Punishment will be seen to generate different experiences to widely divergent 
audiences: male citizens in ancient Greece, the whole Christian community in 
the middle ages, the common people at the early- modern executions, and then, 
following the passage to modernity, to embittered yet relatively privileged 
spectators from afar, and to audiences of transgressions perpetrated in the 
name of the group to which they belong.
PRE- MODERN PLEASURE: Recognition mediated through the enacted 
world. Pleasure is understood in relation to the entire social world as it presented 
itself  to the audience. The world- making character of punishment and its rela-
tionship to existential dilemmas of the contemporary audience are taken to 
be analytically central: more central than cruelty and pain, which may be the 
first that comes to mind when thinking about the pleasures of punishment. 
Each world has to be understood on its own terms. The compositions of the 
worlds were markedly different from one another in ancient Greece, medieval 
Europe, and in the early- modern period. The dilemmas facing the audiences 
nevertheless appear to have shared certain traits. In each period, punishment 
forged a community of spectators who shared the same predicament, and 
confirmed their place in the bigger scheme of things, caught between forces 
beyond their control and the necessity to gain recognition from their own 
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community. The spectators struggled with the impossible requirements of the 
enacted world. They strived to satisfy the desire for social esteem, derived 
from the prevailing social morality, while the satisfaction was elusive due to 
the institution of punishment, powerful agents of justice and other forces 
beyond their control. At the same time, they were recognized by other people 
in the audience as one of them, precisely because their predicament was the 
same as everybody else’s. This was the Platonic pleasure of punishment, as 
experienced by pre- modern audiences: a temporary satisfaction of the desire 
to be fully part of the community, mediated by existential dilemmas and 
the enacted world. Evidence of the Aristotelian pleasure of punishment, on 
the other hand, is inconclusive with respect to ancient Greece and medieval 
Europe. Concerning the early- modern period, the available documentation 
of early- modern execution crowds is consistent with two kinds of absorbed 
arousal: the carnivalesque and the sublime. On one analysis, the executions 
presented a crucial venue for the carnivalesque. Precisely because they were 
occasions for articulate display of official rank and social prestige, when 
undermined by ordinary people who were drinking and laughing, or mocking 
the authorities, this produced intense excitement within the crowd around the 
scaffold (Bakhtin 1968). Alternatively, the absorbed arousal at the execution 
site was sublime, in the sense suggested by Edmund Burke (1997). On this 
analysis, the audience were absorbed in the unfolding scenes, experiencing an 
almost irresistible attraction to violence, death or degradation, while experi-
encing a paradoxical elevation: awe, reverence, and respect.
PASSAGE TO MODERNITY: Pleasure became problematic. At the end of 
the nineteenth century, there was a sense that the pleasure of watching pun-
ishment had become problematic, as formulated by Friedrich Nietzsche in 
the Genealogy of Morals. While sharing the awareness, repeatedly formulated 
ever since antiquity, that punishment derived its ordering mission from the 
passions which also pushed it beyond all set boundaries, the disruptive power 
was attributed to pleasure rather than to anger. To discuss pleasure, in this 
way, was novel. Pleasure had become problematic, as a result of a series of 
transformations during the nineteenth century. Shared excitement and imme-
diate absorption were rendered increasingly difficult at the scenes of punish-
ment, due to the element of prohibition in social morality and changes in the 
penal practices, associated with the birth of the modern prison. At the same 
time, the tension between the desire for social esteem and its satisfaction was 
reinforced by eroded status hierarchies and the new contradictions of capit-
alism, making recognition increasingly precarious (Hegel 2018; Scheler 2017). 
Then, there was the new idea of punishment as somehow representing the 
audience. Before the nineteenth century, punishment, as opposed to private 
revenge, was mainly the domain of gods and worldly rulers. Yet with the evo-
lution of state criminal justice and the gradual spread of democratic ideas, 
it became possible to imagine a state that could step in and act on behalf  of 
groups of ordinary citizens. Consequently, the passage to modernity affected 





excess. Recognition mediated through the enacted world and through the eyes 
of other spectators gave way to direct recognition. For large sections in the 
audience, a state- administered revenge exacted on groups identified as respon-
sible for violating basic principles of order and morality sustained a collective 
self- revaluation, which involved immediate yet temporary relief  of distress. 
The carnivalesque excitement and the sublime abandon, on the other hand, 
evolved into obscene enjoyment. The shared awareness of prohibition meant 
that excitation was reinforced at the same time as it was repressed. Modern 
punishment seemed to be safely enjoyed in the company of others only on 
condition of its public disavowal.
STATE OF THE ART:  The silence on pleasure. Thirteen years after 
Nietzsche’s observation that pleasure had become problematic in the con-
text of punishment, Emile Durkheim published an essay, Two laws of penal 
evolution, where he, likewise deeply aware of the ambiguous role of passion, 
adopted the more conventional stance, and attributed the disruptive role to 
anger (Durkheim 1984). Pleasure was not mentioned. It was not considered, at 
a particular moment in time, after the passage to modernity, when Nietzsche 
and other writers, above all Sigmund Freud and Max Scheler, had discovered 
the fundamentally disruptive character of pleasure. Durkheim, who pioneered 
the sociology of punishment, who stressed the centrality of passion, and 
identified the audience as the key figure in punishment, all of which were 
decisive advances, incidentally initiated the long silence on pleasure within 
social science. The pleasure of the audience who witnessed punishment – the 
topic brought up by Nietzsche – would be mentioned at the margins but never 
reached the analysis of modern punishment. After Durkheim, the influential 
accounts of Elias and Foucault elaborated on the silence, by locating pleasure 
in a distant past, when the pleasure of punishment was assumed to be pro-
lific and shamelessly expressed at the scaffold. The supposedly widespread 
enjoyment of public displays of cruelty dramatized the difference between 
a previous stage and the modern condition, whether conceptualized as self- 
control and refined manners (Elias 2012), as institutionally channelled moral 
outrage (Durkheim 1997) or as subtle techniques of power to increase prod-
uctivity (Foucault 1979). Nothing was ever said about the pleasure of modern 
audiences. There was a deadening silence on pleasure in social science. At 
the same time, most people tend to believe that it is still there, and few would 
dare to argue that pleasure in fact disappeared with the passage to modernity. 
Instead, it seemed to become a well- kept secret in the hands of theoreticians 
who were often obscure and reactionary, such as Jacques Lacan or Peter 
Sloterdijk. Yet the topic is far too central to be allowed to stay obscure and 
reactionary.
COMPETING PARADIGMS: The redundancy of pleasure. The prolonged 
interest in the subject (sujet) in Foucauldian accounts – and to some extent 
also in Neo- Durkheimian accounts – during recent decades has shed light on 
its historical and social constitution, through the amalgams of power and dis-






be redundant. The paradigm of subject formation can be traced to Nietzsche, 
who originally advanced the idea  – ironically likewise in the Genalogy of 
Morals – that punishment makes us who we are. It would come to involve a 
thorough appreciation of the productivity of punishment. But it was hard to 
find a role for pleasure that went beyond automatic satisfaction of a desire that 
was already fundamentally marked by power and privilege. Once constituted, 
people were essentially hard- wired to existing relationships of power through 
their desire. The pleasure of the audience was consequently erased, and only 
appeared in psychoanalysis, which picked up bits and pieces of what had been 
sidelined in social science, while keeping to their domain of the repressed 
and never seeming to discuss the same kind of punishments as historians or 
criminologists had in mind. At the same time, there is no way back from the 
analysis of power as productive, as opposed to strictly repressive. I intend to 
discuss the productivity of punishment from another angle, bracketing origins. 
What needs to be understood, according to the underlying problematic, is not 
what punishment ‘does to us’, but rather how punishment bridges the gap 
between desire and enjoyment, in different historical contexts. The problem-
atic of desire goes beyond the constitution of subjectivities, and asks what 
happens with already constituted desire, in everyday life, as people navigate 
existing power imbalances and institutional encounters. It means addressing 
historic articulations of power and desire, without necessarily considering 
issues of identities, self- images or subjectivities. The answers provided may be 
related to issues of identity. What satisfies the desire can be tied to self- images, 
in a treacherous and ambiguous way. As Freud (1961) remarked, ordinary 
people tend to be much more moral and much more immoral than they like 
to believe, at one and the same time.
DEALING WITH THE REACTIONARY:  How to be critical. In phil-
osophy, the use of  thought experiments is standard. The Western history 
of  philosophy is littered with allegories, literary references and thought 
experiments. I have chosen to reproduce some of the  examples – the plight 
of  Agamemnon, why must there be a clear line of  sight to hell, why choose 
a certain death in return one night of  sexual pleasure – to reconstruct the 
world and the dilemmas as they may have presented themselves to the con-
temporary audience. Some of the examples are inherently problematic, and 
unavoidably raise questions such as ‘whose desire?’ and ‘whose pleasure?’ 
and ‘at whose expense?’. The white male subject position being presupposed 
in several examples can be seen to silence the manifold of  voices and 
experiences of  people who did not fit into this narrow frame and had to bear 
the consequences. To simply reproduce the Homeric lightness with which 
female servants are executed for sex- related violations can be seen to natur-
alize views of  women as a disposable property of  men; the allegory including 
the white and the black winged horses in Phaedrus can be seen to reproduce 
racist stereotypes of  a black body weighed down by physical need and a white 
body linked to spiritual values. Kant’s example, as elaborated by Lacan, on 
the man who might embrace a certain death in return for one night of  sexual 
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pleasure, may primarily speak to heterosexual male phantasies. Given all the 
power imbalances that are incorporated in Western history, its history of 
philosophy being no exemption (Lloyd 1984), it is necessary to also take a 
critical look at the examples being recycled, but not necessarily in the form 
of normative rejection, or to once more expose them as male- centred and 
Eurocentric options that can only present themselves in an unchallenged 
world of  privilege. Instead, what happens if  one goes along all the way, to 
face the ugliness of  desire? The suggested critical stance is demanding. It 
takes accepting that desire is shaped through systems of  domination and that 
anyone in the audience – regardless of  social position – can find satisfaction 
in killings, or participate in cheering execution crowds. Desire is ambiguous 
to the core, and enjoyment is always of  the other, inherently linked to trans-
gression, shaped by the experiences of  patriarchy, heteronormativity, slavery, 
colonialism, capitalism, feudalism, or Christianity. Punishment tends to take 
spectators, whether privileged or oppressed, to places where guilt and enjoy-
ment are inseparable. Yet by going along, by pursuing desire all the way, we 
may also find the desire for something radically different. If  the desire for 
social justice is immanent in the most racist, or in the most horrifying acts, 
disentangling that aspect would be true to the original intention of  critical 
theory, ‘to liberate human beings from all circumstances that enslave them’ 
(Horkheimer 1982: 244). The desire for punishment in the audience could be 
an ally of  social justice, rather than working against it, on condition that it is 
addressed as such, as a desire for social justice.
CLAIMS:  Narrowed down. This book offers a series of interpretations 
of how practices, understood by contemporary audiences as punishment, 
bridged the gap between desire and enjoyment in four different époques. More 
specifically, the claims concern how the classic tragedies in ancient Greece, 
how afterworldly punishment in medieval Europe, how public executions in 
Early- modern Europe, and how the prison, the death penalty and torture 
in the post- 1968 Western world activated the desire for social esteem and 
provided enjoyment by recognizing spectators as fully part of the commu-
nity or, alternatively, through the excitement of taking part in collective self- 
assertion. Given the nature of the undertaking, the conclusions reached must 
be tentative. The available evidence allows for several interpretations. Mine 
may serve to initiate a discussion that I hope will be questioned by others. 
I can only begin to imagine all the objections which can be raised. The relative 
sparsity of evidence from the thirteenth century – compared to the other time 
periods – means that interpretation can be seen to be insufficiently grounded. 
The current situation presents in a sense the opposite problem. The wealth of 
current research on topics related to the consumption of punishment means 
that much evidence can be mustered for the interpretation made here, yet also, 
at the same time, much more evidence that can be used to question it.
DYNAMICS:  Progressive or regressive recognition? At the heart of the 
problematic of desire, conceived of as the inevitable mismatch between desire 




dialectic captured the dynamics of desire, its precarious nature and depend-
ence on the other, and, also, its ambiguity. In the very first version, the struggle 
for recognition was driven by the desire to restore social esteem (Hegel 1998), 
and marked by the inherent duality of that desire, torn between the wish to 
be fully accepted as part of the collective and the wish to assert oneself  over 
against others. Hegel’s fundamental intuition concerned the progressive side 
of recognition; individual claims for recognition would transcend existing 
institutional forms, successively pushing them to acknowledge and enable 
more freedom. Within the Hegelian tradition, recognition is seen to presup-
pose mutuality and be conducive to personal growth and societal well- being 
(Honneth 1992; Taylor 1975; Kojève 1969). However, the desire for recog-
nition can just as well unfold in a different direction; toward intolerance, 
revenge and unrestrained self- assertion (Sloterdijk 2010; Fukuyama 2012). 
Punishment operates right in the middle of this dynamic with the capacity 
to provide recognition. Inserted in between desire and enjoyment, punish-
ment can offer relief  of the status concerns of an audience, or through the 
absorbed excitation of taking part in collective assertion. The direction of 
transcendence is not inherent in the dynamics of desire. Whether the progres-
sive side or the regressive side of recognition takes precedence is a matter of 
struggle, influenced by external conditions, actions and interventions. There is 
no overall logic; desire for social esteem is inherently ambiguous and changes 
direction due to the everyday workings of power, and resistance.
RAISING THE STAKES: The indeterminacy of desire. To better under-
stand how punishment operates in the gap between desire and enjoyment may 
shed light on the deep- seated popular support that drives punishment against 
better knowledge and at high social costs, as well as disclosing new points of 
intervention. The desire to be fully included, or to distinguish oneself  over 
against others, does not necessarily translate into a yearning for punishment. 
There are less harmful ways of satisfying the desire. And there can be much 
more productive and creative ways of doing it. Thinking about it as a gap 
between desire and enjoyment that can be filled with more or less any col-
lective action, or intervention within the dimensions of order and morality, 
means that the political options multiply far beyond criminal justice. It might 
undo the claustrophobic sense of being caught between, on the one hand, 
decades of political utilization of the dynamics of desire for strictly punitive 
ends, and, on the other hand, the critical analysis of the formation of subjects 
that are hard- wired to systems of domination, which left no point of inter-
vention other than experimenting with new norms and prohibitions. There is, 
precisely at the level of desire, an entirely open question, whether the desire 
will develop into punitivity, into individual achievement, or social justice. The 
basic ambiguity is at the same time a space for indeterminacy, and thus con-
tention. The option of social justice is inherent in the dynamics of desire, 
just like increased punitivity, an emphasis on conventional goals, or whatever 
happened to confer social esteem on an individual: a well- kept home, public 





educational merits and labour market position. The desire to oppose and to 
rebel, to refuse compromise, or to die for a cause are also cut from the same 
cloth – driven by notions of morality and justice, albeit in a very different 
direction: toward extended rights, new standards of respect, and levelling of 
power asymmetries. In the final analysis, desire is a political question. The 
task is not one of tempering desire, since, if  history teaches us anything, desire 
for punishment cannot be tempered, only be made to reappear as desire for 
social justice.
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1  The disappearance of pleasure?
The pleasure of punishment seems to have changed character with the passage 
to modernity. The first thing to note is the gradual disappearance of pleasure 
from public sight. Available historical research suggests that observable signs 
of pleasure at executions sites – laughter, cheers, drinking, merriness – became 
more infrequent in the nineteenth century, compared to the preceding two 
centuries. Any account of the transformation needs to consider the eyewit-
ness accounts, which document the mood of the audience. The partial dis-
appearance of pleasure from public sight should not be taken to indicate that 
pleasure as such disappeared, but rather that the experience of the audience 
changed character. Another indicator of change was that pleasure lost its 
former innocence in moral philosophy. The passions of punishment had been 
a recurrent theme in the philosophical discussion ever since ancient Greece. 
Yet the treatment underwent a noticeable shift during the nineteenth century. 
A comparison between Bentham and Kant on the one hand, and Nietzsche 
and Freud on the other hand, suggests that pleasure replaced anger as the 
most disruptive passion in the context of punishment, and became suspicious 
and socially inappropriate. Both kinds of evidence, the eyewitness accounts 
and the philosophical arguments, point toward a transformed experience 
of pleasure on the part of the audience. The nature of that transformation 
remains to be determined. Existing approaches in social science shed little 
light on the transformation, or tend to think of it in terms of disappearance. 
While the audience’s pleasure may have persisted with an undiminished degree 
of satisfaction, despite new penal practices and the dislocations in social 
morality, ironically, some of the most influential accounts of the passage 
to modernity worked to efface pleasure, conceptually. The pleasure of pun-
ishment was first of all historicized. In the influential accounts given by 
Durkheim, Elias and Foucault, it was seen to be strictly confined to the early- 
modern period, when the enjoyment was shamelessly expressed at the scaffold. 
In the efforts, moreover, to understand how deeply punishment affected 
people in the audience, the enjoyment produced was tacitly assumed to be 
ephemeral. Given the prevailing problematic of subject formation, pleasure 
was redundant. In this chapter, I will discuss some key indicators, as well as 
available interpretations of the transformation during the nineteenth century. 
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In the order of appearance, they include the performance of early- modern 
execution crowds, the discussion on the passions of punishment by contem-
porary philosophers, followed by a critique of the historicization of pleasure 
in current social theory on punishment.
The disappearance of pleasure from public view
Early modern executions regularly presented ‘theatres of cruelty’ that were 
meticulously scripted and protracted in time (Evans 1996). The people had 
to watch – according to the principles of sovereign power. An audience of 
common people was required as part of the ritual, to enact and to confirm 
power of worldly and religious authorities (Foucault 1979). However, they 
also wanted to witness executions. Public executions were highly popular 
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The prospects of a hanging 
attracted spectators from all walks of life. In colonial America, ‘all kinds of 
people came to watch – old and young, rich and poor, white and black, male 
and female— in numbers that were enormous for the era’ (Banner 2002: 31). 
The popularity of public executions is undisputed, also in the context of 
pre- industrial Europe. In the larger cities, thousands of people were present, 
or even tens of thousands. To catch a glimpse of the events at the scaffold, 
spectators may have had to arrive hours in advance. Sometimes they had 
walked long distances. Most people, including those living on the countryside, 
had first- hand experience of executions. It has been estimated that an average 
person would witness at least one execution during their lifetime (Spierenburg 
1984). Religious authorities and government officials generally encouraged 
attendance. Yet presence was voluntary. How come that public executions 
were so tremendously popular?
Most historians highlight their festive character. There is a wealth of eye- 
witness reports from different countries which described a shared festive 
mood at the execution site. The visible signs of amusement were striking to 
contemporary observers. A young French diplomat testified to having been 
driven by curiosity to attend a Stockholm execution in 1635, and was slightly 
abhorred by the sacrilegious behaviour of the crowd. Two men convicted for 
theft were mercilessly dragged to the gallows by the executioner, all the while
a large crowd was gathering, and while no one expressed any sign of com-
passion / …/ On the contrary, our servants told us, who followed this sad 
spectacle closely, that the bystanders burst out laughing when one of the 
condemned struggled and made attempts to resist the ropes, as if  it was a 
comical farce they were watching.
(quoted in Sandén 2016 50).
Spectators started laughing as the hanging was imminent, and the French 
diplomat came to think of a comical farce. Similar observations were made 
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among the onlookers at a Tyburn execution in the mid- eighteenth century. 
It was ‘as if  the spectacle they had beheld had afforded pleasure’ (quoted 
in Gatrell 1994: 68). At the same site, Francis Grose, another British writer, 
described how ‘one of the most solemn and dreadful scenes imaginable’ were 
given ‘the appearance of a fair of merry- making’ (quoted in Gatrell 1994: 59).
The carnivalesque mix of humour and irreverence seems to have been 
to some extent culturally accepted at the scaffold. It was even ingrained in 
the use of language. The labouring class casually referred to executions as 
fairs  – ‘a hanging fair’ (Linebaugh 1975:  66). The ‘gallows humour’  – an 
expression which is still in use in several European languages – thrived. On 
an execution day, some people took time off  and looked forward to having 
a good time: eating, partying, and socializing. Some were dressed up, others 
were drunk. Contemporary analysis of the execution crowds often stressed 
the welcome escape from daily routine, blending everyday social needs with 
religious functions, chatting with friends and collecting relics from the dead 
(Gatrell 1994). Pickpockets and street vendors were busy. Expectation was 
in the air. To some extent, the outcome was uncertain. The prospects of last- 
minute pardons and other reversals made the event even more exciting. The 
condemned sometimes survived due to inept hangmen or technical malfunc-
tion, and stories were circulated about people who had fled the scene, after 
botched executions (Sarat 2014; Sandén 2016). The spectators were held in 
suspense, and their sympathies were unreliable. As has often been pointed 
out, the sympathies of the audience could go both ways. The priest’s man-
datory speech at the scaffoldprovided religious blessing but could also pro-
voke indecent comments from parts of the audience. The same people who 
sat silently in the churches during the Sunday sermons could taunt the priests 
at the execution sites.
The eyewitnesses were not always conscientious observers with a primary 
interest in finding out the truth of the matter, or even in giving a correct 
account. The French diplomat in Stockholm was standing too far away to 
actually see what happened, and relied on observations made by his servants. 
Some eyewitnesses, such as Samuel Richardson, were morally alienated and 
made a point of not understanding the reactions of the audience. After noting 
the mirth among the execution crowd, he added that it was incomprehensible. 
The pleasure did not make sense to him. Many accounts of the sentiments at 
executions sites appear to have been biased by social class, or by contempt 
for the plebeian composition of the crowds (McGowen 2000; Spierenburg 
1984). For this reason, the laughter, the cheering and other expressions of 
mundane pleasures may have been overemphasized. In addition, some of the 
eyewitnesses were outspoken opponents; they did not necessarily oppose cap-
ital punishment but were critical toward the practice of public executions. 
Charles Dickens was one of them. After attending a famous London hanging 
in 1840, with an estimated crowd of 30,000 people, he complained about 
seeing ‘nothing but ribaldry, debauchery, levity, drunkenness, and flaunting 
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a ground to end public gatherings around the gallows. On the other side of the 
Atlantic, when a Pennsylvanian parliamentarian committee in 1824 proposed 
to abolish public executions, it stressed the expressions of enjoyment. The 
spectators – the committee explained – were immune to the moral education 
on display and returned from the execution ‘evidently delighted’, as they just 
wanted to ‘be amused; to enjoy a day and season of mirth and indulgence’ 
(quoted in Banner 2002: 151). It was ultimately about legitimacy. The blend 
of public pleasure and plebeian composition of the crowd operated as part 
of an argument for reformed penal practices. In the same vein, the British 
Quaker J. J. Gurney reported seeing large crowds of people, of all ages and 
‘chiefly of the lower orders’, on their way to a hanging in 1816. While the exe-
cution was characterized as ‘the most dreadful and melancholy’ceremony, the 
congregated audience displayed ‘feelings of a pleasurable nature’ (quoted in 
McGowen 1986: 319).
In any discussion of the pleasure of punishment, the behaviour of the early- 
modern execution crowd tends to present itself  as a paradigmatic example. 
The images of cheerful mood, festivity, and debauchery are stark and pro-
vocative. The festive mood appears as one easily recognizable aspect of enjoy-
ment. Execution crowds and their behaviour have been a matter of scholarly 
controversy ever since the 1970s. How much of a popular carnival was it? 
Were people insensitive to the suffering of others? Was power confirmed, or 
was it challenged? The available evidence seems open to several interpret-
ations (Garland 2010; Spierenburg 1984; Laqueur 1989; Gatrell 1994; Burke 
2009). The expressed relationship between the audience and the authorities 
was complex. The emotional reactions were to some extent orchestrated, and 
to some extent drawn from the repertoire of popular culture. The mood of the 
crowd – festive, rowdy and possibly insubordinate – appeared to contradict 
the setting, which was solemn, religious and gruesome. As often noted, the 
‘base and disorderly popular pleasures’ threatened to rip the sacred aura from 
the ritual and turn it into its opposite – the profane (Smith 2008: 49). People 
could act irreverently in so many ways. Drunken and excited crowds turned 
capital punishment into the ‘shabbiest of rituals’, which ‘lurched chaotically 
between death and laughter’ (Laqueur 1989: 309). There was chanting, and 
obscenities were expressed straight into the air, and although these manners 
may have been frowned upon by middle- class observers, they were socially 
acceptable, or at least tolerated, in context. What started as a solemn ritual 
might end as a carnival of popular amusement – or it could stay a solemn 
ritual. The early- modern execution could be a space for defiance and for all 
sorts of enjoyment on the part of the audience. Above all, however, it was a 
venue for official power and politics (Gatrell 1994). The state controlled the 
judicial process. Whatever the crowd ended up doing, the entire event was 
staged by the authorities.
Taken together, the contemporary testimonies suggest that many executions 
were festive in some sense of the term. At the same time, they offer nothing 
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executions provided the people present with enjoyment. The testimonies pro-
vide little insights into the mechanisms involved, or the nature of the enjoy-
ment. What gave rise to the enjoyment? It is difficult in retrospect, also given 
the evidence, to know the nature of the spectator’s enjoyment, or the reasons 
why people turned out in such large numbers. Was it the anticipation of death 
by hanging, was it the prospect of having a day off, or was it the satisfac-
tion of other social needs and obligations that their presence also might have 
implied? Popular culture seems to have embraced a wide spectrum of postures 
stretching from rebellious to deferential, from debauchery to curiosity. In The 
Hanging Tree, V. A. C. Gatrell summarised the available evidence on British 
execution crowds by saying that ‘people steered a wavering course between 
tacitly ethical approval, sardonic and transgressive defiance, and mockery, 
sentimental anguish, or outright voyeurism’ (Gatrell 1994: 196). Executions 
were a venue for ballads, broadsheets, jokes and drinking, which allowed for a 
variety of sentiments and responses on the part of the congregated audience, 
many of which were readily interpreted as signs of enjoyment. Yet far from 
all executions were festive. Many were the direct opposite:  solemn official 
processions. In Germany, it has been argued, executions were tiresome, orderly 
and predictable until the beginning of the nineteenth century (Evans 1996).
During the nineteenth century, public expressions of penal excitement 
would become less common. The disappearance was a protracted process 
which extended well into the modern period. And it was always partial. There 
are many later examples of cheerfulness around the scaffold, from the mid- 
nineteenth century and onwards. For instance, in Owensboro, Kentucky, in 
1936, a partying execution crowd of ten thousand people gathered during 
the night before the hanging (Laqueur 1989), and in 1999, the enthusiastic 
public response following the release of post- mortem photographs of an 
electrocuted man in Florida caused web servers to crash (Lynch 2000; see also 
Pratt 2000). Ten years earlier, in the same state, large crowds of people had 
chanted ‘Burn, Bundy, Burn’ on the eve of the execution of an infamous serial 
killer. For natural reasons, as one of the few countries which have retained 
the death penalty until this day, the examples mainly stem from the United 
States. If  the concept of execution crowds is extended to cover extra- legal 
punishment, the range of examples multiplies. One can find reports of visible 
and audible signs of enthusiasm on the part of the audience from many pol-
itical contexts such as Jim Crow lynchings in the American south or punitive 
mobs in Fascist Italy, especially during transition periods, when the ordinary 
workings of the state apparatus were distrusted by dominant social groups 
(Pfeifer 2004; Matteo 2017). Hence, festive execution crowds cannot be said 
to have disappeared. But they have become significantly less frequent in the 
modern period. It does not follow that people in general have become any 
less prone to embrace state violence, excessive or not. The twentieth century 
was full of large- scale atrocities carried out by state officials and supported 
by large sections of the domestic public. Some of the atrocities were under-
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lines of punishments for acts of wrong- doing, by contemporaries. The mass 
executions of party officials, among many others, in the Stalinist Soviet Union 
of the 1930s tended to be understood as a mix of ideological necessity and 
punishment for ordinary offences, or treason (Sebag Montefiore 2004). The 
Nazi holocaust was driven by racially motivated goals to exterminate whole 
groups of people, enabled by the industrial organization of modern society, 
yet silenced in public contexts and mainly carried out in Poland, outside of 
Germany (Bauman 1989; Aly and Heim 2002). Diagnosing a general decrease 
in public expressions of enjoyment at the scenes of punishment must there-
fore come with certain qualifications. The frequency of public expressions of 
enjoyment cannot be used to support any Elian ideas of processes of civiliza-
tion which go beyond the thin ice of public surface. Instead, what the decrease 
can be taken to indicate is that the experience of Western spectators may have 
changed, compared to those of early- modern execution crowds. The enjoy-
ment was either privatized, as opposed to publicly shared with other people, 
or, if  the enjoyment was shared, which it was at times, the awareness of pro-
hibition would inevitably shape the experience.
The gradual disappearance of pleasure from public view was no doubt 
linked to the simultaneous disappearance of punishment from public view. 
Following the Enlightenment, public displays of cruelty were gradually 
abandoned (Spierenburg 1984; Garland 2010; Bessler 1997). Punishment 
moved indoors, and into the realm of cultural imaginary. An audience of 
eye- witnesses was no longer called for. While parents had regularly brought 
their children to watch hangings, as noted by a mid- eighteenth century visitor 
to London, to instil morality amongst other things, by the end of the cen-
tury punishment increasingly relied on ‘what remained unseen but imagined’ 
(Wilf  1993: 51). The shift to the unseen was a consequence of the large- scale 
transition from corporeal punishment to imprisonment. The prison- building 
schemes across Western countries and the subsequent reliance on custo-
dial forms of punishment meant that public venues disappeared, one after 
the other. By the end of the nineteenth century, there were few places to go, 
should you want to consume punishment in the company of others. In a short 
essay on the death penalty, Albert Camus described his father on one day 
shortly before the war in 1914. The father was enthusiastically looking for-
ward to the first execution of his life. He walked away thinking that the guil-
lotine was too mild a punishment, considering the crime, only to return home 
nauseated, lying down on the bed, suddenly starting to vomit. What actually 
happened that day, he kept for himself  (Camus 1988). The experience must be 
typically modern. On the rare occasion of a public execution, spectators were 
unaccustomed. There was no longer any execution culture, with broadsheets 
and ballads.
The disappearance of public expressions of pleasure was certainly 
influenced by the changing penal practices. Yet that was not the whole story. 
The prison might well have turned into a venue for shared, on- site enjoy-
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prisons should encourage, as well as be able to attract, spontaneous visitors. 
Jeremy Bentham, the British moral philosopher whose life coincided with the 
Enlightenment period, retained the idea that punishment should be open to 
the general public, and integrated it into the plans for the never realized model 
prison, Panopticon. The prison gates of Panopticon should be ‘thrown wide 
open to the body of the curious at large’ (Bentham 1843a: 46). Everybody 
would have access to the facilities, and curiosity and excitement were reasons 
to go. Bentham thought of the observation not only as the inspector’s duty 
to discipline the inmates but also as a ‘great and constant fund of entertain-
ment’ for the inspector, and for others. Looking through the blinders, it was 
suggested, could be attractive to the inspector’s family members. While not 
always terribly exciting, the observation of inmates would combine utility 
with pastime, and was judged superior to window watching in a town- house 
(Bentham 1843a). It was thus perfectly conceivable to reconcile prison cells 
and public enjoyment. Jeremy Bentham’s suggestion was further elaborated by 
Joshua Jebb, who designed Pentonville, one of the very first modern prisons. 
Jebb envisioned that the prison would attract well- dressed visitors, strolling 
and conversing in the prison halls, reminiscent of a contemporary shopping 
mall (Smith 2008). The plans for public prisons had been drawn. But this 
particular aspect was never to be realized. Panopticon- like prisons were built, 
such as Pentonville, but they would never provide a ‘great and constant fund 
of entertainment’ for families. The prison would not be opened to the public. 
Its doors have remained closed until today, and straightforward reactions 
from the audience were effectively prevented on the scenes of punishment.
Pleasure becomes problematic
With the birth of the prison, visible expressions of enjoyment were designed 
out of penal practice. But the gradual disappearance of pleasure from public 
view also indicated a more fundamental transformation of the audience’s 
experiences. The pleasure of punishment did not go away, but was rendered 
problematic. It was problematic in the sense of being socially inappropriate. 
There was moreover a growing unease about its potential consequences. 
Pleasure had become suspicious, and might in the context of punishment even 
be inherently dangerous. In itself  this was nothing altogether new; in a longer 
historical perspective, stretching back to ancient Greece, the pleasure of pun-
ishment had recurrently been treated as problematic. But it had always been 
considered less problematic than anger. What happened during the nineteenth 
century was that pleasure replaced anger as the most disruptive passion. The 
change was captured first by Nietzsche and then, more systematically, in 
Freudian psychoanalysis. The scale of change can be appreciated if  the views 
of Nietzsche and Freud are compared to those of Kant and Bentham, one 
hundred years earlier.
Immanuel Kant and Jeremy Bentham represented different perspectives 
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rule- based, and the other utilitarian. Yet they shared a common ambition to 
stifle excessive punishment and make penal practices at the time, at the end 
of the eighteenth century, more rational and more legitimate. In this context, 
in their endeavour to rationalize punishment, pleasure was seen as harmless, 
or innocent, whereas anger was considered volatile and potentially disruptive. 
I have chosen two excerpts, one from each of them, to illustrate their views 
on the passions of punishment. In Bentham’s case, pleasure in the context of 
punishment was generally commendable. In Principles of Penal Law, a text 
that was published in 1830 but probably dated back to the mid- 1770s (Bedau 
2004), he argued that the pleasure of vengeance was a positive force, useful in 
social life and vital for law enforcement.
Produced without expense, … it is an enjoyment to be cultivated as well 
as any other; for the pleasure of vengeance, considered abstractly, is, like 
every other pleasure, only good in itself  … Useful to the individual, this 
motive is also useful to the public, or, to speak more correctly, necessary. … 
Take away this spring, the machinery of the laws will no longer move.
(Bentham 1843b: 383)
While anger and private vengeance had to be managed and phased out, the 
pleasure of vengeance was characterized in positive terms: as innocent (‘an 
enjoyment to be cultivated as well as any other’), as inherently valuable (‘only 
good in itself ’), as generally beneficial (‘useful to the public’), and as neces-
sary for prosecution (without this pleasure, ‘the machinery of the laws will 
no longer move’). Bentham was aware that the positive valuation could be 
controversial. He mentioned that other moral philosophers disagreed with 
his position, yet he did so only in a general manner, without engaging with 
their arguments in detail. He was confident; the pleasure of punishment was 
commendable on a number of accounts. There was only one qualification: it 
is commendable only if  the executed punishment is legitimate. The pleasure 
is ‘innocent so long as it is confined within the limits of the laws’ (Bentham 
1843b: 383). Should the punishment be contrary to the law, the corresponding 
pleasure became illegitimate. Although this was a significant reservation, 
penal pleasure was on the whole embraced.
In this respect, Bentham was a good representative of  the ‘new 
Epicureanism’ in the eighteenth century. Pleasure was seen as legitimate, 
or innocent regardless of  source, by many of  his contemporaries. Whether 
stemming from eating, riches or punishment, pleasure was good (Kavanagh 
2010). The eighteenth century meant that pleasure was freed from religious 
restrictions. Earlier conceptions had been embedded in a religious cos-
mology, often branded as ‘worldly’ and tangled up in Christian accounts 
of  sin (Porter 1996). Christian dogmas could encourage excessive punish-
ment, yet prohibited indulgence in the pain of  others. Bentham’s endorse-
ment of  the pleasure of  punishment stood out compared to Medieval and 
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Summa Theologica, the default stance was that the pleasure of  punishment 
was wrong. It was sinful to take pleasure in the imposition of  pain on others, 
also as a spectator. Centuries later, at the beginning of  the early- modern 
period, Hobbes would reiterate the same prohibition in one of  his arguments 
against vengeance. Vengeance was detrimental because it involved ‘glorying 
in the hurt of  another’ (Hobbes 1996:  101). Vengeance was wrong partly 
due to the illicit character of  the accompanying pleasure. Bentham, on the 
other hand, was less hesitant in his embrace of  the pleasure. Influenced by 
utilitarian principles of  good and evil rather than religious notions of  sin, he 
valued pleasure irrespective of  source. On the single condition that the pun-
ishment being exacted was not excessive, pleasure was legitimate. Bentham’s 
positions on the pleasure of  punishment stood out also with respect to later 
approaches, as pleasure was not tainted by transgression. There was no 
assumed connection to excess. The enjoyment was thought of  as an innocent 
pastime, rather than as an insatiable lust.
The transgressive dynamics of punishment has been a constant con-
cern within Western culture, and the eighteenth century was no exception. 
But if  punishment was excessive, it was not because of pleasure. Excess was 
associated with anger, rather than with pleasure. In Anthropology from a 
Pragmatic Point of View, published in 1798, Kant continued the tradition of 
adopting a dual approach to vengeance, based on the close affiliation between 
anger and justice. Anger was partly legitimate, reflecting the ancient notion of 
righteous indignation, generated by experiences of injustice. In this capacity, 
the desire for vengeance was not only deeply rooted in human nature and 
social order but also closely affiliated to the desire for justice, which followed 
the dictates of reason. At the same time, Kant described the desire for ven-
geance in opposite terms – as highly and unambiguously disruptive.
The desire for vengeance is one of the most violent and deeply rooted 
passions; even when it seems to have disappeared, a secret hatred, called 
rancor, is always left over, like a fire smoldering under the ashes / …/ It 
transforms the desire for justice against the offender into the passion for 
retaliation, which is often violent to the point of madness.
(Kant 2006: 170f)
Vengeful anger was a kind of unlimited hatred, which corrupted the desire for 
justice, and threatened to thwart punishment in relation to the offence. The 
desire for justice was transformed and became excessively violent. Kant thus 
considered anger to be a highly disruptive passion, like so many others before 
him, while pleasure was innocent, and moreover of little consequence.
A century later, Friedrich Nietzsche treated pleasure as a naturally dis-
ruptive element, and paid less attention to anger. The destabilizing motion 
toward excess, which seems to be inherent in almost any account of punish-
ment, was wholeheartedly attributed to pleasure. If  punishment transgressed 
beyond the boundaries of reason and legality, it was not because of vengeful 
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passions, such as uncontrolled anger, but because of unrestrained pleasure, 
and untempered desire. Nietzsche called attention to the presumed pleasures 
of cruelty. He started elaborating the notion of ‘pleasure of cruelty’ in the 
Birth of Tragedy, his very first work. It was also the book which inaugurated 
the modern study of Dionysus, the ancient Greek deity. Dionysus was the 
god of many things: wine, music, excess, loss of self, senseless violence, fer-
tility, suffering and self- affirmation. Nietzsche foregrounded the internal 
dynamics involved. What had earlier been attributed to a transcendent deity – 
unbounded enjoyment and violence  – was now transferred to the psychic 
interior of individuals (Heinrichs 1984). In the Birth of Tragedy, the Dionysic 
was an aspect of human experience; the ‘horrible “witches’ brew” of sensu-
ality and cruelty’ (Nietzsche 1967: 40). Similar remarks can be found scattered 
in other works. The pleasure of cruelty was a consistent theme in his oeuvre. 
In Daybreak, he described ‘an unspeakable happiness at the sight of torment’ 
(§113; emphasis in original). It was a collectively shared experience, associated 
with liberation and celebration.
In the act of cruelty the community refreshes itself  and for once throws 
off  the gloom of constant fear and caution. Cruelty is one of the oldest 
festive joys of mankind.
(Nietzsche 1997: § 18)
The recollections of ancient Bacchic cults, as they had been passed down, 
were one important point of reference. In that context, cruelty performed reli-
gious rather than punitive functions. There are plenty of reasons to doubt the 
idea of unrestrained pleasure in earlier times, and one should therefore stress 
that Dionysus was primarily an analytical principle to Nietzsche (Heinrichs 
1984). In his later work, above all in the second essay of the Genealogy of 
Morals, the pleasure of cruelty was discussed in conjunction with punish-
ment, and particularly with transgressive punishment. The shift of emphasis 
meant that the violence could not be wholly arbitrary, or imposed on tran-
scendent grounds, but was tied to a specific action, which might have triggered 
the acts of cruelty. Punishment, for Nietzsche, was necessary to shape subjects 
who were reliable and acted in accordance with social norms. Yet the close 
link to celebration was maintained. There was no real party without cruelty, 
Nietzsche said, followed by the exclamation that ‘there is so much festive in 
punishment’ (Nietzsche 1989: II §6; emphasis in original). The aspect of excess 
was understood independently of the original violation. Instead, cruelty was 
driven by an internal dynamic. When punishment was transgressive, pleasure 
was generated in the process, for everybody who took part, and that pleasure 
was the driving force.
Nietzsche is generally seen to celebrate the pleasure of cruelty, and to some 
extent that may be true. But a closer reading of the scattered notes on the 
subject reveals that he articulated the contemporary sentiment that pleasure 
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of unrestrained pleasure. He was not talking about his own times. In the 
Genealogy of Morals, the references dated back to the Middle Ages, or even 
further back, and writers such as Cervantes, Dante and Aquinas were invoked. 
It is a circumstance often overlooked. The époques of unrestrained pleasure 
were over – which explained the ‘bitter taste’ left upon reading Cervantes’s 
novel Don Quixote (Nietzsche 1989: II §6). The reference to bitter taste was a 
far cry from pleasure. Although Nietzsche did not specify the exact passages 
in Don Quixote, there is a torture scene in the book where the duke and the 
duchess are not present but according to one interpretation ‘derive all neces-
sary pleasure from the account that is given them later’ (Nabokov 1983: 71). 
Nietzsche suggested that contemporary readers found it be ‘the funniest of 
books’ and would ‘nearly laugh themselves to death’ whereas late nineteenth- 
century readers found torture scenes hard to digest (Nietzsche 1989: II §6). 
The argument was that people still enjoyed punishment while being unable to 
express it. Speaking about cruelty as ‘one of the oldest festive joys of man-
kind’, he sensed that something had changed – a certain cultural refinement 
was required – and hastened to add: ‘Do you think all this has altered and that 
mankind must therefore have changed its character?’ (Nietzsche 1997: §18). 
To his mind, the times had changed but not people.
Nietzsche may have been an astute observer of the modern condition; an 
excellent guide, if  read as an observer of his own age, rather than as a com-
mentary on earlier historical phases, or on an immutable human nature. He 
articulated what I take to be a more widely spread sentiment: that pleasure 
in the context of punishment had become problematic – more illicit, more 
disruptive and more shameful – in post- Enlightenment Germany. A cultural 
taboo unsettled the enjoyment. It was a matter of acknowledging the dis-
ruptive qualities of pleasure at a specific point in time. In earlier époques, 
‘when mankind felt no shame towards its cruelty’, people could indulge in the 
intense excitement they experienced as spectators. It could be expressed in the 
company of others, in public and without shame. In the contemporary con-
text, the pleasure of cruelty was not extinguished – it was still experienced by 
the audience. After all, he insisted, it was sincerely festive and mankind had 
not changed. But this pleasure required ‘some kind of sublimation’; it had to 
be rendered harmless and inoffensive (Nietzsche 1989:  II §7). The pleasure 
in cruelty was transformed into the imaginary and refashioned as compas-
sion. Contemporary notions of tragic pity represented such an adaptation. 
Nietzsche did not explicitly discuss contemporary penal practices, and – since 
public executions were abolished in Germany in the mid- nineteenth century 
(Evans 1996)  – he may have had little first- hand experience of the behav-
iour of execution crowds. Yet the same line of reasoning can be applied to 
public executions. The excitement over the suffering being witnessed at the 
scaffold came to be considered base or inappropriate and had to be turned 
into a refined indignation over suffering. The transformation was necessary. 
Within the perimeters of social morality, the enjoyment had to be sublimated. 
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while compassion came across as the opposite of the pleasure in cruelty, in 
reality it was merely the socially commendable outlet of the same kind of 
excitement.
Sublimation involved the internalization of social prohibition. Nietzsche 
used the concept in the second essay of the Genealogy with respect to pun-
ishment and to the intense excitement designated as the ‘pleasure in cruelty’. 
Several commentators have noted the similarities between Nietzsche’s and 
Freud’s views on sublimation, in particular with respect to its root causes 
in repression, effected by contemporary social norms (Gemes 2009; Phillips 
2015). To Freud, sublimation was one of several responses to prohibition, 
or the fact that certain kinds of pleasure were illicit. In his interpretation, 
sublimation operated at the level of desire. It involved a displacement of 
the object of desire, when the original drive could not be expressed without 
encountering blame and censure. Forbidden desires were diverted, and given 
an alternative direction due to the internalized social morality (Freud 1931; 
Civitarese 2016). The prime example was the sublimation of sexual desire into 
artistic creativity. In an essay on the childhood memories of Leonardo da 
Vinci, Freud described how sexual desires could escape repression by being 
sublimated into scientific curiosity. Forbidden desires, such as the sexual 
attraction to his mother and, later in life, da Vinci’s desire to have sex with 
men, were transformed into a powerful and socially commendable urge 
to know and to create exceptional works of art (Freud 1919). Just like in 
Nietzsche’s approach to the pleasure of cruelty, the guiding idea was that the 
enjoyment was made consonant with the fin de siècle social morality, through 
a transformation effectuated by its prohibitions.
What was harmless became disruptive and dangerous over the course of 
the nineteenth century. Pleasure assumed formidable as well as shameful 
connotations that were foreign to eighteenth- century understanding 
(Kavanagh 2010). In the following century, anger stopped being the main con-
cern in philosophical treatises on punishment. Nietzsche articulated pleasure 
as a problem in relationship to punishment. His treatment of the passions of 
punishment was in stark contrast to Jeremy Bentham, and other eighteenth- 
century writers such as Immanuel Kant and Edmund Burke, to whom 
pleasure was morally unproblematic in this context. For reasons that remain 
to be elucidated, Nietzsche might even be seen to represent a decisive turn in 
the Western discussion of passion and punishment. Since antiquity, passion 
was seen to undermine the legitimacy of punishment, as a pillar of social 
order, and in the long history of efforts to cleanse punishment from passion, 
to be discussed in the next chapter, excess was above all associated with unre-
strained anger, or anger of the wrong kind. Pleasure had been present for the 
most part of this history, although rarely occupying a central spot. Instead, 
the problematic passion had been anger – anger, or emotions related to anger, 
such as hatred and righteous indignation. Anger was seen to be the most dis-
ruptive emotion, far more dangerous than pleasure. Pleasure presented all 
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undermine the institution from within. It was liable to escape the moderation 
of reason and instigate excessive punishment, which threatened existing pol-
itical orders. During the nineteenth century, the focus shifted from anger to 
pleasure. The suspicion of subversion came to be directed towards pleasure.
Its complex and volatile features were later elaborated by Sigmund Freud 
beyond the specific context of punishment. With Freud, pleasure became a 
general problem (Schuster 2016). Psychoanalysis was born with the modern 
problem of pleasure: the combination of private enjoyment and public dis-
avowal. It was originally articulated in terms of repression, a concept which 
Freud started elaborating in the 1890s (Brenner 1957). Repression meant 
that every individual felt compelled to curb drives that were associated with 
illicit pleasure, for instance in the domain of sexuality, or punishment. The 
experience of compulsion was rooted in social morality. Certain kinds of 
enjoyment were being suppressed to protect the well- being of all members 
of society, while at the same time generating inner tension, as the drives 
were unable to find satisfaction, and were instead manifested in guilt, shame 
and issues of mental health. The process of repression was never complete, 
and the drives would remain operative and continued to undermine the 
instituted order (Freud 1931; 1955). From this perspective, the pleasure of 
punishment was one kind of illicit pleasure, which was necessarily repressed. 
While gradually disappearing from public view, the excitement turned pri-
vate and was accompanied by shame and public disavowal. Private shame 
replaced public display, and the constant suspicion of trouble, associated with 
passions generally speaking, as opposed to reason, was crystallized around a 
new object. Pleasure was no longer innocent, ‘an enjoyment to be cultivated 
as well as any other’, as Bentham had argued one hundred years earlier. It was 
suspicious, disruptive and repressed.
Making pleasure disappear: historicization and conceptual 
irrelevance
Just like pain seemed to disappear from punishment when the prison 
cell replaced the gallows, and the pain was no longer tangible, or readily 
observable – there were no limbs broken, no blood, no audible cries and no 
visible agony – so did pleasure appear to vanish from punishment with the 
gradual disappearance of public displays, since it was no longer immediately 
observable, in the form of laughter, chanting, cheering, or excited crowds. But 
as indicated by Nietzsche and Freud, pleasure did not disappear, no more than 
the pain of punishment went away. Instead, it changed character due to pro-
hibition. Processes more encompassing than the increasingly secluded char-
acter of penal practices were in motion, which forced pleasure underground, 
or prevented it from being expressed in public. The nineteenth century saw 
wider changes in the social organization of emotional reactions, according 
to a widely shared assumption. Friedrich Nietzsche, Sigmund Freud, Èmile 
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other aspects were miles apart  – all converge in the view that something 
happened with the passage to modernity that fundamentally changed the 
conditions for the audience’s experience of pleasure.
The transformation of  punishment during the Enlightenment period has 
been extensively explored, as well as source of  much controversy (Foucault 
1979; Ignatieff  1978; Laqueur 1989; Melossi and Pavarini 1981; Rusche 
and Kirchheimer 1939; Spierenburg 1984; 1991). The transition from exe-
cution to imprisonment, the prevalence of  riots, and the change away from 
public display have been central themes in a scholarly discussion, which at 
the time  – the 1970s and the 1980s  – involved much disagreement but, in 
retrospect, above all much historical evidence on punishment in practice. The 
protracted and partial disappearance of  public excitement has been noticed 
in passing, taken for granted rather than studied in its own right. Embedded 
in some of  the most influential accounts of  the transformation was an idea 
of  historical progress; or rather, to avoid the normative connotations of  ‘pro-
gress’: a historicization of  the pleasure of  punishment, according to which 
it flourished in pre- modern times, only to gradually disappear from the 
public scene with the passage to modernity. Elias (2012), Durkheim (1997) 
and Foucault (1979) historicized pleasure in a particular way: The pleasure 
of punishment was prolific throughout the early- modern period. Pleasure was 
shamelessly expressed at the scaffold. After that, it went away, or became 
much more infrequent. Guided by very different concerns, Elias, Durkheim 
and Foucault can nevertheless be seen to subscribe to this common base- 
line story. They all used the early- modern period to describe a process in 
which the gradual disappearance of  visible signs of  enjoyment at the scenes 
of  punishment indicated a diminishing role of  passions at the level of  indi-
vidual experience. To Elias, the gradual disappearance of  public enjoyment 
was a sign of  increased self- control and changing sensibilities; to Durkheim, 
it signalled changes in social morality and the tempering role of  the criminal 
justice system; and to Foucault, it indicated a sanitized and scientific deploy-
ment of  power along with the corresponding, normalized subjectivities. As 
can be reconstructed from their main works, the three authors focused on 
different drivers, or aspects of  the process. But the end result was the same 
with respect to the spectators’ experience: there was less space for passion.
 1. Norbert Elias argued that the enjoyment of cruelty used to be widespread 
and culturally accepted. Pre- modern societies were governed by unregu-
lated consumption of cruelty and lack of empathy; ‘the pleasure in killing 
and torturing others was great, and it was a socially permitted pleasure’ 
(Elias 2012: 189). With the passage to modernity, on the other hand, such 
overt expressions were less frequent and no longer socially permitted. 
The approach foregrounded the social organization of emotions:  how 
people were supposed to feel and behave when exposed to cruelty and 
pain. It was not altogether clear if  pleasure, in addition, was taken to 
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the experience – ‘the pleasure in killing and torturing others was great’ – 
and about its social organization: ‘it was a socially permitted pleasure’. 
The first part implied that the experience of pleasure had diminished 
at the level of individual experience: the audience ceased to draw satisfac-
tion from cruelty, or acts of punishment. The second part suggested that 
the partial disappearance of overt expressions was a matter of changing 
social norms. In the second half  of the nineteenth century, public displays 
of enjoyment were less socially accepted, or even tabooed, in relation to 
punishment, but also more generally. Elias thought of the disappearance 
as an integral part of the civilizing process. On this reading, all public 
displays of pleasure became more infrequent. ‘Outbreaks of strong com-
munal excitement’ were less frequent (Elias and Dunning 2008: 44), as 
a result of stricter emotional control and changing cultural sensibilities. 
The shifting cultural sensibilities had a moderating effect on immediate 
expressions of enjoyment  – in the consumption of punishment, or in 
other contexts.
 2. ‘Nowadays’, Durkheim wrote at the turn to the twentieth century, ‘it is said 
that punishment has changed’, away from vengeful passions, to be firmly 
anchored in the state and in ‘well premeditated foresight’ (Durkheim 
1997: 44f). But despite appearances to the contrary, passion was still the 
motor force of punishment. Interestingly, pleasure was not mentioned 
among the relevant passions. For Durkheim, punishment was above all 
an emotional reaction, which reinforced popular sentiments and a pool of 
shared values. He used the notion of collective consciousness (conscience 
collective) to refer to a bedrock of values, beliefs and sentiments, which 
permeated any given society: a social morality which remained tacit on a 
daily basis, but was expressed – and came to be known by the members 
of the society – through punishment (Durkheim 1997; Garland 1990). 
With the passage to modernity, vengeful passions remained the key driver, 
yet lost part of their earlier force. The ‘lively emotion’, the ‘sudden explo-
sion’ and the ‘outrage’ had been replaced by emotions that were ‘calmer 
and more reflective’ (Durkheim 1984: 130). Apart from the moderation 
of anger, there was the emerging element of compassion for the punished 
offender and the growing concern for human dignity. Beyond changes in 
social morality, Durkheim stressed the importance of the development of 
a criminal justice system. While vengeful passions reigned more freely in 
pre- modern societies, modern societies had tempered the collective moral 
outrage in the institutions of criminal justice, by claiming monopoly 
on the legitimate exercise of violence, in a language of universal rights 
and impartiality. The vengeful emotions were transferred to the state, 
given a culturally approvable outlet, and helped, moreover, to socialize 
the audience, the ‘honest people’ for whose sake it was all done, not so 
much through deterrence, but by recreating a shared social world which 
provided guidance and emotional attachment for individual members of 
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 3. In the first part of Discipline and Punish, Foucault was attentive to 
public expressions of enjoyment, and described how early- modern 
executions could evolve into carnivalesque events ‘in which rules were 
inverted, authority mocked and criminals transformed into heroes’ 
(Foucault 1979: 61). All such popular expressions of excitement would 
disappear during the nineteenth century when public rituals of display 
were replaced by punitive techniques that were targeted at individuals 
in closed settings, far from public view. Foucault thus inscribed the dis-
appearance of public passion in the general transformation of power. In 
the modern period, there was no such thing as collective expressions of 
pleasure. What happened was that penal practices went from being pri-
marily repressive to primarily productive, which meant that mechanisms 
became technical, scientific and hidden in specialized institutions, where 
expectations and control singled out the individual from the collective 
(Hörnqvist 2010). Punishment was sanitized, hidden from public view, 
no longer relying on display and excess, but on social norms and science. 
The role of pleasure was acknowledged at the margins. In interviews from 
the same time period as Discipline and Punish, Foucault could state that 
power ‘induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse’ (Foucault 
1980: 119). But in sharp contrast to the abundant focus on discourse and 
knowledge, as preeminent products of power, he never elaborated on the 
relationship between pleasure and power. Pleasure was a peculiar side- 
effect of power, and its role, if  it had one, was reduced to rewarding indi-
vidual compliance with the prescribed programmes, or with prevailing 
relationships of power.
Thus, along different lines of reasoning, Elias, Durkheim and Foucault all 
historicized pleasure and located it in a distant past. Public signs of excite-
ment were projected into premodern Europe and worked to support the thesis 
of a radical break with the passage to modernity. The supposedly widespread 
enjoyment of public displays of cruelty dramatized the difference between 
a previous stage and the modern condition, whether conceptualized as self- 
control and refined manners (Elias), as institutionally channelled moral out-
rage (Durkheim) or as subtle techniques of power to increase productivity 
(Foucault). As a consequence, the pleasure of punishment was effectively 
historicized. It was tacitly associated with the public expressions of rowdy 
amusement and debauchery, or, alternatively – if  the executions proceeded 
in an orderly fashion – with the sublime experience of terror, during a couple 
of centuries in European history. The silence on pleasure in modern contexts 
was conspicuous. There was little trace of Nietzsche’s and Freud’s sense that 
pleasure had become problematic and more disruptive with the passage to 
modernity. One might find points of commonalities with the positions of 
Nietzsche and Freud, above all with respect to the repression and the sublim-
ation of modern pleasure. But none of them – Elias, Durkheim and Foucault – 
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It was not simply a matter of unchallenged assumptions of historical pro-
gress. What ultimately decided whether pleasure was on, or off, the research 
agenda of social science was the particular set of concerns, according to which 
some things were worth investigating further. Given the problematic of desire, 
it is all about pleasure; how desire transforms into satisfaction, and back 
again into desire. Within a different and more influential paradigm in social 
science, however, pleasure is redundant. Given the problematic of subject for-
mation, what needed to be understood was the complex relationship between 
punishment and subjection, not the everyday dialectics of desire. The prob-
lematic was tied up with the idea that punishment affects us in a more pro-
found way than we like to believe. It was a question about what punishment 
does to us – to our identities or our subjectivities. The question goes back to 
Nietzsche, who originally advanced the idea that punishment makes us who 
we are. Through punishment, he argued, people were made reliable, equipped 
with a conscience and fit to enter into social agreements. Punishment was 
central for the ability to hold promises; ‘to breed an animal with the preroga-
tive to promise’, (Nietzsche 1989: II § 1; emphasis in original). On Nietzsche’s 
reading, pain was the effective mechanism. It had to hurt because only what 
hurts was remembered, and people easily forgot. ‘The harshness of the penal 
law’ indicated the trouble it took to conquer forgetfulness (II §3). People were 
subjugated into accountability, slowly moulded and made predictable through 
painful interventions. Punishment was not the only instrument, according to 
Nietzsche, as political tyranny and the morality of customs worked in the 
same direction, to constitute useful subjects.
Punishment was a clear- cut instantiation of  power, as it relied on pain, 
approached individuals as an exterior force, which compelled them to do 
things against their will, and in addition symbolically manifested the futility 
of  their attempts to resist. After 1970, Michel Foucault picked up the same 
theme of  subject formation, while reframing the relationship in terms of 
productivity (Foucault 1998). The individual was not an independent entity, 
later subdued by exterior forces, in the process of  manifesting their super-
iority. Instead, the individual was ‘one of  power’s first effects’ (Foucault 
2003: 30). That was the deeper meaning of  the famous reference in Discipline 
and punish to ‘the soul’ as the object of  punishment. The productivity of 
punishment was epitomized by the birth of  the prison, on the threshold to 
modernity. The prison embodied a discipline which subverted the level of 
conscious decision, evident in the precedence it gives to ‘punishments that 
are  exercise – intensified, multiplied forms of  training’ (Foucault 1979: 179). 
In this way, actions were made consonant with prevailing power structures, 
inside Western prisons, as well as in other social institutions. Individual 
behaviour was exposed to essentially the same kind of  power across the 
social body, thereby dissolving the sharp distinction between prisoner and 
audience. On this analysis, power was exercised with rather than over against 
people, making them want what they wanted, and achieve what they wanted. 
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the realm of desire: what we wish and who we think we are. In the decades 
following Foucault’s death in 1984, subject- formation would become the 
mainstream approach to the productivity of  power. The consequences at 
the level of  subjectivity were central. The governmentality literature, which 
took its name from a re- discovered lecture held by Michel Foucault in 1979, 
paid attention to issues of  personal identity; ‘what forms of  person, self  and 
identity’ were constructed (Dean 1999: 32; Rose and Miller 1992; O’Malley 
2004). The idea of  a socially constituted desire was defined in opposition to 
a natural desire. Judith Butler (1997), paradigmatically, said ‘if, following 
Foucault, we understand power as forming the subject as well, as providing 
the very condition of  its existence and the trajectory of  its desire, then power 
is not simply what we oppose but also, in a strong sense, what we depend on 
for our existence and what we harbor and preserve in the beings that we are’ 
(Butler 1997: 2). Analytically, the key concern was to find out how desire had 
been shaped historically, through discourses and struggles. Once constituted, 
however, people were essentially hard- wired to existing relationships of 
power through their desire. Consciously alluding to both meanings of  the 
word ‘subject’ in French and English, they were referred to as ‘subjects of 
desire’ (Butler 1987).
In the late- modern prison, productivity equalled subject formation; 
interventions were seen to be ‘a primary means of creating accountable and 
thus governable and obedient citizens’ (Bosworth 2007: 68). Transformations 
of power, associated with neoliberal governance, came to expression in a 
condensed form within the prison. The research objective was to look behind 
the rhetoric of the law- abiding citizen and discover a manifold of attempts ‘to 
breed an animal with the prerogative to promise’. There was a diagnosed shift 
from ‘discipline’ – the production of reliable subjects within institutions – to 
‘technologies of citizenship’ through which individuals transformed them-
selves into better citizens, inside as well as outside of institutions (Foucault 
1997; Cruikshank 1999). In an awkward way, the Foucauldian approach 
mirrored the stated ambition of the rehabilitation programmes employed 
in many if  not most Western prisons. According to the official policy, the 
average prisoner had to be remodelled, according to ideas on social skills and 
anger management, which reflected labour market needs in the lower tiers 
of the service sector at the time (Hörnqvist 2010). To what extent subjects 
were in fact reconstituted was a matter of discussion. From one perspective, 
the prison appeared as a site for the production of wage labour, educating 
for the labour market opportunities awaiting inmates upon release. The pro-
ductive techniques would compensate for the failure of previous attempts of 
subject formation within other institutions such as the family or the school. 
From a different perspective, the prison was a showroom intended for an out-
side audience: an ideological projection of an ordered microcosm of obedient 
wage labourers into the perceived chaos of unemployment and crimin-
ality (Hörnqvist 2008; 2013). Pleasure was analytically peripheral on both 
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through penal techniques, as opposed to how punishment operated in the gap 
between desire and satisfaction.
Although mostly associated with the Foucauldian tradition, the prob-
lematic of subject formation dictated research also beyond that tradition, as 
Durkheim’s insight that the spectators were the central  figure – punishment 
mainly exerts ‘its effect upon honest people’ (Durkheim 1997: 63) – came full 
circle, with the cultural turn, starting in the 1990s. Cultural representations, 
rather than organizational programmes and professional discourses, were 
considered to be the matter out of which subjects were moulded. If  the impact 
on the audience was at best peripheral in Foucauldian approaches, in this 
context, it was crucial from the outset in a neo- Durkheimian context. The 
central assumption was that the vast majority come to know about punish-
ment through consumption of popular culture. The audience was barred 
from the prison, except as visitors to friends and next of kin, and few people 
build their notions of contemporary punishments on first- hand experiences. 
Hence, the consumption of punishment migrated into popular culture. 
Punishment was no less present in everyday life. But it was enjoyed privately. 
Starting with Edgar Allen Poe and the Gothic literature (Smith 2009), enjoy-
ment of punishment would predominantly take place in private. Punishment 
was consumed privately, comfortably on the sofa with a crime novel, by 
playing prison management games on the computer, watching documentaries 
on police brutality, or TV shows on prison gangs, or anyway vastly removed 
from the grim realities of punishment. Michelle Brown used the term ‘penal 
spectator’ to account for the audience’s complicity, and raised the question 
what punishment does to us, at the level of emotions and self- conceptions. We 
must understand ‘what kinds of subjectivities develop’ as ordinary citizens 
consume punishment through popular culture (Brown 2009: 5). In a similar 
vein, Austin Sarat, picking up on Nietzsche’s claims in the Genealogy, argued 
that cultural representations of capital punishment, for instance in popular 
films such as Dead Man Walking, not only shaped our conception of the 
death penalty but also contributed to the constitution of the modern, respon-
sible subject (Sarat 1999; 2001). Embedded in both accounts was the concern 
that widespread cultural exposure to punishment produces a certain moral 
insensitivity on the part of the audience. Inadvertently, we learn to accept 
cruelty as part of the basic fabric of society. Punishment may thus affect 
our moral character, as well as other aspects of self- images or subjectivities. 
Once again, however, given the problematic of subject formation, there was 
little space for pleasure as an experience in everyday life, or how punishment 
operates in the gap between desire and satisfaction.
The consequences were wide- ranging in terms of scholarly lack of interest. 
There is a body of work in psychoanalysis (Freud 1955; Lacan 1992) and 
cultural theory (Žižek 1994; Eagleton 2005) which asserts that there is a 
persisting link between pleasure and the consumption of pain. The spectators’ 
enjoyment, before as well as after the abolition of public executions, has 
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(Carrabine 2012; Hörnqvist 2013; Carvalho and Chamberlen 2018; Garland 
1990). But the theme did not fit squarely into the shared historicization of 
pleasure, associated with Elias, Durkheim and Foucault, and has received 
limited attention in research on modern punishment. If  it was not effectively 
historicized, it was treated as an obscure side- effect of power, associated with 
psychoanalytic insights into the irrational depths of the human psyche. While 
acutely attentive to pain, and meticulously tracking the transformation of 
pain within the modern institutions of punishment, from Sykes (1958) over 
Christie (1981) to Crewe (2011), social theory on modern punishment has 
not investigated pleasure, or the way in which punishment operates in the gap 
between desire and satisfaction.
The disappearance of pleasure in social theory may have been paradig-
matic in the narrow sense: an effect of concerns and interests being located 
elsewhere, as opposed to the result of elaborate lines of reasoning, specifically 
to deny or to diminish the experience. At the same time, there is a long trad-
ition of philosophical argumentation, starting in Ancient Greece, that was 
acutely aware of the passions associated with punishment and for this reason 
sought to erase them. The arguments of Kant and Bentham, briefly discussed 
in this chapter, as well as those of Aquinas, were part of that tradition. The 
passions were seen to be ever- present, threatening to undermine punishment 
from within:  hence, the objective to purge punishment from passions, and 
make it rational. The distinction between punishment and vengeance was one 
central topic which drew on the more general opposition between reason and 
passion. Institutional developments, the slow monopolization of punishment 
by the state, the gradual evolution of an apparatus of criminal justice, and, 
in the nineteenth century, the invention of modern police forces and peni-
tentiary systems staffed by officials incorporating the ethos of legality, fur-
ther served to erase passions from punishment. The attempts culminated in 
the establishment of a concept of punishment in the mid- twentieth century, 
which focused strictly on the rule- based imposition of pain and avoided any 
mention of passions. Rational punishment finally seemed to be separated from 
impassionate vengeance. Yet it was a futile endeavour.  The next chapter traces 
the impossible flight from passion which led to the modern understanding of 
punishment while retrieving what was left behind: the dimension of passion, 
excess, and social morality.
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2  The impossible flight from passion
The modern concept of punishment was captured by H. L. A. Hart in his 
presidential address before the Aristotelian Society in October 1959. In the 
speech, later published as ‘Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment’ in 
the Proceedings of  the society, he offered a definition, drawing on discussions 
with fellow British legal philosophers. The standard case of punishment bore 
five characteristics:
 (i) It must involve pain or other consequences normally considered 
unpleasant.
 (ii) It must be for an offence against legal rules.
 (iii) It must be of an actual or supposed offender for [the] offence.
 (iv) It must be intentionally administered by human beings other than the 
offender.
 (v) It must be imposed and administered by an authority constituted by a 
legal system against which the offence is committed. (Hart 1959: 4)
Punishment was equated with the rule- based imposition of pain by a legal 
system. It was principled, proportionate, state- administered and crime- 
centred. The definition satisfied the high demands on clarity articulated 
within the contemporary philosophical community. It was the perfect com-
bination of conceptual rigour and common sense. But the definition was also 
noteworthy for what it omitted. It contained no reference to personal interest, 
or to principles other than legal rules. There were no references to passion, to 
social morality or to recognition of status – aspects that had been integral to 
punishment in other historical contexts. Since its publication, the presidential 
address has been the natural point of reference for a large body of works on 
punishment (Brooks 2012; Fassin 2018). Needless to say, the definition has 
attracted criticism for neglecting some aspects (Feinberg 1970; Packer 1968). 
But the suggested amendments often involved only marginal changes. Hart’s 
conception has been highly influential and surprisingly uncontroversial.
Above all else, the understanding was specifically modern. In this chapter, 
I  will discuss the modern understanding of punishment, and the long and 
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of legal violations, and what was forgotten along the way. If  it seemed uncon-
troversial, in the context of mid- twentieth- century Britain, it was not only 
because the concept corresponded to the penal arrangements at the time, 
but also because of its prehistory:  a history that can be dated back to the 
fourth century BCE. The modern conception of punishment was the tenta-
tive end point of countless intellectual interventions and institutional changes 
to efface passion. This chapter reconstructs some steps on the way to the 
modern concept of punishment, based on some of the many attempts to 
separate punishment and vengeance. The steps were taken in philosoph-
ical discourse, as well as in institutional practice. As will be the procedure 
in this chapter, and in the following three chapters, some of the most influ-
ential contemporary philosophers  – Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Hobbes and 
Hegel – will be read against the background of available knowledge on the 
institutional conditions of punishment at the time: the classical democratic 
period in ancient Athens, the thirteenth- century Catholic Europe, and the 
early- modern absolutist states, respectively. Starting with ancient Greece and 
the first known attempts to distinguish between punishment and vengeance, 
I will follow the construction of the modern conception, while at the same 
time retrieving what was left behind – and thus uncovering what had been 
suppressed, although essential to understand the modern predicament:  the 
dimension of passion, excess, social morality and recognition of status. All 
the philosophers discussed in this chapter were above all trying to find the best 
way to cope with intentional acts of wrong- doing. Their immediate concern 
was to establish what characterized legitimate punishment. However, beyond 
the delicate, normative question of justification, they all engaged with the 
complex role of passions, and were aware of the presence of strong emotions, 
including pleasure, hatred and indignation, and their potentially destabilizing 
impact. Rereading the philosophical arguments, against the background of 
available scholarship on the historical context, will reveal a space between 
rational punishment and impassioned revenge, which has been filled with 
righteous anger, and imperatives of status restoration, amongst other things.
Distinguishing punishment from vengeance
Throughout the Western tradition of thought, punishment has been haunted 
by the fear of passions. Conceptual and institutional barriers have been erected 
and re- erected to keep passion in check. By far the most important barrier was 
the distinction between punishment and vengeance. Plato is generally credited 
with the idea. In Protagoras, he contrasted rational punishment with mindless 
revenge. The wider topic concerned virtuous behaviour: could it be taught, 
or was it innate? Protagoras, after whom the dialogue was named, was giving 
a speech on the origins of morality. His position was that virtue and mor-
ality were acquired through learning. Many people no doubt had difficulties 
in complying with existing norms. Yet given the right kind of interventions, 
their behaviour might be changed. Punishment could be such an intervention 
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to effect change. In another dialogue, Plato compared punishment with 
medication. The judge was like a doctor, who cured the perpetrator- patient 
through a bitter cure of flogging, fines or prison (Gorgias 480b– d). With the 
right dosage, punishment could be instrumental in bringing about behav-
ioural change. Vengeance, on the other hand, was ill- suited to effect changes 
for the better. Punishment was differentiated from vengeance: to ‘punish in 
a rational way’ was the opposite of retaliating ‘unthinkingly like an animal’ 
(Protagoras 324b). Whereas punishment was forward- oriented and took the 
future behaviour of the perpetrator into consideration, vengeance was merely 
concerned with past injustices. Above all, however, punishment was rational, 
as it was issued from the principles of reason, and not from passion. That 
was the main principle of differentiation: to simply seek revenge was to act 
‘unthinkingly like an animal’. Aristotle would later make use of the same 
metaphor in his arguments for governance according to the law: ‘for appetite 
is like a wild animal, and also passion warps the rule even of the best men’ 
(Politics 1287a). Since it was guided by passion and fully preoccupied with a 
past injustice, which by definition could not be undone, vengeance was thus 
unlikely to change the behaviour of the perpetrator, and more likely to effect 
harm at the societal level.
It has been said, with respect to the passage in Protagoras, that the dis-
tinction between punishment and vengeance ‘must be regarded as one of the 
most momentous discoveries ever made by humanity’ (Vlastos 1991:  187; 
see also Pauley 1994). Given the sketchy character of Plato’s comments, and 
against the background of the existing penal practices, this might have been 
to overstate the case. Plato advocated the idea of rational punishment against 
the background of Athenian judicial institutions that were characterized by 
private vengeance and elite rivalry. In everyday life and culture, it was diffi-
cult to establish any foothold for a distinction between punishment and ven-
geance, in the sense that these terms have come to be understood today. There 
were no public prosecutors and no professional police force (Allen 2000). 
The Athenian courts were the only institution which bore any semblance to a 
modern criminal justice system. The courts were central pillars of the young 
democracy. Contemporary Athenians, it has been argued, saw the court as 
a forum for the common people to adjudicate in matters of rivalry and con-
flict within the elite (Cohen 1995). To what extent they also corresponded 
to modern ideas of justice has been the subject of intense discussion. Some 
argue that the courts testified to an emerging commitment to the rule of 
law, while other scholars argue that the courts merely provided additional 
instruments to exact vengeance (Forsdyke 2018; Cohen 1995). The legal codes 
were vaguely formulated, and the many ordinary citizens in the jury were not 
legally trained. While some of the contemporary penal techniques, such as 
fines, capital punishment and even prisons, would also be employed in the 
modern era, the responsibility for implementing punishments, even when 
issued by a public court, was often left to private citizens. The city- state had 
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2016). But the idea had been planted. Plato’s intervention set the terms of 
the future discussion, by introducing the idea that punishment could be made 
rational. Simultaneously, another idea was advanced, which would prove to 
be just as significant: that this required the suppression of volatile passions.
Since Plato, the difference between punishment and vengeance has been 
a recurring theme in Western thought. The idea of rational punishment, 
first advanced in Protagoras, initiated a long tradition, according to which 
the problem is separating what is vengeance and what is punishment, or to 
cleanse all traces of vengeance from punishment, and in particular all forms 
of irrational desire and emotions. With rational punishment poised against 
passionate revenge, the terms of the debate were set. The currently most 
influential articulation of the distinction was produced by Robert Nozick in 
Philosophical Explanations. On his analysis, vengeance came forth as the very 
opposite of punishment. It constituted the inverted image of the modern con-
ception of punishment. As can be taken from the list of five features, ven-
geance was passionate, personal, irrational, excessive, and not necessarily 
based on a legal violation. The first three features of revenge were:
 (i) revenge may be done for a perceived harm or slight, as opposed to a 
legal violation;
 (ii) revenge was inherently limitless, as opposed to being proportionate and 
limited;
 (iii) revenge was personal, as opposed to impartial and unconcerned. 
(Nozick 1981: 367)
The fifth feature concerned the presumed lack of generality; revenge was 
particular and did not comply with universal principles. The most intriguing 
feature was the fourth one. It is worth quoting the fourth criteria in extenso as 
it deals with the element of passion and pleasure, which saturated revenge but 
was virtually absent from retributive punishment.
Revenge involves a particular emotional tone, pleasure at the suffering 
of another, while retribution either need involve no emotional tone or 
involve another one, namely pleasure at justice being done.
(Nozick 1981: 367)
Whereas revenge was deeply emotional, and derived pleasure from the pain 
of others, punishment was either entirely free from passions or confined to 
the ‘pleasure at justice being done’. Nozick’s formulation suggests a moral or 
intellectual satisfaction, reasonable and potentially highly justified but very 
bleak in comparison with the passions of vengeance. As a whole, the distinc-
tion echoed a number of binary oppositions that have been invoked ever since 
Plato:  the opposition between good and bad, law and honour, reason and 
passion, personal and impersonal, proportionate and disproportionate. None 




40 The impossible flight from passion
scrutiny than the opposition between passion and reason. So, if  vengeance 
was ‘inherently limitless’, illicit, personal and disproportionate at the same 
time, that was fundamentally because it would not heed the commands of 
reason and was led astray by passions.
Until the nineteenth century, the distinction between punishment and 
vengeance carried a substantial amount of  unfulfilled promise. The modern 
notion of  punishment presupposed the evolution of  a corresponding notion 
of  crime and a separate sphere of  criminal justice organized by the state. And 
this evolution was slow and by no means unilineal. During long stretches of 
Western history, private vengeance was the dominant form of punishment. 
The entire Middle Ages ‘lived under the sign of  private vengeance’, and it 
was imposed ‘as the most sacred of  duties’ (Bloch 1965: 125). Revenge was 
mandatory and private for those who had been wronged. In early- medieval 
Europe, there were no legal institutions that were separate from other social 
institutions, in terms of  personnel or procedure (Berman 1983). Society was 
a patchwork of  jurisdictions – with different rules for lay commoners, for 
the nobility, for the clergy, often in competition. Private and public law were 
intertwined and not clearly distinguishable from one another (Møller and 
Skaaning 2014). The imposition of  punishment was guided by personal, 
by religious as well as rank considerations. Official relationships of  power 
retained a personal character. The bond was personal, and so was the 
breaking of  the bond. To members of  the medieval society, legal rules had 
no universal validity, as the protector of  a common good. Instead, it has 
been argued, ‘law was viewed as a tool of  vendetta and revenge’ (Hanawalt 
and Wallace 1999: x). Passions, anger above all, were seen to be inextricably 
part of  punishment, and one major line of  demarcation was drawn between 
just anger and vengeful anger. Medieval literature is full of  descriptions of 
royalties who – guided by anger – incurred excessive revenge in ways that 
contrasted sharply to the official virtues of  rulership, such as clemency, 
mercy and justice (Althoff  1998). Contemporaries would thus distinguish 
between righteous and illegitimate revenge, rather than between punishment 
and revenge. Against this background, Aquinas insisted on precisely this fur-
ther distinction: between punishment and vengeance. In the heart of  Catholic 
Europe of  the late thirteenth century, he held the view that there was a diffe-
rence. Yet it was difficult to discern the difference, based on the existing penal 
practices and institutions, for similar reasons as in Ancient Greece; punish-
ment assumed private forms, in the absence of  states and public bodies with 
the capacity to prosecute offenders and execute punishments.
Conceptually, this posed a challenge, which was taken up in Summa 
Theologica. Aquinas could not find the line of demarcation within existing 
penal practices. The means employed were the same in both cases. Revenge 
made use of the ‘means of punishment customary among men’, and thus 
operated by depriving individuals of what they loved the most, such as life or 
liberty, riches or reputation (ST II- II, Q 108 A 3). Vengeance and punishment 
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complicate things further, punishment was not necessarily more legitimate, 
or more rational – the two aspects stressed by Plato and Aristotle. Vengeance 
could follow the dictates of reason and be legitimate, just like punishment. An 
act of revenge was justified, provided that the intention was to achieve some 
greater good, such as to uphold justice or to honour God. Instead, Aquinas 
highlighted another opposition, which would become an important element 
in the modern conception of punishment: the opposition between public and 
private. The objective of punishment was the common good. It was executed 
in view of the peace and virtue of all members of society, whereas private 
vindication constituted the goal of revenge (ST I- II, Q 96, A  3; see also 
Koritansky 2005). Anybody could make use of ‘the means of punishment 
customary among men’ based on some notion of wrongful behaviour, but 
not necessarily with the common good in mind. The public- private oppos-
ition covered the manner in which the pain was imposed, how decisions were 
taken, and with what objective in mind. Vengeance was associated with vested 
interests and private initiatives. Punishment, on the other hand, had to be 
imposed by a public body authorized by law. Although such bodies may have 
been in short supply, at the time of writing, Aquinas argued that ‘to punish 
pertains to none but the framer of the law, by whose authority the pain is 
inflicted’ (ST I- II, Q 92, A 2, ad. 3).
At the beginning of the early- modern period, Thomas Hobbes would 
repeat the need for a public body. In Leviathan, the chapter on punish-
ment commenced with a definition that stressed its non- private character. 
Punishment was ‘an evil inflicted by public authority, on him that hath done, 
or omitted that which is judged by the same authority to be a transgression 
of the law’ (Hobbes 1996: 205). At first sight, Thomas Hobbes came close to 
the modern understanding of punishment as the rule- based imposition of 
pain by a legal system, targeting individuals who had been found guilty of 
crime. In Leviathan, as well as in other works, Hobbes stressed the justified 
and the rational, the proportionate and the public character of punishment, 
as opposed to vengeance, which depended on the passions of individuals, 
such as anger, hatred or ambitiousness (Gutnick- Allen 2016). The passions 
made vengeance unreasonable and dangerous. The illegitimacy of vengeance 
was, however, not fundamentally grounded in lack of rationality. Unlike 
Aquinas, Hobbes held that there was no legitimate vengeance on the part 
of the individual members of society. It did not matter how reasonable or 
justified it appeared to be. Hobbes’s hostility towards vengeance was a cor-
ollary of the proposed violence monopoly of the sovereign, which in turn 
reflected the ongoing institutional changes in late- medieval Europe. The 
emerging nation states were monopolizing punishment, in competition with 
the church, feudal institutions and local judicial practices (Merback 1999; 
Spierenburg 1984; Giddens 1985). The increases in administrative capacity 
to enforce legal violations, to collect taxes and to make war on other nations 
were all crucial elements of state formation, and the right to private ven-
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was the common good. According to the doctrine of sovereignty, punishment 
was entrusted to state institutions in return for everybody’s protection. At the 
same time, it incorporated an element of personal revenge. While substituting 
the feudal practices, the early- modern public executions retained a number 
of the characteristics traditionally associated with vengeance (Spierenburg 
1984; Foucault 1979). Even when directed at transgressions of the criminal 
law, punishment contained aspects of status restoration, over- compensating 
for the violation of the sovereign’s standing. Hence, punishment was not fully 
compatible with modern understandings and continued to have a private and 
wilful character, long after national criminal codes were established.
The differences between punishment and vengeance were fleeting well into 
the nineteenth century. But in the Philosophy of Right, published in 1820, 
Hegel argued that vengeance had been fully overcome by punishment.
When right is posited as law and is known, every accident of feeling 
vanishes together with the form of revenge, sympathy, and selfishness.
(Hegel 1952, §211)
Organizational practice and philosophical ideal were, on this analysis, no 
longer in contradiction. Punishment was universal and adhered to binding 
rules, and there was no longer any place for revenge. To Hegel, like other 
political philosophers before him, vengeance encapsulated the very opposite 
to punishment. But whereas Plato and Aquinas advocated the idea of pun-
ishment against the background of penal practices characterized by private 
vengeance, and Hobbes and Kant presupposed a public court system and a 
common criminal code, along with the sporadic outburst of sovereign ven-
geance at the scaffold, at the time of Hegel’s writing, there had in addition 
evolved a distinct criminal justice system:  large state organizations for the 
investigation of crime and for the execution of punishment. In many European 
countries, the early to mid- nineteenth century witnessed the emergence of a 
criminal justice apparatus, built around professional police forces and large 
correctional services. The police, the prisons and the courts were professional 
bureaucracies:  rule- governed organizations staffed with state officials, who 
came to develop a bureaucratic ethos. Legal training and formal merit were 
gaining precedence over personal ties and aristocratic virtues (Kocka 2004; 
Lacey 2016). The evolution of the modern state was decisive, as perceptibly 
captured in the Philosophy of Right. Early on in his career, in the aftermath of 
the French revolution, Hegel was convinced that the transformation of ven-
geance into punishment required social institutions with the ability to abstract 
from the personal. That was a key mission of the state (Hegel 1998; Schmidt 
2007). The later Hegel, the author of the Philosophy of Right, elaborated 
what it meant – or should mean – that punishment was administered by a 
state with a sizeable criminal justice apparatus. The personal and everything 
particular were sidelined for the sake of universality. When judicial processes 
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disappeared: anger and vengeful desires, pity as well as spite and prejudice. 
State officials, such as police and correctional officers, or judges, took the 
necessary decisions but left no personal mark. ‘Those who administer justice 
are persons, but their will is the universal will of the law’ (Hegel 1952: §102). 
Governance was strictly rational, devoid of emotions and unaffected by 
passions.
In the 1830s, the notion of Rechtsstaat was coined to capture the new 
principles of government. The notion developed out of Germany and later 
spread throughout the continent, and analogous expressions can be found in 
many European languages: in French, Italian and Swedish. The best English 
approximation is the ‘rule of law’ (Costa 2007; Zolo 2007). It was initially 
conceived as a critique of sovereignty; the idea gained strength in the nine-
teenth century, after centuries of autocratic rule of hereditary monarchs. As 
opposed to the unbounded power, envisioned by theorists of sovereignty, and 
its wilful deployment in practice, Rudolf von Jhering and Georg Jellinek, who 
were the legal engineers of the Rechtsstaat, stressed the necessary restraint 
of power, the self- limitation of the state. All citizens were attributed with a 
legal sphere which offered protection from undue administrative intrusions 
(Costa 2007). Punishment and any other coercive state interventions had to 
be foreseeable, and they should be applied impartially and universally, in a 
manner which respected the rights of individuals, in their capacity as citizens 
in a state rather than as subjects of a sovereign. In many respects, the rule of 
law had a long prehistory. The idea that all government of men must comply 
with impartial rules – one principal element of the Rechtsstaat – can be traced 
back to antiquity (Sellers 2014; Forsdyke 2018), as well as to medieval times 
(Tierney 1982:  Møller and Skaaning 2014). In the modern sense, however, 
the rule of law presupposed a fully fledged state monopoly of violence, along 
with the build- up of professional bureaucracies. The successful concentration 
of punishment in the criminal justice apparatus not only phased out early- 
modern penal practices and pushed competitors to the side. It also meant the 
state could constrain its representatives from excessive outbursts of power. 
Passion, particularity and personal interest were counterposed by rule- based 
regulation and further constrained by legal rights entrusted to individual citi-
zens. Punishment, it appeared, had finally been purged from passion.
It has been said about punishment in the nineteenth century that it needed 
‘to be dispassionate in order to be just’ (McBride 2007: 8). In principle all 
strong emotions should disappear from the public surface of penal practice. 
And by the end of the century, punishment did seem to be dispassionate, and 
successfully cut off  from vengeful desires. The cleansing of passion, the long 
campaign starting with Plato, to eradicate passion from punishment, seemed 
to have been settled with the establishment of a state- administered criminal 
justice system, governed by principles of impartiality and universality. From 
this perspective, the rapid decrease of visible signs of enjoyment at the scenes 
of punishment was not only a function of changes in social morality, but also 
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reforms. All vestiges of private passion were confidently brushed to the side 
in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, as well as in the legal notion of Rechtsstaat. 
The resolution may ultimately have been philosophical, but it was under-
pinned by institutional change. In the following century, the process of sep-
aration from vengeance would continue. Official discourse on punishment 
was further stripped of emotions, as punishment came to rely on the dis-
passionate search for scientific truth (Pratt 2002). The bureaucratic ethos of 
state officials would be reinforced by the powerful sanitizing force of psych-
ology and medical science. As a consequence, in 1959, the notion of pun-
ishment as state- administered imposition of pain for legal violations could 
appear uncontroversial. Hart saw no need to mention passions. The modern 
concept of punishment rested on its successful separation from passion and 
revenge, and while many of the processes involved, above all the evolution 
of a criminal justice apparatus under state auspices, unfolded largely unper-
turbed by philosophical argumentation, the separation was also the result of 
a protracted and very explicit discussion of the role of passions.
The dual role of anger
When some of the most influential philosophers in the Western tradition 
drew the boundary to vengeance, in the context of different historical situ-
ations and penal practices, the most immediate concern was to establish what 
characterized legitimate punishment. They were moral philosophers, trying 
to find the right way to cope with intentional acts of wrong- doing. However, 
beyond the delicate, normative question of justification, they were all acutely 
aware of the ineradicable presence of strong emotions, including pleasure, 
hatred and indignation, and their potentially destabilizing impact. The 
modern concept of punishment can be seen to be born precisely out of this 
awareness. It incorporated a vision of an institution built on laws, rationality 
and universality, as opposed to social status, passion and personal interest. 
The volatile passions that went into and came out of punishment were not to 
be allowed to run the show. The fear that punishment would be undermined 
from within by the very passions it sought to address has been a constant con-
cern, ever since Plato’s days. Francis Bacon (1955) spoke of revenge as ‘wild 
justice’; Cesare Beccaria warned that punishment must not be ‘the instrument 
of furious fanaticism’ (Beccaria 1778:  52), Immanuel Kant described the 
vengeful passions as ‘often violent to the point of madness’ (Kant 2006: 171) 
and Emile Durkheim called passion ‘the soul of punishment’, which ‘ceases 
only when exhausted’ (Durkheim 1997:  86), just to mention a few, well- 
known examples from different time periods. The formulations can be taken 
to convey the same basic insight, or moral concern. The element of trans-
gression was endemic. Punishment for transgression may at any moment turn 
into a punishable transgression. There was a thin line between the making 
of justice and a new and avengeable injustice. While punishment stabilized 
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destabilized from within by the very passions and notions which punishment 
strove to satisfy, constantly driving it beyond the legally instituted bound-
aries. It was a dilemma, which has been acknowledged beyond the confines of 
particular scholarly traditions (Durkheim 1997; Shklar 1990; Eagleton 2005; 
Smith 2008; Adut 2018). Punishment tended to undermine itself. The basic 
justification was derived from the ordering mission, to recreate an endangered 
order, while constantly, in its ambition to do so, overstepping the principles 
derived from that order, and thus threatening to lose its basic justification.
The distinction between punishment and vengeance represented one 
approach to the dilemma. The two horns of the dilemma were attributed to 
punishment and vengeance, conceived of as separate and distinct activities. 
The distinction homogenized punishment, precisely by focusing so consist-
ently on vengeance. Just as punishment was thought of as one thing, ven-
geance was the alternative, and hence everything that punishment was not. 
Punishment was by definition freed from emotional expressions of vengeful-
ness, enjoyment or other powerful emotions, from private initiative and from 
excessive violence. The aura of aloofness, impartiality, legal security, foresee-
ability and legitimacy that came with the modern notion should make punish-
ment into a powerful stabilizing force in the recreation of social order: that, 
and that only. By assigning passions and all forms of illegitimate action to 
vengeance, punishment was unburdened from its troubled history and the 
constant concern for passion- driven excess. Partly as a response to this easy 
way out of the dilemma, critiques have argued that the two practices are in 
many cases indistinguishable from one another, and that vengeance has been 
misrepresented. Historically, it was maintained, vengeance has been consist-
ently associated with barbarity, whereas punishment was tied to civilization; 
one practice was chaotic and the other ordered (Zaibert 2006; Shoemaker 
2005; Miller 1998). Now, while the dichotomy between civilization and 
barbarity may adequately represent the position taken by Hegel, or modern 
analytical philosophers such as Nozick, such sweeping remarks also tended to 
obscure a very different side of the Western tradition of thought, located in 
the space between reason and passion. Some of the most influential European 
philosophers did not think of vengeance as necessarily illegitimate, or bar-
baric. Notions of righteous revenge survived until the Enlightenment period, 
among philosophers, such as Thomas Aquinas (1941) and Immanuel Kant 
(2006). The desire for revenge was thought to be deeply grounded in both 
human inclination and social order, and not necessarily unjustified.
Plato may have been the central point of reference for the distinction 
between rational punishment and impassioned revenge. He was the rationalist 
philosopher with little sympathy for passion and public opinion in politics. 
He was the aristocratic critique of Athenian democracy and court practices, 
who looked down on ‘sophists’ like Isocrates, who sold their skills much like 
lawyers do today (Klosko 2006; Allen 2000). That being said, the simple 
opposition between reason and passion was foreign even to Plato. Although 
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all passions were bad. Certain passions that animated punishment were good, 
or good under certain circumstances. Plato discussed the topic, referring to 
the third element of the soul in the Republic. Somewhere in between reason 
and irrational passion, there was a whole dimension of human experience, 
which was activated in the process of punishment and which was partially 
embraced, up until the eighteenth century. Latter- day dichotomies carry 
the risk of misrepresenting the long and complex discussion of the role of 
passions in punishment, as well as, more specifically, foreclosing any dis-
cussion of pleasure and punishment that is not easily reducible to obscene 
enjoyment.
Anger was without any doubt the central passion in philosophical 
discussions on punishment before modernity. It was also the most problem-
atic passion, and subject to conflicting valuations. In Ancient Greece, the dual 
role of anger in everyday life and culture came to expression in the classic 
tragedies (McHardy 2008). The tragedies enacted the free range of vengeful 
passions on stage. They showed how punitive anger could be destructive – 
fuelling never- ending cycles of mandatory vengeance, within families and 
between generations. For the leading characters, the consequences were disas-
trous no matter what they did, destroying whole families and initiating wars 
between city- states. In the Oresteia, written by Aeschylus, the entire city of 
Troy was sacked in response to a supposed abduction; a daughter was sacrifi-
cially killed by her vengeful father, who was then ambushed and killed by his 
wife, who went on to be murdered by her son. One injustice led to another, 
and the response was not contained by any legal institution. Only in the very 
end was a court summoned to settle the dispute. At the same time, anger was 
considered socially useful. There was ‘an anger proper to a judge’ (Macleod 
1982:  129). In this capacity, as an instrument of justice, anger was valued 
positively. In The Wasps, a comedy by Aristophanes, the anger manifested 
in the courtroom was indispensable for the city- state’s independence, in the 
wars against the Persians, and moreover helped the individuals guarding their 
honour (Allen 2000). Anger derived from social honour was commendable, if  
given direction by reason. Reason and passion were not opposed in a whole-
sale fashion. Instead, it was a matter of finding the right relationship between 
passion and reason. Anger regulated by reason was indispensable, whereas 
unreasonable anger was destructive. Nothing demonstrated the fundamental 
duality of anger better than the Furies, the Greek deities of vengeance. 
Although often presented as the arch- symbol of unreasonable fury, the 
Furies were at the same time, in the context of their most famous appearance, 
ultimate preservers of social order. For the most part of the Oresteia, 
the Furies help stage the intrafamilial killings and circles of revenge, and in 
the third part they continue to demand the death of Orestes, as punishment 
for murdering his mother. But the role of the Furies changes, as they take part 
in the resolution of the conflict. They participated in the trial against Orestes, 
and finally accepted the divine verdict that freed Orestes from punishment. 
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protectors (Podlecki 1966; Goldhill 2004; for a contrary interpretation, see 
Schroeder 2004). The Furies appeared both as protectors and as destroyers of 
order. In both capacities, they were powered by anger, which stemmed from a 
shared pool of social morality and notions of honour.
Thomas Aquinas continued the discussion of the complex role of passions. 
In the context of Catholic Europe in the thirteenth century, anger was seen, also 
by essentially rationalist philosophers such as Aquinas, to have an indispens-
able role in the process of punishment. In Summa Theologica, in deliberating 
whether anger was a sin or not, Aquinas stressed that ‘if  one desire revenge to 
be taken in accordance with the order of reason, the desire of anger is praise-
worthy’ (ST II- II, Q 158, A 2, co.). Anger had to be tempered and given dir-
ection by reason, only then was it a useful vehicle for justice. It was, however, 
difficult to distinguish between virtuous and sinful anger, even at the level of 
theory. Like all passions, anger was subject to double standards: Aristotelian 
notions of virtue and Christian notions of sin. Anger was double- edged; 
both necessary and catastrophic; on the one hand a useful passion, and on 
the other hand a cardinal sin. At heart, it was not a sin. Aquinas saw anger 
as a passion triggered by experienced injustice, which motivated individuals 
to seek vindication (Miner 2009). Anger was positively connected to justice 
and human happiness. It was a basic emotional response, in the encounter 
with obstacles, injustice or pain, which frustrated the attainment of legitimate 
goals. In this sense, vengeful passions were conducive to human happiness 
(Knuutila 2004). At the same time, anger was a sin. The passion could lead 
astray, and give rise to punishment that was not at all deserved, in which case 
it was a cardinal sin. There was a fine line between anger as a vehicle for 
justice and anger as a cardinal sin. For an external observer it was difficult to 
determine which anger was justified. Instead, Aquinas directed attention to 
the intention of the actor; ‘in the matter of vengeance, we must consider the 
mind of the avenger’ (ST II- II, Q 108, A 1, co.). It was sinful, if  the intention 
was to impose pain and suffering on the perpetrator. It was legitimate, if  the 
intention was to achieve a greater good beyond the act of punishment. One 
might still wish to impose pain, yet the underlying objective had to be derived 
from reason and involve a greater good. It was a fine line – and a fine line 
with potentially huge implications for the one who was angry, since wrongful 
punishment might in turn be punished; in fact, punished in the harshest con-
ceivable way, eternally in afterlife.
Aquinas proceeded from the assumption that ‘punishment is referred to 
God as its first author’ (ST I, Q 114, A 1, ad. 1). Human passions and penal 
practices were understood within the context of the Last Judgement. Divine 
justice in the afterlife, either in purgatory or in hell, added a further dimen-
sion to the institution of punishment. It was the aspect of a higher justice, 
which operated on sins, rather than on the violations of worldly laws. The 
afterworldly aspect duplicated the problem of vengeance, and put punishment 
administered by humans at severe risk. In the worst case, punishment would 
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in the Divine Comedy. In Dante’s vision, the author was led by the Roman 
poet Virgil through hell. As they descended, the gravity of the sins increases 
and the punishments became ever more formidable. In a stony landscape, on 
one of the lower regions, the visiting couple find thieves, pimps, fraudsters 
and corrupt leaders mercilessly exposed to ‘horned demons armed with heavy 
scourges’, who were incessantly beating the naked backs of the crowd (Inf. 
Canto XVIII:  35). They continued wandering, and at the bottom of hell, 
among the punishments for the very worst transgressions, such as fratricide 
and treason, one of the most famous encounters in the entire Inferno took 
place. Submerged in ice, two souls had frozen together in a single hole and 
only their heads protruded from the ice. One head was constantly gnawing on 
the other. As the couple came within hearing distance, it turned out that the 
upper head belonged to count Ugolino della Gherardesca, who supposedly 
betrayed the city- state of Pisa in 1288. According to Dante, the count was a 
traitor, and hence could expect eternal damnation of the worst kind. What 
was perhaps more surprising was that the other head belonged to archbishop 
Ruggieri Rubaldino, who meted out della Gherardesca’s worldly punishment 
after he was found guilty of treason. In hell, the archbishop is constantly 
being exposed to the count, who sinks ‘his teeth into the other just where the 
brain’s stem leaves the spinal cord’ (Inf. Canto XXXII:  128– 9). There was 
obviously a higher justice in operation that overruled existing legislations. The 
judge, who punished treason, ended up in a far worse situation in the afterlife 
than the one he originally punished, because he was judged by another judge, 
according to a law above the law. As it were, the archbishop’s punishment 
in the afterlife was brought upon him by the punishment that he authorized 
in this life. He had imprisoned count della Gherardesca, together with his 
two sons and two grandchildren, in a tower in Pisa, where they would all die 
of starvation. Dante related the suffering of the children, locked up in the 
tower without food (Inf. Canto XXXIII). Their horrific fate was interpreted 
through the dual lens of Christian theology and public opinion at the time. To 
Dante, the punishment was more corrupt than the original crime of treason 
(Oreglia 1991). Count della Gherardesca may have betrayed the city, which he 
was set to protect, but archbishop Rubaldino went too far in the punishment 
of treason, as it included the innocent children. The archbishop should have 
restricted himself  to punishing the count and spared his children, in which 
case he might have avoided Dante’s inferno.
During the middle ages, the two- tier system of punishment was explicit, 
and one could find comfort or, alternatively, cause for concern in the idea 
of a divine justice, which put all kinds of injustices on trial, including the 
excess that was endemic in punishment. The punishment of the archbishop 
and the count in the Divine Comedy illustrated the double recourse to a higher 
law. The archbishop was punished for his excessive punishment of the count. 
The second punishment (of the archbishop) was excessive as well, by most 
standards, but according to the principles of divine justice it was entirely jus-
tified. The idea of a higher justice, which under certain conditions justified 
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excess, was not confined to the medieval world. Following the middle ages, 
ideas of the Last judgement gradually lost influence. But the empty space left 
by divine justice was filled by principles which were rooted in other histor-
ical contexts. The idea of a higher justice was incorporated in political the-
ories of sovereignty during the early- modern period, and in notions of raison 
d’état, reasons of state which overruled the existing legislation (Foucault 
2007). Principles above the law would continue to operate in modern contexts, 
to warrant officially prohibited and cruel acts of punishment. In modern 
contexts, these principles were often rooted in social morality, rather than 
derived from theories of the state or from religious notions of divine order. In 
contemporary contexts, transgressive punishments typically defy the criminal 
code but follow a higher law, which has been seen as a condensate of the way 
of life of the community (Žižek 1994). Emile Durkheim (1997) used the notion 
of collective consciousness (conscience collective) to account for the temper-
ance of passions as well as for the persistence of the sacred in punishment. 
It captured the mundane aspects of moral condemnation while at the same 
time incorporating the transcendent qualities of punishment: the impression 
that the imposed justice relied on something more fundamental than the indi-
viduals involved. As sacred, it could operate as a higher principle sustaining 
excess (Smith 2008). To justify transgression is not normally the most prom-
inent function of social morality; on the contrary, it is more often associated 
with moderation and convention. It tends to be implicit, or sedimented in 
actual practices, as emphasized by Hegel (1952), who foregrounded the lived 
morality (Sittlichkeit) as opposed to the abstract morality of Kant  – uni-
versal principles, which were valid regardless of context. Yet under certain 
conditions, social morality may be hypostatized as justice and dictate punitive 
anger toward acts that deviate from its shared habits, normative expectations, 
and notions of the world (Paskewich 2014). In this capacity, social morality 
may sustain passion and excess, operating alongside the law, without being 
officially acknowledged as punishment.
Punishment as status restoration
Hart’s famous definition epitomized the modern state- centred concep-
tion. Punishment was essentially impartial enforcement of the existing 
legislation – or, simply: law enforcement. Punishment was bound to one spe-
cific model:  legal rules were the only conceivable ground for punishment 
and violations were thought of as crime. The definition did not allow for the 
invocation for other principles, which – if  violated – may constitute ground 
for punishment. In the process of its establishment, the modern concept not 
only pushed passion and vengeance to the margins but also consigned com-
peting principles of rule violation to oblivion. Historically, violations of the 
principles underlying the distribution of social esteem have frequently been 
punished. Perpetrators have been punished with the chief  objective to restore 
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presume that punishment may be more than law enforcement. I believe that 
punishment can be many things, within certain perimeters. To my mind, the 
main criterion is cultural intelligibility: for something to be an act of punish-
ment it must be recognizable as such by contemporaries. The pain imposed 
on the perpetrator should be felt to be deserved by contemporary audiences, 
on the grounds of a violation of some basic principle. People need not neces-
sarily endorse the principle in question, the penal practices, or the specific 
punishment being meted out. Quite to the contrary, they may radically dis-
agree. But they will perceive the traction of the principle being violated, and 
comprehend the intervention as punishment, and not as arbitrary cruelty, 
show of force or odd fancies. The intelligibility was cultural since it depended 
on shared notions of the world and shared social meanings. The staunch 
refusal to let Antigone bury her dead brother may for instance strike modern 
theatre audiences, watching Sophocles’ famous play, as an odd fancy of the 
god Creon. The heroism of Antigone’s defiance might even derive some of 
its force from the incomprehensibility of the divine dictate. Yet it was per-
fectly in accordance with the contemporary penal practices, and must have 
been understood as such, as punishment rather than as whimsical cruelty, by 
audiences at the Great Dionysia. Being executed without burial, placing the 
dead body in the open, for everybody to see, was the ultimate punishment in 
ancient Greece, because of its particularly dishonourable effect (Allen 2000). 
Antigone’s insistence on burying her brother may have demonstrated a tension 
between the Homeric morality and the emerging civic ideology (Fowley 1995), 
but it was above all an attempt to rescue him from the worst infamy of con-
temporary penal practices.
In ancient Greece, the object of punishment was above all acts of disres-
pect. The acts themselves were not necessarily different. The Areopagus court 
made famous in the Oresteia specifically processed murders. Other Athenian 
courts processed transgressions that courts have attended to in many other 
societies as well: adultery, violence, theft, defamation, or fraud. While some 
of the actions being punished were crimes, on current understandings, what 
had been violated was not primarily the law but the social esteem of the 
injured party. The concern with social esteem was ingrained in the very notion 
of punishment. The most frequent Greek word for punishment was timoria 
and the verb ‘to punish’, timoreisthai, also meant ‘to assess and to distribute 
honour’ (Allen 2000: 61). To punish was to restore status and efface the mark 
of dishonour in relation to the community, or in the eyes of other people. 
One way to understand the function of punishment was along the transac-
tion model: through the infliction of pain, punishment removed social esteem 
from the punished and returned it to the party who had suffered the violation. 
When someone had been subjected to acts of wrong- doing, the social esteem 
had to be restored, either by seeking justice through the courts, or by taking 
revenge at any cost, since it was imperative to requalify as a full member of the 
community (Herman 1993). The two alternatives represented different ways 
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and transferred it straight away, whereas court litigations relied on the ability 
to convince the jury. To win the case, one needed to appeal to notions of 
honour and appropriateness, as well as to anger and other passions of the jury 
members. The existing legislation seems to have been secondary for the out-
come. Not even the litigant necessarily referred to the law during the hearing 
(Allen 2000).
The courts were a venue for punishment and for conflict resolution. While 
adhering to the logic of private vengeance, the courts negotiated the restor-
ation of social esteem, for ordinary people who presented their cases. In this 
capacity, the proceedings were a public concern to an extent that is almost 
inconceivable today, or for any other society for that matter, because of the 
central place of the court in daily politics, and because of the scale of public 
participation. Each year six thousand men were selected to serve as jurors 
(Harris 2013). The average male citizen spent a significant amount of time 
in court. A typical court hearing was presided over by a jury, composed of 
anything ranging from a few hundred to several thousand citizens, who were 
chosen by lot (Lanni 2016). The litigants, in other words, stood before a large 
crowd of people, which they needed to win over. Verdicts were based on 
majority votes passed by the assembled citizenship. Although all citizens were 
equal before the law, in principle, the courts reflected the prevailing distribu-
tion of rank and privilege. Individuals from families who could mobilize a 
wealth of resources were much more likely to vindicate their rights in court, as 
they were well trained to speak in public, or could afford to hire a professional 
speech- writer. Poor citizens were dependent on the support of more influential 
individuals to assert their claims. The courts were also circumscribed in other 
ways, which reflected the existing, socially stratified notions of status. Female 
citizens only possessed a portion of the amount of social esteem attributed 
to their male counterparts, and needed in addition to be represented by a 
male citizen. Slaves had almost no social esteem at all, and were generally 
excluded from the courts. The many alien residents, also known as metics, 
were likewise excluded from presenting their cases in court, as a rule, although 
there were exceptions (Lanni 2016; Harris 2013; Griffith 1995). The courts in 
fourth- century BCE Athens were thus a space thoroughly organized around 
social esteem rather than law. They reflected the logic of private vengeance 
and rested on private power. However, although anger and individual status 
were the basis for the claims made, the proceedings included the public 
interest in ways that private vengeance did not, as the litigants had to present 
their cases in public and appeal to a shared language of desert (Allen 2000; 
McHardy 2008).
Litigants attempted to reclaim their lost social esteem by persuading 
members of the jury – or their fellow male citizens – in ways that resonated 
with existing notions of anger, honour and social status, as shown by Danielle 
Allen (2000), using as evidence texts written to be given as speeches before the 
court. Isocrates, who started his career as a professional speech- writer, wrote 
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It is not on behalf  of any injury from blows that I come to court trying 
to get justice from him but because I  suffered indignity [aikia] and 
dishonour.
Isocrates instructed the litigant to continue by saying that because of this, 
‘it is fitting for free men to be the most angry’, and urged the court to ‘inflict 
the greatest penalty’ on the one who was standing charges (quoted in Allen 
2000: 50). In this way, members of the jury would be led to understand the 
magnitude of the insult to his standing, and the need to undertake action 
to restore social esteem. The gravity of the assault was not measured by the 
degree of physical harm, or the ‘injury from blows’ received. The assault was 
conceived from the perspective of social esteem. The litigant had suffered 
indignity and dishonour, because of the blows; and because of the indig-
nity and the dishonour generated by the blows, he was angry. The invoked 
standard was the experienced anger. Isocrates gave the instruction to empha-
size the anger, and the jurors were expected to fully understand that passion, 
which stemmed from the perceived violation of status and propelled the judi-
cial process, all the time being double- edged: sometimes perpetuating cycles 
of vengeance and sometimes resolving the conflict in court.
Isocrates was of the same generation as Plato, and went on to become a 
well- known orator in Athens. Isocrates and Plato represented opposing views 
on truth and public opinion, philosophy and rhetoric, as commonly discussed 
under the topic of ‘sophism’. Yet the two intellectuals also represented 
different approaches to punishment. Whereas Plato contrasted rational pun-
ishment with unreasonable revenge, thereby sowing the seeds of a modern 
conception of punishment organized around legality and reason, Isocrates, 
on the other hand, stood for an approach which was organized around social 
status and passion. The approach was moreover embedded in the contem-
porary court practice, as opposed to Plato’s rationalism. On this model, anger 
played a central role in the process of punishment. It was an instrument to 
reach justice:  a verdict that would restore the social status of the injured 
party. The loss of esteem in relation to the community triggered vengeful 
passions. The more severe the violation, the angrier one was expected to be. 
Punishment thus relied on non- legal principles of desert and conceptions 
of transgression. It emphasized rather than suppressed passion, as well as 
highlighting the crucial role of recognition of social status within the commu-
nity. Instead of an institution built on crime and dispassionate law enforce-
ment, punishment unfolded along the axis disrespect, rational passion and 
social status. In all these respects, punishment as status restoration differed 
from modern understandings of punishment as law enforcement.
The concept of punishment as status restoration guided by passion would 
survive far beyond ancient Greece. It was also embedded in medieval accounts 
of righteous revenge, and the decisive role of anger in that context. In Summa 
Theologica, Aquinas maintained that revenge was grounded in the natural 
inclinations of human beings, above all in anger. It was a passion provoked 
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by a perceived violation of one’s status in the eyes of the community. ‘All 
causes of anger’, he argued, can be ‘reduced to slight’ (ST I- II, Q 47, A 2, co.). 
Slight was always relative to social standing, on this essentially Aristotelian 
account. Someone was not being given due respect, or was treated disres-
pectfully, given determinate expectations of esteem. Slight was a very broad 
concept, in Aquinas’s treatment. It covered situations when people acted care-
lessly, or intervened in the lives of others for no good reason. ‘Forgetfulness’, 
for instance, was ‘a clear sign of slight esteem’, as were ungrounded attempts 
to stop friends from doing what they had set out to do (ST I- II, Q 47, A 2, ad. 
3). Anger was a passion rooted in a fine- grained understanding of status vio-
lation. It called for restoration of honour in the face of subtle slight, or more 
severe forms of wrongdoing, involving force or fraud. Only through punish-
ment could the passion be quelled and the loss of social esteem be reclaimed. 
Anger could thus animate the quest for justice, in a perfectly rational manner. 
But it was never an entirely reliable guide. Under certain conditions, anger was 
a cardinal sin punishable in the afterlife; for instance, if  one merely wanted 
to satisfy personal ambition for social status. Anger was thus incorporated in 
very different ways in the institution of punishment; as legitimate passion to 
restore social status, and as the motor force behind renewed violations, this 
time of the principles of divine justice.
For Thomas Aquinas, as for many people in thirteenth- century Europe, 
punishment in the afterlife was in a sense the real punishment. All worldly 
punishments were executed under divine oversight and were moreover bleak 
in comparison to what the afterlife held in prospect. Graphic illustrations 
of the sufferings imposed on wrongdoers were commonplace. Hell was 
communicated to the largely illiterate population through sermons and visual 
art. Church visitors could watch the damned being tortured on mosaics and 
paintings all over the continent. In this sense, everyone had to consider the 
Last Judgement and the horrific punishments in hell (Fudgè 2016; Morgan 
1990). Given that cultural intelligibility is the hallmark of punishment, divine 
justice must qualify, even if  never carried out in the material world. Dante’s 
Divine Comedy may be the most well- known text on late- medieval conceptions 
of punishment (Shoemaker 2009). Yet it was by no means unique, but 
represented the high point of an entire literature genre on the afterlife. In the 
preceding centuries, heaven and hell had been captured with increasing level 
of detail, and from this perspective the Divine Comedy represents the literary 
culmination (Morgan 1990). The divine justice was depicted in systematic and 
detailed fashion. What strikes the modern reader is precisely the level of detail. 
As has been noted with respect to contemporary visual representations in the 
churches, there was ‘an abiding interest in order and authority at all levels, 
and in hell no less so’ (Fudgè 2016: 145). Sin was the major ground for pun-
ishment, and the concern for systematicity was in particular devoted to the 
punishment of sin. When thinking about the relationship between transgres-
sion and punishment in the Divine Comedy, Dante was not guided by existing 
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were a mix of Aristotelian distinctions on vice and Christian notions of sin 
(Morgan 1990). Upon leaving hell, Dante and Virgil ascended up the Mount 
Purgatory, where the purpose of punishment was to purify the souls on their 
passage to paradise. In this part of the poem, the punishments mirrored the 
sins committed during their lifetime. The pain was imposed based on their 
performance in this world. Yet Dante was not concerned with transgression in 
relation to other people; actions involving anger, gluttony or envy might harm 
fellow members of society but were above all transgressions of the underlying 
moral- ontological order. The inner meaning was the same in all cases. To sin 
was to turn away from God, in particular to turn away from the love of God, 
toward self- love and worldly interests. Ultimately, every sin was ‘a denial of 
the divinely ordained order’ (Ellrich 1984: 62). As a mix of theological tenets 
and Aristotelian morality, the divine order constituted the ground on the basis 
of which punishments were issued in relation to specific rule violations. For 
Dante, like Aquinas, the divine order was the principle for punishment in the 
afterlife, operating parallel to the imperatives of status restoration in this life.
The concept of punishment as status restoration would remain operative, 
also as new punitive principles emerged, such as sovereignty, or the criminal 
law. Throughout the early- modern period, the expansion of state punishment 
was caught in the field of tension between ‘the king’s two bodies’ (Kantorowicz 
1997), one aspect corresponding to the deeply personal and another aspect to 
the ultimate ground for political power. Sovereignty was an articulation of 
the supremacy of worldly power over against the church (Brown 2010), along 
with the theorem of the monarch as the unique representative of the Christian 
god. The idea that violations concerned the status of the regent rather than 
universally applicable laws was salient in theories of sovereignty. The idea was 
activated in relation to political opposition as well as in the context of mun-
dane wrong- doing. On the one hand, the sovereign stood above the law, and 
could invoke the necessity to punish political enemies at will (Schmitt 2009). 
The exercise of power was not necessarily rule- based, not necessarily tied to 
a predefined crime, and not necessarily uniform but also depended on solip-
sistic raison d’état which overrode the stated law (Loick 2012; Foucault 2007; 
Foisneau 2013). On the other hand, ordinary transgressions also contained 
an element of violation of the king’s standing; ‘in every offense there was 
a crimen majestatis’ (Foucault 1979: 53). While enforcing the criminal code, 
punishment restored the source of royal recognition. The elaborate display 
would ritually affirm the sacred status of the regent. And just as every offence 
was an affront to the king’s standing, the early- modern executions contained 
an element of personal revenge. The common use of mercy, granted by the 
monarch, who could overturn death sentences pronounced by courts of law, 
further reinforced the personal character of power (Hay 1975). Early- modern 
punishment consequently incorporated the personal aspects of status restor-
ation while at the same time capturing the transcendent qualities of divine 
justice. The public executions were simultaneously of this world, a restor-
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divine justice, putting the audience in touch with the basic order underlying 
the world. Of course, punishment in the early- modern period also contained 
a range of elements  – national criminal codes, state administration, law 
schools – that pointed towards the law as the principle for punishment: the 
principle that would become hegemonic in modernity. Yet passion and status 
recognition, principles from preceding époques, were by no means discarded 
as grounds for punishment.
Eventually, the longstanding philosophical discussion on the differences 
with respect to vengeance, in combination with the far from unilineal evo-
lution of the institutional framework of criminal justice, led to the modern 
concept of punishment as law enforcement. Alternative conceptions of 
punishment, rooted in other historical contexts, were pushed to the side by 
focusing strictly on crime and legality – but also by presenting vengeance as 
the sole alternative, and passion as dangerous and avoidable. Yet a rereading 
of the philosophical arguments, against the background of available scholar-
ship on the historical context, revealed a dimension of punishment located 
in between rational punishment and impassioned revenge. Three features 
appear to have been consistent from ancient Greece until the early- modern 
period. First of all, the dual role of passion; anger, in particular, was often 
approached in a nuanced manner, rather than condemned as irrational. Anger 
was on the one hand necessary in the search for justice, and on the other hand 
anger was dangerous and needed to be suppressed. Secondly, there was a 
persisting awareness of the paradox of transgression. Punishment derived its 
basic justification from the ordering mission but was inherently transgressive 
and constantly undermined, by passion and by competing principles. Finally, 
the conception of punishment as status restoration remained influential until 
the nineteenth century. Violations of social esteem were the object of pun-
ishment, and punishment derived its function from the necessity of injured 
parties to reclaim their status in the eyes of other members of the group. The 
modern concept of punishment can be traced all the way back to Plato, who 
likened the passions of punishment to the mindless fury of an animal, which 
was in opposition to what reason called for, in Protagoras. Yet the wider 
spectra of experiences, which were firmly tied to social esteem but located 
somewhere between rational punishment and impassioned revenge, can also 
be traced back to Plato, who rejected the simple opposition between passion 
and reason, in favour of a third element of the soul, which was elaborated 
in Phaedrus and in the Republic. This whole dimension was referred to as 
thumos, and will be the topic of the next chapter.
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3  The ambiguous desire for recognition
What kind of desire is the desire for punishment? The question, as far as 
it concerns the audience, turns on whether there exists a more or less per-
manent desire specifically to punish. Is there, as Nietzsche indicated on many 
occasions, a latent lust for cruelty and revenge in the population, which can 
be satisfied by acts of punishment? It would be a reservoir of punitivity, 
which would be difficult to satisfy in any other way, whether it was natural 
or socially constructed in the first place. The alternative is that the desire to 
punish would be part of a broader register of desire. Is there, in other words, 
a distinguishable desire that is tied specifically to punishment, or could the 
same desire just as well, under other circumstances, be satisfied in other ways? 
It is a complex question marred with pitfalls. One can distinguish a desire for 
wealth, a desire for sex, or a desire to win – and the ‘kind of desire’ will be 
defined in terms of what satisfies the desire. The desire for wealth would be 
satisfied by riches, the desire for sex by sex, and so on. In the same vein, one 
could assume a desire for punishment. However, to identify the desire in terms 
of a specific object would be to beg the question. While perfectly true, it would 
not be very informative to speak about a desire for punishment, which is satis-
fied by punishment. Here the question ‘what kind of desire?’ is posed against 
the backdrop of the problematic of desire. Desire is assumed to be desire 
for something – for something located on the other side of the gap between 
desire and enjoyment. What this something is must not be predetermined, or 
assumed to be satisfiable only by the object at hand.
I will argue for the position that the desire for punishment belongs to a 
broader register of desire. It is the desire to be fully part of society, or to dis-
tinguish oneself  over against others. The argument will once again start with 
Plato and Aristotle. They referred to the desire as thumos. From the very outset, 
it was intimately connected with both punishment and social esteem. Later 
attempts reflected the same tension between retaliatory rage and the desire for 
recognition. Aquinas would discuss the persistence of thumos, its nuances and 
many ambiguities in a Catholic medieval context. During the Enlightenment, 
Hegel addressed the desire for recognition in terms of vengeance. The final 
section of the chapter analyses recent attempts to rehabilitate thumos under-
taken in conscious opposition to Hegel’s intuition that individual claims for 
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recognition will necessarily transcend existing institutions and realize more 
freedom. It is shown that desire for recognition can turn toward intolerance, 
revenge and unrestrained self- assertion, and still find satisfaction.
Thumos: torn between vengeance and competition
Plato described thumos as the third element of the soul. The famous alle-
gory of the chariot, as related in Phaedrus, may serve to introduce the multi-
faceted desire. It is a tale of two horses and one charioteer, and how they 
perform together. Talking about the sources of human motivation and the 
excessive nature of desire, Socrates described a chariot being pulled by two 
winged horses. One of the winged horses was white and the other was black. 
The black horse was mortal and incarnated the drive toward immediate sat-
isfaction of bodily appetites, such as hunger, sex and thirst. The white horse 
represented thumos, which was likewise non- rational, but very different from 
the black horse. The white horse made a noble impression, had finer features 
and a better posture. Unlike the black horse, which was ‘crooked in shape’ and 
‘companion of excess and boastfulness’, it needed no whip as it responded 
to ‘spoken orders’ of the charioteer (Phaedrus 253e). The two horses made 
the chariot move through their combined power. The charioteer, representing 
reason, did the steering. While unable to move the chariot, the charioteer 
alone could distinguish the real good and find the way forward. The alle-
gory of the chariot might seem to convey yet another image of the familiar 
relationship between reason and passion. The extended campaign to cleanse 
punishment of passion, which started with the passage in Protagoras where 
Plato associated the desire for vengeance with the mindless fury of a beast, 
operated on the binary opposition reason and passion, which was central to 
the formation of the modern concept of punishment. Desire would on this 
analysis be uniformly non- rational and pleasure- seeking, suggesting all sorts 
of detours from what is suggested by reasoned principles and deferred grati-
fication. The white horse in the allegory was, after all, just a horse, albeit 
with better posture; ‘erect in form and clean- limbed, high- necked’ (Phaedrus 
253d). Like the black horse, it was non- rational, powerful and difficult to con-
trol. While necessary to set the chariot in motion, both horses contained the 
seeds of irrational excess. But that would be to miss the point, or the third 
element of the soul, which was likewise part of Plato’s teachings.
The allegory is better read as presenting a way out of the simple oppos-
ition between reason and passion. The main observation to be made is that 
the two horses are different from one another. Socrates presented them as 
each other’s opposites. The white thumos- horse was immortal and associated 
with transcendence. It was ‘a lover of honour when joined with restraint and 
a sense of shame, and glory’ (Phaedrus 253d). It was very different from the 
black and mortal horse, which pursued goals associated with satisfaction 
of bodily needs. As opposed to the black horse, which quickly tired when 
the bodily needs were satisfied, or if  the object of desire was out of reach, 
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the white horse might pull forever, as it was immortal and inspired by eternal 
and unchanging values, such as glory. The white horse was ‘a companion of 
true glory’, potentially transcending mortal restraints (Phaedrus 253d). The 
thumos- horse was still a beast, and as such unable to find its way without a 
charioteer. But while the black horse was insensitive to rational reasoning 
and followed bodily needs, which were imperative, excessive and boundless, 
the white horse was oriented toward social esteem and able to hear the voice 
of reason. Under circumstances it could be called back by reason, or take 
rational advice. The two horses pulled in different, at times even contrary 
directions. When falling in love, for instance, Socrates described how the black 
horse took the lead, forcing the carriage toward the beloved one, excited by 
the prospects of having sex. At the mere sight of the object of desire, the black 
horse rushed forward, oblivious of the charioteer’s whip. Even the charioteer 
tottered. In this situation, the white horse showed restraint and high principles 
in a pursuit blinded by love, set in motion by bodily desire. The white horse 
struggled in the yoke, held back by reason but also by shame – it was said to 
drench ‘the whole soul with sweat from shame and alarm’ (Phaedrus 254c).
The relationship between the charioteer, the white horse and the black 
horse illustrated Plato’s view of the tripartite nature of the soul – divided into 
reason, thumos and appetite, respectively. The claims concerned the nature of 
human motivation rather than the composition of the soul (Cooper 1999). On 
this reading, there were three kinds of desire: one propelling people toward 
the satisfaction of physical needs, another related to understanding and to 
deliberation, and then there was a third kind of desire, thumos. Thumos is 
translated variously by ‘anger’, ‘spirit’, ‘passion’, or ‘temper’ (Pearson 2012: 5). 
In the current literature, it is mostly left untranslated, to avoid choosing one 
meaning over another. I  will do the same and refrain from translating the 
term, and instead highlight its foreign character by using italics. Thumos has 
rarely been discussed in the context of punishment, beyond a rather narrow 
circle of classicists. Yet it could be relevant for discussions on what kind of 
desire might have gone into punishment not only in ancient Greece but also 
in later historical periods. I  believe that thumos is essential to understand 
what the audience sees in punishment. The concept referred to a register of 
desire, which is of central importance for the institution of punishment in any 
society, and for everyday lives of individuals as well, for that matter; a register 
stretching from the desire for retaliation to the desire for social status.
From the outset, thumos was tied to punishment, anger and social esteem. 
In Book IV in the Republic Plato argued that thumos was a distinct third 
element of the soul, which was neither rational nor necessarily irrational. He 
started the argument by referring to the anger of a man who had been treated 
unjustly; in such cases thumos will persevere through ‘hunger and cold and 
all such things, and, by enduring, overcome them without ceasing from noble 
acts until it achieves its end, or dies’ (440d). The condition was exemplified by 
Odysseus, who, upon his return after the long journey, found out about the 
licentious living of a large group of suitors, who had established themselves 
 
 
62 The ambiguous desire for recognition
in the household during his absence. The suitors had made advances to marry 
his wife Penelope and had moreover been sleeping with the female servants 
referred to as maids. Odysseus was furious because of the gross insult this was 
seen to involve, and was anxious to vindicate his honour. When Odysseus, 
disguised as a beggar, caught sight of the maids, he was consumed by the idea 
of killing them all, on the spot. But he managed to restrain his anger, struck 
his breast and rebuked his heart as Homer put it, tempering ‘the irrational 
passionate part’ of the soul (Republic 441c). In that very moment, thumos’s 
call to action was controlled by reason. Odysseus was infuriated but managed 
to control himself  with great restraint. But the desire for vengeance and the 
perceived need to restore social esteem continued to be felt. So, given some 
time to lay out plans, he killed the suitors and ordered the execution of the 
maids (Odyssey XX– XXII). In this respect, Odysseus constituted a good 
example of someone who was acting on a desire for status recognition. His 
course of action was not dictated by some primordial anger but above all by 
sensitivity to prevailing notions of social esteem. The severe punishment of 
what in essence constituted a violation of household rules was mediated by 
reason and dictated by the need to vindicate Odysseus’s social status in the 
eyes of fellow members in the community.
If  there was a core meaning of thumos, it referred to anger, and above all 
to anger triggered by violations which called for reparation (Cooper 1999; 
Pearson 2012). It was a specific kind of anger, rooted in the experience of 
injustice and perceptions of social esteem. The centrality of such anger 
was prominent in the Homeric poems, written well before the democratic 
period. In the Iliad, Achilles was absorbed by righteous indignation when 
Agamemnon, his commander in the Trojan War, deprived him of a treasured 
war prize, an action that was experienced as unbearable violation of social 
esteem. Achilles’s anger contained elements of resolution, courage and even 
pleasure, famously characterized as ‘far sweeter than honey’ (Iliad 18.109). 
The concept of thumos remained marked by its origins in the Homeric world 
of mandatory vengeance. But thumos may not necessarily be equated with 
anger, or with archetypical images of vengefulness. In the parable of the 
chariot, the thumos- horse was characterized as a companion of true glory 
without any reference to vengeful passions. While anger may have been cen-
tral, it was by no means the only emotion associated with thumos. In Rhetoric, 
Aristotle defined 12 different emotions,which would- be public speakers had to 
be familiar with if  they were to persuade the audience. At least seven of them 
could be seen to be thumos- related: anger and hatred, of course, and, beyond 
that, fear, confidence in the face of danger, feeling disgraced, righteous indig-
nation, envy, and eagerness to match the accomplishments of others (Cooper 
1999). The recognition of status in the eyes of others was central in this con-
text. As Gregory Klosko pointed out, thumos covered ‘a range of emotions 
concerned with someone’s image of himself  and his desire that others share 
that image’ (Klosko 2006: 74). The experience of disgrace, righteous indigna-
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assertiveness, and with how one was perceived by other people, measured by 
the prevailing standards of social esteem. All of the emotions were in one 
way or another bound up with the recognition of social status and one’s 
experienced standing in the community. Yet strictly speaking, thumos was not 
an emotion. It was a desire. In the Aristotelian tradition, ‘desire’ is the generic 
term for what makes people act. Desire sets in motion; ‘what is called desire 
is the sort of faculty in the soul which initiates movement’. Like all desires, 
thumos was first and foremost ‘action- prompting’ (De Anima iii 10, 433a31– 
b1). On an Aristotelian reading, thumos spurred people to act in particular 
ways – to take revenge, to be courageous, to seek public office, or to mind 
one’s reputation.
On all accounts, thumos was the impassioned urge to take revenge, and 
thus linked to a specific event and certain emotions, above all anger. Beyond 
that, there is less agreement. The meaning of thumos is contested. There are 
different opinions as to the meaning of thumos, and its relationship to reason 
and to virtue. While some scholars limit thumos to retaliatory desire, other 
scholars include more than the urge to avenge injustice: above all the desire for 
social esteem. A narrow conception stands against a broader conception of 
thumos. On the first reading, primarily based on Aristotle’s discussion of the 
term, thumos was the desire for retaliation in response to a perceived slight – 
full stop (Pearson 2012). Aristotle stressed that thumos was triggered by acts 
of disrespect, or slight. Slight, in turn, was subdivided into three species: ‘con-
tempt’, ‘spite’ and ‘insult’ (Pearson 2012:  113). The common denominator 
was the violation of the norms of social esteem, which was the underlying 
framework to understand offences at the time. In this capacity, thumos was a 
powerful source of motivation – almost like a force of nature. It was thought 
of as a physical reaction. The blood circulating around the heart came to 
a boil; at the time, that was one prevalent metaphor used to describe anger 
induced by injustice (Oksenberg Rorty 1992). And even today, the boiling of 
the blood remains a metaphor for anger in everyday language. When some-
thing makes my blood boil, I am so angry that I can hardly control myself.
During the democratic period, thumos seems to have acquired a wider 
meaning, beyond anger and the desire for revenge. The connotations shifted 
toward ‘spiritedness and a sense of honour’ (Urmson 1990: 168). The broader 
conception of thumos has been advocated most persuasively by John Cooper 
and is supported by textual evidence from Plato’s Republic, as well as by a 
different interpretation of Aristotle. On the second reading, thumos refers to 
assertiveness in social life more generally: competitiveness and the desire for 
social esteem. On this other reading, thumos is a more general desire. The 
retaliatory desire belongs to a family of ‘spirited desires’, which ‘are com-
petitive in character, they aim at self- assertion as an agent, as a person to be 
taken serious practical account of, in comparison and in competition with 
other agents’ (Cooper 1999:  276). The desire was not necessarily triggered 
by a specific event, or an act of injustice. The object of thumos- desire was 
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1999: 135). Rather than being a desire for retaliation, it was a natural part 
of social interaction, in a competitive and socially stratified society such as 
ancient Athens. On this reading, thus, the urge for vengeance was part of a 
larger or more complex desire: the concern for social esteem, or the perceived 
need to restore, maintain, or gain social esteem, as defined in the community. 
The desire for punishment to avenge injustice would be of the same kind as 
career- mindedness, or the will to uphold an unstained reputation.
The wider desire extended far beyond punishment and into other areas of 
life. At heart, it was the desire to be accepted as a socially valuable member 
of the community. The desire may be more urgent, or more compelling, in 
the context of punishment, when someone had experienced a sudden loss of 
social esteem, following acts of disrespect, in the form of slight or more ser-
ious offences. A punitive intervention to restore social esteem was called for, 
if  the person were to be seen as a respectable member of the community – by 
other people. But the desire for punishment was the same desire as manifested 
in other areas in life. Thumos was immediately bound up with issues of mor-
ality, community and social status (Koziak 2000). It was the desire to count 
as a full member of the group, on the conditions set by social morality. As 
such, it would not be tied to a specific intervention, such as punishment, but 
rather to the pursuit of conventional goals, or goals which may confer esteem 
upon the actor in the eyes of the community. Thumos would thus be oriented 
toward group conformity. But it was at the same time moving people beyond 
group conformity toward individual distinction. Thumos was transgressive, 
assertive and competitive, constantly pulling people in different directions, 
toward group conformity and toward individual distinction. While focused 
on the achievement of conventional goals, thumos was also the wish to assert 
oneself  amongst fellow companions, seemingly stopping at nothing, perse-
vering through hunger and cold and similar trials ‘until it achieves its end, 
or dies’, as Plato put it. As Francois Dubet (2009) has noted in a modern 
context, the desire for social status is inherently contradictory, oriented both 
toward conformity with the group and toward individual distinction. Thumos, 
taken as the wider desire for recognition, may, fundamentally, be the urge just 
to belong and to escape the anxiety of being dismissed, or being looked down 
upon, but it does not stop there and evolves into the wish to distinguish one-
self, within the same group. People thus strive, at one and the same time, to be 
just like everybody else within the group and to stand out within the group, in 
competition with other members. This is a complexity, if  not a contradiction, 
at the level of desire.
Instead of choosing sides in the scholarly discussion on whether the broad 
or the narrow conception best captured Aristotle’s use of the term, one might 
conclude that thumos was complex and fundamentally ambiguous. In that 
case, the notion of thumos appears fraught with ambiguity, torn between 
emotional responses to acts of disrespect and the overarching striving for 
social esteem in the community. The corresponding desire would be inher-
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the striving for social esteem. The complexity of thumos – its ability to include 
opposites – is precisely what makes the concept useful to understand the desire 
that went into the audience’s consumption of punishment in ancient Greece, 
as well as in other societies. The basic coordinates of desire can be assumed 
to differ in between historical periods, and along prevailing lines of social div-
ision (Butler 1997; 1990). In Athens, the audience were predominantly male 
citizens, and the examples of Odysseus’s and Achilles’s rage and subsequent 
vengeance may primarily have spoken to the male part of the population. But 
it does not follow that thumos was only for them. The options may not have 
been available to the overwhelming majority of female citizens, slaves and 
foreign residents. But they too must have felt the traction of thumos, which 
transcended given conditions. At the most basic level, the desire to belong as 
fully part of social interactions is not confined to a particular social group.
The persistence of thumos
Whether taken as a specific desire for punishment or as a more general desire 
for social esteem, thumos has been embedded in very different contexts, from 
Plato and onwards. In each period covered by this study, thumos has been 
acknowledged as a powerful source of motivation, and its moral implications 
have been discussed by some of the most influential philosophers. I will discuss 
the positions advanced by Plato and Aristotle in ancient Greece, by Aquinas 
and Dante in medieval France and Italy, by Hegel in early- modern Germany, 
and – in the next section – by Sloterdijk and Fukuyama in a current Western 
context. In each context, the desire to gain – or equally important: regain – 
social esteem was volatile, fundamentally ambiguous and balancing at the 
margins of legitimacy. Thumos has consistently received a dualistic treatment, 
in terms of legitimacy. In Western culture, generally speaking, envy and pride 
have been detested whereas competitiveness and status- seeking have been 
celebrated. Yet that is generally speaking: the emphasis placed on the various 
elements of thumos has shifted, and the dualisms which have framed the 
understanding have likewise changed, between the chosen periods. The desire 
has been celebrated at times and deprecated at other times, torn between 
religious notions of sin and worldly notions of social status, and linked to 
shifting goals, sometimes directed at compliance with rules of honour and at 
other times geared towards respect for equal rights.
The ancient celebration of  thumos was never unqualified. Like appetite, 
or bodily needs, thumos was by definition non- rational, and as such defi-
cient. Yet first Plato and then Aristotle considered thumos as a prerequisite 
to achieve some of  the higher values in life (Cooper 1999; Pearson 2012). 
It was as an essential part of  human motivation; the goals associated with 
reason, such as intellectual curiosity, or the ambition to rule wisely, were not 
for everybody, whereas indulgence in bodily pleasures was ephemeral and 
without lasting value. As the third element of  the soul, thumos bore a com-
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rational. It was very different from the bodily needs, which were entirely 
irrational. Thumos incorporated reasoning: deliberation and understanding 
were essential to achieve goals that conferred social esteem. It heard the voice 
of  reason, Aristotle wrote, yet ‘imperfectly’ (Nicomachean Ethics 1149a). The 
desire could not be fully rational. In the normal course of  events, it was 
reason’s natural ally. Unless ‘destroyed by a bad upbringing’, Plato said, 
thumos would side with reason, against the appetites, as ‘naturally auxil-
iary to the rational’ (Republic 441a). In the parable of  the chariot, the white 
thumos- horse figured as an indispensable ally of  reason. In other contexts, 
thumos was more unreliable and could go against reason. As observed over 
and again, thumos might easily backfire, in eruptions such as the unre-
strained rage of  Achilles, who chose to die young in return for eternal glory, 
or in cycles of  mandatory revenge stretching over generations. Social esteem 
and its derivates – glory, the noble, or honour – can be desired independent 
of  what is conducive to individual well- being, reasoned political goals, or 
other rational interests. Thus, while thumos was generally considered con-
sistent with reason, it was sometimes the very opposite, in the pursuit of 
social status.
The desire was inherently volatile and had to be tempered by reason. The 
case of Odysseus’s homecoming was exemplary in this respect. His desire to 
kill the maids and the suitors was not a rational desire, in the Platonic sense. 
Odysseus was someone who had been subject to a violation of the rules of 
social esteem, which triggered a specific desire to punish the perpetrator. It 
was not the ambition to rule wisely, or to understand the true nature of vice. 
But the desire incorporated reason and measure. After all, Odysseus did not 
act on his initial impulse to seek revenge and paused to deliberate, taking 
relevant conditions into account. At the same time, the desire came across as 
non- rational and transgressive. Especially the premeditated execution of the 
maids has puzzled commentators, since it appeared to be excessive in relation 
to their offence, or the act of sleeping with the suitors, whether compelled to 
do so or not. Thumos in the broader sense, as the desire for social esteem, was 
embraced with the same reservation. The desire had to be properly checked 
by reason; if  not, the result was the ‘timocratic’ character. In the Republic, 
Socrates, speaking for Plato, gave the following portrait of a ‘timocratic’ 
person whose qualities, to his mind, were a mix of good and bad. The char-
acter was wilful and educated. It was someone who was concerned with the 
pursuit of public esteem and valued military achievements higher than art 
and culture; smooth, arrogant and sometimes ruthless. ‘While such a person 
would be harsh on slaves’, Socrates remarked, ‘he would be civil to free men 
and very respectful to those in authority, keen to hold office and ambitious’ 
(Republic 549a). As a young adult, this person tended to despise money, but 
later in life there was a noticeable trace of avarice. In this case, thumos led 
astray as well, but not in the shape of holy rage or excessive revenge, but in the 
single- minded obsession with achieving conventional goals for oneself, such 
as holding a public office.
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In medieval Europe, the ambivalence of thumos in both capacities  – as 
retaliatory desire and as the desire for social esteem – was radicalized. There 
was a thin but sharp line between commendable assertiveness and cardinal 
sin. Aquinas and Dante lived in a world squeezed between religious notions 
of piety and worldly notions of social esteem. The retaliatory desire of 
the ancient Greece was embraced by both writers, as a ground for rational 
vengeance; at the same time, the revenge was constantly at risk of condemna-
tion in the afterworld, precisely for being marked by the same assertive desire. 
Thumos was encouraged as an essential virtue to do justice and to restore 
social esteem, while being tempered by the imminent threat of divine justice. 
Most members of the medieval community were, on the dominant religious 
understanding, destined for punishment in the afterworld, either eternally or 
for some time. The punishments in hell were endless, whereas the punishments 
in purgatory were temporary, designed as penance, to purge the soul from 
sin, before its ascendance to heaven. Each sin was purged through a kind of 
penance that was adjusted to its particular features. Dante’s account in the 
Purgatorio was entirely structured after the seven mortal sins, with libertines 
and revellers on the shelves at the top of Mount Purgatory. Further down, and 
punished more severely, were the souls whose earthly existence was marked by 
the thumos- related passions of hatred, envy or pride. Pride was the root of 
them all. Any desire to assert one’s social esteem had to be balanced against 
a religious doctrine, according to which pride was the essence of all sins (ST 
I- II, Q 77, A 5; ST I- II, Q 84, A 2). Pride was the gravest of sins, since it 
represented the very opposite of the love of God, namely inordinate self- love. 
Hence, the punishment was designed to humble. The penance of the prideful, 
in Dante’s poem, was to carry boulders, which bent down their heads and 
forced their gaze toward the ground. Those who had been obsessed with their 
own perception could no longer see themselves – or how they were perceived 
by others in the community. The prideful were forced to humility by the laws 
of nature; the weight of the stone reminded them of their place in the larger 
scheme of things.
Ascending up Mount Purgatorio, Dante encountered the wrathful; in a 
vision, he saw people, blinded by anger, slaying a young man with stones. 
In medieval Europe, anger was linked to reason and justice. But under cer-
tain circumstances, it was a cardinal sin (Miner 2009), and this was such 
a case. The wrathful were punished by being engulfed in a cloud of black 
smoke, which smelled of foul air and prevented them from seeing anything. 
The foul, black smoke reflected the anger that had clouded their judgements 
during life. The souls were doomed to spend their time in blindness until their 
sins of anger had been purged. Envy occupied the shelf  positioned between 
pride and anger, as it was seen to include elements of both. The envious, like 
the prideful, were obsessed with their own share of esteem, competing with 
others, once again turning away from the love of God. They looked in the 
wrong direction, to compare their fortunes with those of their neighbours, 
anxiously competing for power, honour and status, in ‘fear they may lose 
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because another rises’ (Purg. XVII: 119). The penance for envy was excruci-
atingly painful. The sinners were forced to sit like beggars in the sun with the 
eyelids sewn up with iron threads, with tears pouring out from ‘the horrible 
seam’ (Purg. XIII: 83). The punishment reflected Dante’s view of envy as a 
sin of the eye. The notion of envy as deviant vision was commonplace in con-
temporary literary texts (Langum 2016). Hence the punishment, which was 
directed specifically at the eye. The proud and the angry were also punished 
in ways that impacted on their ability to see. But the vision of the envious was 
punished directly. They were blinded, facing the sun with stitched- up eyelids. 
In their blindness, the envious were supposed to train the inward eye to dis-
cover truths about human frailty, and learn to re- focus on God’s wisdom, love 
and justice (Kirkpatrick 2004).
In a culture which cherished vengeance and social esteem, and recourse 
for injustice in the end was private, the worst deadly sins were thumos- related: 
pride, envy and anger. The three passions were interlinked in a sacrilegious 
dynamic, which cast an inescapable shadow over the desire for social esteem. 
Pride fuelled anger and envy, which taken together signalled excessive pre-
occupation with the self, involving a turning away from God along with a 
desire to transcend one’s allotted position in the scheme of things (Ellrich 
1984). It seems to have been an inevitable contradiction. Thumos was con-
stantly encouraged in medieval Europe, by the organization of social life, 
while being tempered by Christian notions of sin and the corresponding 
threat of severe punishment in the afterworld.
In early- modern Europe, the combined influence of a landed aristocracy, 
the whims of sovereignty, and the remnants of feudal culture encouraged 
rather than checked thumos. Social honour and military glory were dominant 
values (Hirschman 1977; Kocka 2004). They exerted an influence not merely 
within a numerically small aristocracy. Social esteem saturated the entire social 
order. Its distribution was based on estates and birth- right, and status came 
to expression in the way of life of all different social strata, often underlined 
by exterior signs of belonging. It was heavily stratified, and circumscribed by 
perceptions of rigidity. Social esteem was had or lost, rather than achieved 
(Weber 1972). The desire for social esteem was relatively unchecked by com-
peting systems of valuation, after the demise of the Christian cosmology, yet 
before capitalism. Medieval notions of divine justice had lost their grip over the 
population, while social esteem had not yet been partially pushed to the side 
by capitalism, or replaced by new principles for social stratification, oriented 
toward achievement and private gain. The young Hegel was much inspired by 
the French revolution, while writing within the context of l’ancien regime, in 
which social esteem was absolutely central. The centrality of social esteem in 
the contemporary German society can be read off  from the very first version 
of the master- and- slave dialectic. The first version in System der Sittlichkeit, 
written a few years before the publication of the Phenomenology in 1807, 
articulated a specific conception of the dynamics of desire – conceptualized 
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that went into the struggle for recognition, and which may be integrated in a 
wider story with potentially rather disheartening consequences, as opposed 
to the hopes usually attached to it. Although Hegel never commented on the 
ancient Greek notion, the first version of the master- and- slave dialectic beau-
tifully illustrated the two aspects of thumos. The desire for recognition was, at 
one and the same time, the urge to avenge injustice and the desire to be part 
of a community as a worthy member.
As opposed to the later version in the Phenomenology, the struggle for rec-
ognition was set in motion by a specific event; in this case, a crime. The struggle 
started with a theft. The theft above all involved a breach of the honour code 
(die Ehre), and was experienced as a personal offence by the victim (Hegel 
1998). The injured party had been deprived of property, but had also, and 
more importantly, lost status in the eyes of other members in the community. 
The theft, interpreted as an act of disrespect, put the reputation at imme-
diate risk. The perpetrator was known; it was ‘the other’ in the struggle for 
recognition. Victim and perpetrator were locked in conflict. There was, at 
this point in Hegel’s presentation, no third party with the capacity to resolve 
the conflict. The initial offence therefore instigated a series of confrontations 
between the two parties. Each party was taking turns, exacting revenge. The 
struggle followed the logic of private vengeance. The initial breach of honour 
was followed by one- sided attempts to restore social esteem. At stake was the 
recognition of being a worthy member of the community (Honneth 1992). 
Both parties wanted to secure such recognition, but in the end, both were 
unsuccessful. As a consequence, they had to continue; there was no real alter-
native. Not being granted recognition was assumed to threaten the entire 
social being, and Hegel’s master- and- slave dialectic illustrated the relentless 
nature of that desire. People will do anything to gain or regain social esteem, 
in the eyes of fellow members of the community. So, the struggle for recog-
nition evolved into a life- and- death struggle, culminating in murder. But the 
conflict had not been settled; instead, it escalated beyond anybody’s control. 
With one opponent dead, the right to revenge was passed on to the family of 
the fallen, which continued the struggle, eventually escalating to war (Hegel 
1998). The parable, which captured the Hegelian version of the state of nature 
(Constãncio 2015), showed that it was not possible to gain recognition strictly 
in everyday interaction between individuals. Instead of being granted recogni-
tion as fully part of the community, the community was torn apart. To restore 
social esteem was thus ultimately impossible without state intervention.
In System der Sittlichkeit, the struggle for recognition was propelled by the 
desire to restore social esteem. From the very outset, the desire was ambiva-
lent, as the struggle was set in motion by feelings of not being recognized and 
the need to vindicate oneself  in the eyes of others. Both parties were torn 
between their immediate responses to acts of disrespect and their overarching 
striving for social esteem in the community. Hegel’s early account of the 
master- and- slave dialectic thus incorporated the original ambiguity of the 
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What drove the struggle for recognition was thumos in the narrow sense  – 
the desire for punishment as status restoration; starting with a theft and cul-
minating in murder. The struggle unfolded within the context of a culture 
in which rank- specific social esteem was anxiously guarded. The desire was 
always more than a desire for punishment – and linked to the positive state 
of being recognized as a worthy member of the community. The desire for 
recognition was in other words a desire to gain status as full partner in social 
interaction. It was the basic desire to be acknowledged as part of the commu-
nity. As Nancy Fraser has noted, to be recognized in terms of status is to be 
accepted ‘as a full member of society’ (Fraser 2000: 113); it is to be considered 
as ‘one of us’, a worthy participant in any kind of interaction. The desire for 
vengeance was a manifestation of that general desire, when suddenly being 
deprived of status following an offence.
Hegel treated thumos- like desire as a positive force in history, while being 
fully aware of its irrationality and volatility. Taken by itself, the desire for 
vengeance was unreservedly considered as a bad thing. As suggested in the 
Philosophy of Right, it should be eradicated, since vengeance was personal 
and particular, as opposed to rational and universal. But the eradication of 
vengeance happened because of and not despite vengeful desire. That point 
was conveyed by the first version of the master- and- slave dialectic. Experiences 
of non- recognition of social esteem triggered desire and sustained a struggle 
for recognition, which was eventually beneficial to all members of society. 
The bitter conflict between the two parties motivated by transgressive passion 
evolved – according to an immanent logic – into stable institutions through 
which goals associated with justice and rationality were attained. In System 
der Sittlichkeit, the resolution of the conflict between the two parties required 
the intervention of social institutions, which could act as representatives 
for the whole community (Hegel 1998). That was the historic mission 
of the state. The state resolved the struggle for recognition by providing the 
conditions for everybody’s sense of social worth. Through the state, vengeance 
could be transformed into punishment (Schmidt 2007). The retrieval of social 
esteem was elevated from everyday interaction in the community to a higher 
authority, which responded according to universal rules and without passion. 
What had started as cycles of revenge ended in social institutions capable of 
offering recognition to everyone.
The dark side of recognition
Some recent attempts to rehabilitate thumos were undertaken in conscious 
opposition to what was perceived to be centuries of neglect. Modern scholars 
had come to forget about this powerful and non- material wellspring of social 
action, it was argued. Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last 
Man and Peter Sloterdijk’s Rage and Time emphasized its continued import-
ance in the contemporary world. The two works were part of a limited set 
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context of a conservative political critique of the contemporary world (see 
also for instance Strauss 1989; Paskewich 2014). Interestingly, the two authors 
reflected the same tension between the narrow conception of thumos as retali-
atory desire (Sloterdijk) and the broader notion of thumos as competitiveness 
and status- seeking (Fukuyama) as the ancient discussion.
Both attempts were set in a decidedly modern political context. Rage 
and Time, originally published in German in 2006, was concerned with the 
perceived eruption of rage in world politics, in the wake of the ‘nine- eleven’ 
terror attacks in 2001 (Couture 2016). The rage manifested in the terror 
attacks was a righteous anger, driven by pride and the wish to assert oneself  
on the world arena, yet essentially defensive – a response to status infractions 
associated with US involvement in Muslim countries. Western liberal democ-
racies stood unprepared, according to Sloterdijk, or had gone soft due to their 
material affluence and insufficient outlet of ‘thymotic energies’ (Sloterdijk 
2010:  13). Achilles’s holy rage had been forgotten, which was regrettable, 
since it was tied to valiance and other virtues of the Homeric world. The 
forgetfulness extended from anger to all the virtues it once supported: the 
whole dimension of social life that comprised ‘human pride, courage, stout- 
hearted- ness, craving for recognition, drive for justice, sense of dignity and 
honour, indignation, militant and vengeful energies’ (Sloterdijk 2010:  14). 
The post ‘nine- eleven’ eruptions of rage in politics showed that thumos had 
not disappeared. It was only partially suppressed by civilization. Fukuyama 
likewise approached thumos as a central force in modern politics. The turn-
over of the real existing communist regimes in 1989 constituted the point of 
reference, and the book The End of History and the Last Man, published just 
a few years later, was widely read as a guide to the historical meaning of the 
events. Fukuyama argued that people rebelled for non- material reasons, and 
not due to economic factors, or the lack of consumer goods. While the pol-
itical regime in Czechoslovakia, for instance, was able to deliver in terms of 
social security, it humiliated ordinary people on a daily basis, injuring their 
sense of dignity, which eventually drove them out on the streets to protest 
(Fukuyama 2012). To him, this was a testimony of the persisting strength of 
thumos. But it was not the disproportionate revenge of Achilles. Thumos was 
instead associated with the defence of moral values that were embedded in 
one’s cultural context; ‘when those values are not recognized by other people’, 
he claimed, it ‘gives rise to feelings of anger’ (Fukuyama 2012: 172). Thumos 
was on this reading an incarnation of social morality. Anger was not primor-
dial but steeped in a moral form, or mediated by basic notions of justice and 
esteem.
Fukuyama and Sloterdijk restated the ancient notion of thumos to capture 
the political force of anger, pride and shame in an age which to their mind 
was blind to higher, or immaterial, values. Fukuyama presented a broader 
approach, compared to Sloterdijk, by downplaying rage in favour of moral 
values, foregrounding violations of human dignity rather than preparedness 







72 The ambiguous desire for recognition
ambiguity of thumos; the tension between status- seeking and retaliatory desire. 
In addition, and more surprisingly, they invoked Hegel’s struggle for recogni-
tion to support their positions. Sloterdijk and Fukuyama considered thumos to 
be the essence of Hegel’s concept of recognition, either without further quali-
fication (Fukuyama 2012), or with the amendment that the Hegelian striving 
for recognition portrayed thumos as ‘conditioned by civilization’ (Sloterdijk 
2010:  24). Their reference to Hegel may seem unorthodox, as it requires a 
reading that differs in a key respect from what is generally thought to charac-
terize recognition. On most available accounts within the Hegelian tradition 
(Kojève 1969; Taylor 1975; Honneth 1992; O’Neill 1996), recognition is recip-
rocal and conducive to personal growth and societal well- being. The tradition 
also harbours a different approach to recognition, associated with Jean- Paul 
Sartre and Judith Butler, according to which domination is the ground for rec-
ognition. Satisfaction of desire involves sustaining subjection, as conformity 
to asymmetrical power structures is the precondition for recognition (Bertram 
and Celikates 2015; see also McNay 2008). Recognition is the final yet ques-
tionable reward for subject formation. Sloterdijk and Fukuyama, on the other 
hand, can be seen to question the majority approach from the point of view 
of desire rather than subject formation. Their accounts of thumos are the 
opposite of what is conventionally associated with the dynamics of recogni-
tion: one- sided rather than mutual, confined to social esteem, and defensive 
rather than progressive. A discussion of these three characteristics, and how 
they differ from influential approaches in the Hegelian tradition, as exempli-
fied by Kojève (1969), Taylor (1975) and Honneth (1992), will reveal a new 
ambiguity of thumos – balancing between the bright side and the dark side 
of recognition – and, beyond that, a convergence in the shared emphasis on 
social morality, as providing the basic coordinates of desire.
 1. One- sided rather than mutual. There are few traces of Hegelian dialectic. 
The logic is one of one- sided assertion rather than mutual struggle. 
Sloterdijk’s rage is monologic. Achilles was acting on anger, consumed by 
the idea of restoring honour, without taking the responses of other people 
into account. He was not satisfied by the death of Hector, his main antag-
onist in battle. The rage drove Achilles to drag Hector’s dead body behind 
his chariot around the walls of Troy; dragged by its heels, in a final act of 
disrespect. He went too far and did not care. Fukuyama reproduced the 
one- sidedness at the level of values, when he characterized the Hegelian 
desire for recognition as ‘a form of self- assertion, a projection of one’s 
own values on the outside world’ (Fukuyama 2012: 172). The other can 
accept the projected values, or reject them; winning or losing. Recognition 
is conditional on the surrender of the other. From a more conventional 
Hegelian perspective, this appears as an odd kind of recognition, without 
mutuality, produced seemingly regardless of the other. Most interpret-
ations of the master- and- slave dialectic tend to think of the other as the 
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how hard it is to satisfy desire, precisely because it depends on the other. 
The other is – and has to be – an autonomous agent, capable of granting 
as well as withholding recognition. Historically, by stressing the inter-
actional dimension, Hegel took a significant step forward with respect 
to existing approaches to recognition. The idea of struggle was a radical 
invention compared to Fichte’s rights- oriented model of recognition 
(Honneth 1992). Now, there may well be an element of recognition also 
in one- sided assertion. What appears as one- sided assertion between indi-
viduals may reveal the utmost dependence on the other – in the shape 
of the big Other. As I will argue, this is precisely the kind of recogni-
tion provided by punishment. Extreme disregard for specific others may 
involve extreme sensitivity to the expectations of social morality and be 
rewarded by the generalized other (Lacan 1992; Z ̌ižek 2006). The neces-
sary mutuality need not involve specific individuals. For the later Hegel, 
recognition was embedded in institutionalized social practice (Honneth 
2003). If  so, what appears as monologic rage, or one- sided projection of 
values, may in fact involve far- reaching perceptiveness to existing status 
orders.
 2. The reduction to social esteem. The recognition concerned social esteem, 
and only social esteem. In their attempts to revive the ancient concep-
tion of  thumos, Sloterdijk and Fukuyama stressed the centrality of  pride 
and honour, shame and revenge, dignity and ambition in social life. To 
speak of  recognition in this way makes sense. There appear to be some 
widely acknowledged cross- references making up a cluster of  family 
resemblances oriented around social esteem. The corresponding words – 
‘status’, ‘prestige’, ‘honour’, ‘dignity’ and ‘recognition’ – are interwoven 
in everyday language (Sennett 2003). For a long time, moreover, it may 
have been the only conceivable recognition. Status recognition was the 
primordial form of recognition, historically (Taylor 1992; Honneth 
2003; Welskopp 2013). But the emphasis on social esteem comes across 
as reductive, by modern standards. As discussed in the Hegelian trad-
ition, new forms of  recognition came forth during the nineteenth cen-
tury, linked to the state, to education and the family. The family offered 
love and emotional support, and the state provided equal opportunity 
and respect for legal rights (Honneth 2011). Through the educational 
system, individuals earned merits, which could be realized in the emer-
ging labour markets in return for higher income. Consequently, more 
things than social esteem came to be expected and desired in the inter-
action with other people and the wider community. Alongside the 
desire for social honour and competitiveness, the desire for recognition 
extended into political rights – to be seen as a citizen or as part of  a 
specific group – and emotional support – to be seen with loving eyes in 
the private sphere. The desire for recognition came to include more than 
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 3. Backward- looking and defensive, rather than progressive. Sloterdijk and 
Fukuyama stressed the defensive and potentially violent affirmation of 
social esteem. By doing so, they illuminated what might be referred to 
as the dark side of recognition. The conservative thrust to rehabilitate 
thumos tended to be backward- looking, yearning toward what had been 
lost, or was felt to be endangered: individual honour or collective values. 
Fully appreciating thumos would make people ‘redeem what they possess’ 
(Sloterdijk 2010:  16). What they possessed was above all status. Social 
status and capacity for retaliation took precedence over other values 
which, on a different analysis, were equally much a part of recognition, 
for instance mutual respect, equal rights, and emotional support. It was 
a world in which social esteem must be actively upheld and sometimes 
violently defended, much like in the early version of the master- and- slave 
dialectic, without recourse to institutional redress. The vision could not be 
any more different from the more typical Hegelian prospect of collective 
progress. In System der Sittlichkeit, the struggle was powered by individual 
desire to recover lost social esteem, at any cost. Yet while the struggle for 
recognition could be fierce and violent, it evolved into stable institutions 
and mutual respect, and a corresponding expansion of autonomy at 
the societal level. The entire process took place via negativity; that was 
the dialectical twist. Experiences of non- recognition sustained the desire 
for more recognition. Desire was transgressive, and evolved through 
negativity, but in one direction, and one direction only: toward more rec-
ognition and increased liberty.
In light of these differences, thumos as envisioned by Sloterdijk and 
Fukuyama had few and strenuous ties to recognition. It might appear to 
be the opposite rather than the essence of the Hegelian dynamics of desire. 
Within the tradition, one- sided assertion and dominance have generally been 
dismissed as inauthentic, or a skewed form of recognition. Oppression – and 
related experiences – had a place in the analysis, but only as moments along 
the way toward full recognition. In the recent German reception, associated 
with Critical Theory, it was axiomatic that recognition always represented 
‘the opposite of practices of domination or subjection’ (Honneth 2007: 325). 
Hegel’s fundamental intuition was one of historic progress; individual claims 
for recognition transcended existing institutional forms of recognition, suc-
cessively pushing them to acknowledge and enable more freedom (Honneth 
1992). Each stage of recognition led to more encompassing demands – for 
extended rights, increased status or emotional caring – being placed on the 
existing institutions. A  similar vision recurred in other influential readings 
of Hegel, such as Charles Taylor’s communitarian interpretation. The 
Phenomenology described a process toward full human self- realization, as 
a progressive externalization of inner strivings, and the corresponding evo-
lution of social conditions. The recognition being provided in mutual inter-
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sense of who they were and developed into (Taylor 1975; 1992). In the French 
reception, starting with Alexandre Kojève, desire represented the motor force 
in history, constantly prompting actions that transcended the prevailing con-
dition. As such, it could involve hunger, followed by the quest for food. But 
in this respect humans were no different from animals. The desire for recog-
nition was the specifically human desire. Everyone wanted to be recognized 
by others in the community, representing a value which was desired by others. 
The struggle for recognition would eventually lead to the equal recognition 
of all individuals, although each desire was blind, defensive and insisting on 
unconditional satisfaction (Kojève 1969). In all these lines of reception, the 
struggle for recognition was unequivocally progressive, in terms of personal 
growth, self- knowledge, extended recognition or more freedom.
There are thus two very different accounts of the dynamic of the desire for 
social esteem. On the one hand, there is the conservative thrust to rehabilitate 
thumos (Fukuyama 2012; Sloterdijk 2010) and on the other hand, the dom-
inant approaches to Hegelian recognition (Kojève 1969; Taylor 1975; Honneth 
1992). The two sets of accounts are in some respects diametrically opposed 
to each other. Yet both of them are nonetheless firmly rooted in the basic 
characteristics of the desire, as well as in a common conception of the source 
of the desire. From my perspective, the strength of the two sets of accounts is 
that they capture each of the main directions of thumos – toward one- sided 
assertion, a strict focus on status, and defensiveness, or, alternatively, toward 
mutual respect, emotional support and equal rights. Taken together, they fur-
ther highlight the central importance of social morality, which provides the 
basic coordinates of the desire for social esteem.
Same desire, contrary outcomes. In the writings of Plato and Aristotle, 
thumos was already highly ambiguous. The desire could find satisfaction in 
vengeance, or in the common good, in ways that could appear to be irrational 
or rational, narrow- minded or in accordance with higher values. The direction 
toward defensive assertion was always present, as one option. Thumos is blind 
in one important sense. Desire, by its very nature, transcends the given, as it 
insists on immediate satisfaction. But the direction of transcendence is not 
inherent in the dynamics of desire. Neither of the two main directions can be 
taken for granted. The direction should be approached as an outcome which 
is influenced by external conditions, and not in terms of immanent logics. In 
the mainstream Hegelian tradition, it was postulated that individual desire for 
recognition by necessity led to ever- increasing recognition – also at a societal 
level: more freedom, and social institutions conducive to more recognition, 
and individual growth. But the desire for recognition may also work counter 
to the evolution of social institutions and personal development. The desire 
for recognition can propel processes toward punishment of non- conformity, 
as well as toward enlarged tolerance and respect for legal rights. Once in 
motion, however, as desire is operating in one direction rather than the other, 
there seems to be an inherent logic at work, rooted in the basic characteristic 
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that the desire cannot be durably satisfied and always incorporates a yearning 
for more: more of the same. In this respect, the desire to be recognized as a 
full member of the community, or the urge to avenge personal injustice is no 
different from less complex desires, such as hunger or thirst. The dark side is 
just as transgressive as the bright side of recognition, but in a very different 
direction: toward intolerance, violence, calls for justice, the discovery of new 
groups to persecute, new forms of deviance, and more punishment.
The underlying social morality. On both sets of accounts, social mor-
ality provided the basic coordinates for the desire for social esteem. Hegel 
foregrounded the lived morality (Sittlichkeit), which differed between com-
munities, with respect to what conferred status, the principles of punishment, 
standards of expectations, and notions of what the world was like. Social 
morality was behind the shifting content of thumos- related virtues and vices 
in ancient Greece, medieval France, and early- modern Germany. The col-
lective morality of the group was the source of desire – and that which, if  
violated, provoked anger and propelled collective action (Fukuyama 2012). 
On that common basis, thumos could find satisfaction in conventional goals, 
which conferred social status on the individual, such as higher education, a 
well- kept home, military service, gainful employment, a spotless reputation, 
conspicuous consumption, or whatever happened to confer social esteem on 
an individual. This shaped the basic coordinates of desire. Hence, strictly 
speaking, my desire is not my desire. To gain recognition, it is never about 
what I want, but what I take that others expect from me. As Slavoj Žižek put 
it bluntly; ‘the original question of desire is not directly “What do I want?”, 
but “What do others want from me?” ’ (Žižek 1997: 9). The key figure is the 
other, whose desire it is. It can be significant others, specific people in everyday 
life. But it can also be interpreted as a generalized other, the lived social mor-
ality and stratified notions of status, which are embedded in practices such as 
punishment. Generalized, but never undifferentiated, and always fine- tuned 
to the social positions of individual members. On this basis of expectations, 
thumos can be deflected from individual status concerns, toward higher 
values, associated with justice and morality. These were idealized abstractions 
derived from the way of life of the community, which contained the seeds 
of narrow- mindedness and violence, and could dictate punitive anger toward 
acts of nonconformity (Paskewich 2014), while allowing people to conceive 
of themselves as companions of true glory, like the white- winged horse in 
Plato’s parable.
On this line of reasoning, there is no particular desire to punish which is 
shared by the population and which can only find satisfaction in punishment, 
and punishment alone. There is no need to posit a natural lust for cruelty – 
nor is there a need for a socially constructed one. Instead, there is a desire to 
be fully part of society, which is generic and which may be satisfied by pun-
ishment – and a range of other actions, achievements and institutions:  the 
personal, irrational rush to action and the prudent achievement of conven-
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complexity and duality already at the stage of desire. In ancient Greece, 
thumos oscillated between a narrow meaning – the desire for revenge, uncon-
trollable anger in the face of a specific violation, immediate restoration of 
social honour – and a broader meaning: the desire for social esteem, conferred 
by achievement of conventional goals. The desire drew support from social 
morality and existing notions of order and justice, yet was inherently dual-
istic, predisposed to excess and to conformity, marked by uncontrollable anger 
and calculated concern, by personal affliction and general notions of justice. 
In the field of tension between reason and passion, thumos was treated as an 
elusive third element of human motivation, which has been persistently 
discussed and ambiguously valued in the Western tradition of thought. 
Vengeance and status- seeking have been balancing at the margins of legit-
imacy, as reflected in Aquinas’s positions on vengefulness (it could be rational) 
and status- seeking (it could be a cardinal sin). The fundamental ambiguity was 
further reflected in Hegel’s first version of the master- and- slave dialectic, and 
sharply exposed in recent attempts to rehabilitate the concept by Sloterdijk 
and Fukuyama, which suggests that there may be a dark as well as a bright 
side of the dynamic of the desire for recognition of status. In the next chapter, 
I will follow this desire to the other side of the gap to discuss its satisfaction 
in three premodern historical contexts:  the tragedies in ancient Greece, the 
depictions of hell in medieval Europe and the early- modern public executions, 
as consumed by contemporary audiences.
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4  The paradox of tragic pleasure
In Poetics, Aristotle approached the conundrum, how watching the pain 
of others can be pleasurable. The Attic tragedies of his time presented the 
audience with horrific acts of violence and intra- familial betrayal, seemingly 
without end. At the same time, they provided pleasure to an audience. That is 
the paradox of tragic pleasure: the satisfaction received by watching the pain 
and suffering of others. Many well- known philosophers have had something 
to say about the problem, as it continued to puzzle over the centuries. No 
one articulated the paradox better than David Hume in the short essay Of 
Tragedy published in 1757:
It seems an unaccountable pleasure, which the spectators of a well- written 
tragedy receive from sorrow, terror, anxiety, and other passions, that are 
in themselves disagreeable and uneasy. The more they are touched and 
affected, the more are they delighted with the spectacle.
(Hume 1987: 216)
This is an eloquent and oft- cited formulation of what appears counter-
intuitive:  the more ‘sorrow, terror, anxiety’, the more pleasure. Given that 
pain and pleasure are conflicting emotions, how can the consumption of 
pain generate pleasure? Accustomed lines of reasoning did not seem to apply. 
Watching pain should be painful. But as indicated by Hume, pain was pleas-
urable within the context of tragedy. Hence the paradox.
The problem of ‘pleasure in watching pain’ first surfaced in the analysis 
of the pleasure drawn from the Attic tragedy. The theatre stage was also 
Hume’s frame of reference. Yet the apparent paradox has been a recurring 
topic in the philosophical thought on punishment, as exacted on other venues. 
I have chosen three cases of punishment: classical tragedies (ancient Greece), 
afterworldly punishments (medieval Europe), and public executions (early- 
modern Europe). The cases may not – apart from the last one – be imme-
diately recognizable as punishment, on a modern understanding. Yet they 
were culturally intelligible as such to contemporaries. The observed suffering 
was understood as punishment imposed for rule violations. All three kinds 
of punishments were moreover identified as pleasurable to contemporary 
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audiences, and the pleasure they were thought to provide was explicitly 
addressed by contemporary authors. There are also other commonalities 
between the cases, with respect to the basic mechanisms involved and the kind 
of pleasure being generated. Yet the experience of pleasure is assumed to be 
context- specific. The pleasure of tragedies refers to the experience of attending 
the Great Dionysia during the short democratic period of Athens. Modern 
theatre audiences may enjoy watching the same plays, but they will by neces-
sity have a different experience, due to the world enacted through punishment 
(they are not likely to believe in the play of gods or in mandatory vengeance), 
through the institutional infrastructure of punishment (private vengeance is 
not the only option), and through particularities of the scene of consumption 
(the plays are not part of festivities or political manifestations). For the same 
reasons, while modern readers of Dante may enjoy the Divine Comedy and 
be fascinated by the worlds of heaven and hell, they will not experience the 
recognition of the medieval Christian community, which depended on the his-
torically unique and collectively shared existential predicament being enacted 
in the punishment.
I will revisit some of the more noteworthy discussions on the paradox-
ical pleasure of watching pain, here represented by Aristotle and Aeschylus 
(ancient Greece), Thomas Aquinas and Dante Alighieri (medieval France/ 
Italy), and Thomas Hobbes and Jeremy Bentham (early- modern England). 
The problem has been framed differently, reflecting the widely shifting state of 
the discussion at the time of writing: as the paradoxical pleasure of watching 
tragedies, the beauty of divine justice in hell, the enjoyment of excessively 
painful executions, or as the modern predicament of disavowed atrocities and 
private pleasures. The basic problem, however, was essentially the same: how 
can the consumption of pain generate pleasure? There is no straightforward 
answer to this question since the satisfaction was embedded in assumptions 
and narratives. The spectacle of cruelty was not pleasurable per se. The satis-
faction must be contextualized and re- inscribed in the corresponding world. 
The world- making quality of punishment is assumed to be the key to the 
paradox. It is necessary to look beyond the salient pain and suffering, and 
even beyond the specific domain of crime and punishment, and envisage the 
social world as a whole, and which challenges that world presented people 
at the time. Hence, to understand the pleasure, one needs to understand the 
world – three very different worlds – being enacted, first in the Attic tragedy, 
and then by divine punishment in medieval Europe and in the early- modern 
executions. I will undertake an attempt to reconstruct existential dilemmas, as 
they were experienced by the individual spectator. The aim is to understand 
the possible enjoyment provided to contemporary penal audiences. How did 
punishment in three pre- modern contexts satisfy the desire for social esteem 
among contemporary audiences? Analytically, this means a shift from desire 
to enjoyment. The desire for social esteem will be followed to the other side of 
the gap between desire and enjoyment. Given the complexities of thumos, how 
was it satisfied through the consumption of punishment?
82 The paradox of tragic pleasure
Attic tragedy: enacting existential dilemmas
In what has been called the ‘locus classicus of  tragic choice’ (Goldhill 2004: 
25), Agamemnon was ordered by Zeus to embark on a punishing expedition 
to sack the city of Troy. Zeus is king of the Olympian Gods, yet he issued 
the order in his capacity as the protector of proper family relations. Helen, 
the wife of his brother, had run away with the prince of Troy, or she had been 
abducted by him. It is not altogether clear why Helen left but, either way, the 
household’s honour had been violated. Hence, Zeus’s intervention. On his 
way to Troy, Agamemnon received a message from another Olympian God, 
Artemis. A seer had witnessed a pregnant hare being eaten by eagles, which 
meant that Agamemnon will have to sacrifice his own daughter Iphigeneia, 
should he proceed on the mission. Agamemnon was thus presented with two 
options. He will either exact the obligated revenge, and be forced to kill his 
daughter afterwards, or he will spare the life of Iphigeneia, his daughter, and 
passively endure the violation of social norms tied to his status as king of 
Mycenae.
A heavy fate not to obey
But heavy if  I am to rend my
child, glory of the household,
Staining a father’s hand
With streams of virgin sacrifice near the altar.
What of this is without disaster?
(Agamemnon 206– 11, translated  
by Goldhill 2004)
The choice between defending the ‘glory of the household’ and the life of his 
daughter Iphigeneia is tragic since there was no escape from the dilemma. 
Zeus demanded restoration of social esteem, while Artemis has held up the 
fleet and insisted on the sacrificial killing. Agamemnon was trapped in a 
hopelessly difficult situation, where all options had disastrous ramifications. 
What conferred the specifically tragic quality on the choice was that it would 
be impossible for him to live with the consequences, however he chose, as 
underlined by the last line; ‘what of this is without disaster?’ Convinced that 
he will have to kill Iphigeneia with his own hands ‘near the altar’, in a way 
reminding one of the contemporary religious sacrifices, Agamemnon never-
theless continued to sail toward Troy and impose an excessive revenge on the 
people of Troy. But he could not live with the consequences of the choice – lit-
erally not. Arriving home victorious, Agamemnon was eventually murdered 
because of it.
The Oresteia was built on events and characters from the Homeric 
poems. It was a blood feud in which any act of punishment led to a call for 
revenge. The logic of private vengeance propelled the story (Goldhill 2004; 
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starting with a supposed adultery, continuing with murders, between two 
ruling families across generations, also affecting numerous ordinary citizens 
who were compelled to take part in the penal expeditions, or were otherwise 
affected by them, as soldiers, sailors, residents or citizens. Every atrocity was 
part of an ongoing vendetta, where the perpetrator was the next victim; ‘the 
very act of taking revenge repeatedly turns the revenger into an object of 
revenge’ (Goldhill 2004: 24). The Oresteia thus embraced the sacred duty to 
uphold honour through punishment. The absolute character of the duty was 
underlined by divine command. Zeus directed Agamemnon to Troy, Apollo 
commanded Orestes to murder his own mother, and so on, while they were the 
ones who later had to live with the consequences of their own actions.
Although cast in a dramatic form, the Oresteia reflected the social insti-
tution of punishment at the time. It was also clearly influenced by demo-
cratic ideas and practices. The surviving plays of Aeschylus, Sophocles and 
Euripides, the three great tragics, were all written and produced during the 
heyday of Athenian democracy, and would incorporate some of its institu-
tional inventions. As often discussed in the literature, they were marked by the 
tension between the aristocratic virtues of the Homeric poems, which stemmed 
from a different time, before the evolution of the city- state, and the ‘civic 
ideology’ of the democratic political rule (Seaford 1994; Goldhill 1990). The 
Oresteia, in particular, reflected both the Homeric world in which punishment 
relied on private vengeance, and the tension with an embryonic system of public 
justice, which still largely obeyed the logic of private vengeance (Cohen 1995; 
Allen 2000). One of the most discussed modifications of the original Homeric 
narrative was Aeschylus’s introduction of a court of law in the Eumenides, the 
final part of the trilogy, to settle the vendetta. Orestes was tried for the murder 
of his mother; the deities of revenge were infuriated by the acquittal but even-
tually mollified and integrated in the new judicial order. The trial of Orestes 
on stage mirrored the proceedings of the public court in Athens (Sommerstein 
2013), as well as the evolution of democratic institutions. Areopagus, the place 
of Orestes’s trial, was symbolic in this respect. It had recently been a central 
political body of the aristocratic regime. Yet a few years before the Oresteia 
was performed for the first time, in the spring of 458 BC, the political power 
had been transferred from Areopagus to the popular Assembly. The move has 
been assessed as a decisive step in the process of democratization (Meier 1990). 
No longer used for political decision- making, Areopagus was converted into 
a court of law that came to be specialized in homicide cases (Leão 2013). So, 
choosing Areopagus as the venue for the trial in the Oresteia underlined the 
close links to contemporary penal practices, at the same time as it reminded the 
audience of ongoing political change.
The Attic tragedy itself  was a democratic institution, and as such 
hugely popular. As opposed to earlier stage productions – music or poetry 
commissioned for court consumption – the tragedies were produced for citi-
zens, rich and poor, and many people attended the plays and the festivals 
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each spring during Great Dionysia. Spectators turned out in large numbers 
to socialize, or to fulfil their public obligations. It has been estimated that a 
substantial minority, between 15,000 and 20,000 people, of the total popula-
tion of Athens attended the yearly festival (Griffith 1995). The spectatorship 
reflected the composition of any important public event, with an overwhelming 
presence of men with some amount of social standing. Female citizens, 
slaves and foreigners were present to some extent and, particularly in the 
early days, large numbers of poor people were present (Roselli 2011). Tickets 
were distributed through existing political networks. The regime and a civic 
ideology were promulgated, and high- ranking militaries presided over the rit-
uals attached to the plays (Goldhill 1990; 2000). Attendance was expected. 
Those who were invited to the festival were expected to show up. Attendance 
was considered along the lines of a civic duty; ‘theater attendance’, it has been 
remarked, was ‘closely linked to citizenship’ (Winkler and Zeitlin 1990: 4). 
But it could also have been sought for other reasons. The popularity of 
the plays must, in addition, be attributed to the enjoyment they provided. 
The tragedies were written with the intention of providing audiences with 
pleasure (Destrée 2014), and many of them seem to have been successful in 
this respect. The experiences of contemporary Athenians who took part in 
the yearly festivals belonged to the ‘frustratingly undefined but essential cat-
egory of pleasure’ (Roselli 2011: 26). Sitting on the benches in the open- air 
amphitheatres, they were presented with a series of atrocities and dismay on 
stage, which evidently afforded pleasure. The pleasure must be understood in 
its historic context. As Mark Griffith (1995) has argued, the Attic tragedy was 
a cultural form that was born during and in the strict sense confined to Athens 
in the fifth century BCE. The satisfaction drawn from watching Oresteia in the 
festival of Great Dionysia may have little to do with the possible satisfaction 
of today’s audiences. Although the same tragedies are still played on scenes 
around the world, and remain popular, the pleasure they once provided has 
to be understood in context. The spectators’ experience was shaped by the 
immediate circumstances surrounding the play – it was part of a large fes-
tival with elements of eating and drinking, religious processions and public 
relations – as well as by the shared frame of reference between authors, actors 
and audiences (Griffith 1995; Goldhill 2000; Rosselli 2011).
Plato was concerned about the popularity of the tragedies. In the Republic 
(606a- b), he criticized dramatic poetry for producing the wrong kind of 
emotions among the audience:  above all pity. To feel for the characters’ 
misfortunes on stage was pleasurable, yet he dismissed pity on the grounds 
that it was bad for the spectators’ character. Aristotle adopted a different 
approach to the emotions involved, revalued pity and turned tragic pleasure 
into a philosophical problem. It has been called the ‘paradox of tragic 
pleasure’ (Destrée 2014):  that tragedy at one and the same time generates 
pain and pleasure for an audience. One common approach to the paradox 
was to assume that the painful experience transformed as the play unfolded; 
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approach was encapsulated in the notion of katharsis. In the Aristotelian 
analysis of tragedy, the experience was the joint product of pity and fear. 
While often translated as purification, katharsis is better thought of as dis-
charge of emotion (Nuttall 1996). It was an overwhelming sense of relief, 
evolving out of the pity and the fear experienced by the audience, as they felt 
with the characters on stage. On one reading of Aristotle, katharsis referred 
specifically to the satisfaction of thumos and status anxieties (Belfiore 1992). 
Witnessing the main characters acting out their thumos on stage, appreci-
ating their anguish from the safe position of the spectators’ seat, and sensing 
the violent character of the desire and its disastrous consequences, affected 
the desire of the audience. Over the course of the Oresteia, the everyday 
distress and status anxieties of the audience were alleviated, by living through 
the tragic choices of Agamemnon. Indirectly, their own status distress was 
experienced less intensely. Watching tragedies thus tempered rather than sat-
isfied the spectators’ desire, which was just as transgressive and obsessed with 
social esteem as the characters’.
Alternatively, the pleasure of tragedies was somehow related to what the 
world was like, or what it was depicted to be like, against the backdrop of a 
transcendental order that cast its shadows over the events, and the spectators’ 
reminiscence of basic existential conditions. What Aeschylus offered the con-
temporary spectators of the Oresteia was ‘a magnified reflection of their own 
lives’ (Euben 1982: 24). It was the mark of a skilful playwriter to re- enact the 
order of the world, along with the existential implications of that order. The 
contemporary audiences would recognize the moral dilemmas in their lives, 
their existing options and the forces at work behind them, in the actions and 
the sufferings of the characters on stage (Halliwell 2002; Nussbaum 1992). 
On this reading, the satisfaction would have less to do with the pain of others. 
Instead, the world- making qualities of tragedies were decisive. Tragic pleasure 
would not be derived from the pain of the other, mediated by fear and pity 
and other emotional reactions within the audience, but would stem from the 
consumption of punishment in its entire moral and world- making capacities. 
The tragedies provided the spectators with satisfaction by including them in 
a moral order and by processing their existential dilemmas. The audience not 
only recognized the underlying order of the world, in the sense that they were 
familiar with it. They were moreover recognized by that order in return – or 
more accurately: they might recognize themselves as parts of that order. The 
spectators were not merely spectators of a stage production but participants 
in a ritual that enacted a socio- religious world, which included them as indi-
vidual cogs and confirmed their place in the bigger scheme of things.
The Attic tragedy constituted a community of spectators and under-
pinned interpretations of the social world specifically in the dimension of 
justice and order. The Oresteia was exemplary in this respect (Goldhill 2004; 
Griffith 1995; Macleod 1982). Popular notions of justice played a pivotal role. 
Although the acts of vengeance were predominantly extra- legal and exces-
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of social morality (Goldhill 2004; Leão 2013). The transcendent order and 
the world of human affairs were not kept separate. The Olympian Gods fre-
quently intervened on behalf  of the struggling human royalties. The leading 
characters were called upon by Zeus, or by Apollo, to execute the revenge, 
and to restore the status that came with their social position. The principles 
of honour, in particular with respect to family relations  – norms of sexu-
ality, hospitality, or loyalty – directed the course of action on stage, just like 
in the public realm. The expectation to protect social status was pervasive, 
throughout the social body, extending to everyone, in principle. Yet the enacted 
moral universe above all addressed what it meant to be ‘a male, a citizen, an 
Athenian’ (Griffith 1995: 63). This social minority – making up approximately 
one- tenth of the total population in the city- state at the time – represented the 
bulk of the participants at the festival (Roselli 2011). To this audience of adult 
male citizens, the tragedies presented a world governed by private vengeance, 
forces beyond their reach and the centrality of social esteem. Slaves, female 
citizens and foreign residents were represented as characters in the play, and 
contributed in their respective roles to produce the world, with which one 
was familiar. Although the existential dilemmas belonged to male citizens, 
everyone was part of the enacted moral universe. The trilogy ended with the 
whole people of Athens on stage, representing the unity of the city- state.
Modern audiences have grown accustomed to cultural representations 
of penal practices targeting primarily people who are far removed from the 
ordinary arenas of power, glory and even respectability. During Great Dionysia 
in the fifth century BCE, however, it was the suffering and the agony of royals 
that were consumed, not the more profane suffering of a drug pusher, or a 
highwayman. The main characters belonged to the social elite. Those whose 
punishments were on display were rulers, who commanded armies and ruled 
societies. The choruses and the minor parts represented the common people. 
Especially the role of the chorus was decisive for the satisfaction provided to 
the audience. In the Oresteia, the choruses included old men, wives, visitors, 
slaves and servants. The chorus assumed the view from below, in social terms. 
Their view on the events came closest to the perspective of the audience. It was 
moreover significant that the chorus was safe – just like the audience (Griffith 
1995). The chorus was never endangered by the unfolding events and gave 
voice to down- to- earth opinions. Its mood shifted back and forth, and its loy-
alties were unreliable. When Agamemnon was about to announce the victory 
over Troy, the chorus lamented those who once left their homes – ‘but instead 
of human beings urns and ashes arrive back’. It reproached the king for the 
heavy war casualties, and for ‘the slaughter’ instigated because of the personal 
affairs of his brother. The chorus warned of the opinions of ordinary people, 
who had to live with the consequences of vengeance and whose hearts were 
filled with anger (Agamemnon 435– 55). In other passages the chorus spurred 
the characters on to take revenge. After Agamemnon’s death, for instance, it 
incited Orestes to avenge the murder, by killing his mother. The chorus was 
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actions undertaken by the main characters (Conacher 1974). It maintained 
an ambivalent relationship to the elevated status of the rulers who acted on 
the prevailing notions of anger and honour, and who were later struck down 
in acts of retribution.
From the vantage point of ordinary people, tragic pleasure has been 
associated with the satisfaction of watching lionized rulers stumble and 
fall based on their own mistakes. Royals such as Agamemnon were being 
punished for offences which were all the greater because of their standing, 
and therefore punished all the more ingeniously. The satisfaction of the audi-
ence was moral, and depended on the self- incurred misfortunes of powerful 
others (Eagleton 2003). Yet one may catch sight of a fuller satisfaction, by 
completing the shift of focus from Agamemnon to the chorus. Essentially, 
it was a story about them, the common people in the chorus. Rather than 
processing the spectators’ relationship to their superiors, the tragedies may 
have enacted a social world in which they recognized each other, thereby sat-
isfying their own specific desire for recognition. Picking up on Peter Euben’s 
remark on the achievement of Aeschylus, to provide contemporary audiences 
with a magnified reflection of their lives, I want to suggest that the tragedies 
processed a widely shared existential dilemma in ways that could involve a 
collective recognition of social esteem.
In the context of Athens in the fifth century BCE, the Oresteia enacted an 
existential dilemma which may have satisfied the spectators’ thumos- desire, by 
way of each other. On the one hand, there was the generally shared expect-
ation to assert social esteem, and to do so privately – specifically in the face 
of flagrant violations of honour. This expectation was acted out by the main 
characters, to the fullest extent, as underlined by the chorus on stage. On the 
other hand, there was the inability to determine one’s own fate, the agonizing 
lack of control of consequences, which was likewise experienced to the fullest 
by the main characters, and commented on by the chorus, in a world that 
was ruled by wilful gods and other forces beyond human control. Not even 
Agamemnon, despite his being the great warrior king, could determine the 
outcomes, since it was a world which escaped the control of the main actors, 
the chorus and the audience alike. ‘What of this is without disaster?’ – like 
Agamemnon, they could experience being caught between impossible options. 
The tragedies acknowledged the imperative of status- seeking as well as the 
basic futility of that endeavour, affirming the vulnerability of everyone and the 
location of power elsewhere. By acting out contradictions that were inherent 
in thumos- desire and which were further reinforced by the social conditions, 
the tragedies acknowledged the predicament of the individual spectator. They 
repackaged the contradiction between fatalism and vigilant self- assertion into 
a coherent message, which was conveyed to the festival participants. It became 
a story about them; you try hard to fulfil existing norms of social esteem, just 
like Agamemnon did, while success is beyond your control, just like it was for 
him. Still you try – like we all do, and in this striving, in precisely this exist-
ential predicament, you are one of us: a citizen, as good as anyone and fully 
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part of society. Watching Agamemnon struggle with the play of gods and the 
duty to vindicate social esteem could provide relief  from status concerns, pri-
marily to the male citizens who were the overwhelming majority of the audi-
ence. It made them recognize each other, as struggling with the same basic 
predicament in social life, and hence equally part of the group. In this way, the 
tragedy offered temporary satisfaction of the perpetual desire for social 
esteem. The spectators were recognized in their day- to- day struggle to manage 
the tension between the expectations of social morality and their lack of con-
trol of outcomes.
Divine justice: watching hell
The paradox of tragic pleasure recurred in a cosmological setting in the thir-
teenth century. In the work of Thomas Aquinas, it appeared as a theological 
problem, posed within the context of divine justice. The punishments in hell 
were seen to provide contemporary audiences with a pleasure of contra-
dictory nature. It was a pleasure in watching the pain of others, even though 
the pain was envisioned rather than observed. The envisioned afterworldly 
punishments were an integral part of the composition of the moral uni-
verse. Yet how could watching or contemplating hell provide spectators with 
pleasure? And how could it be enjoyed in such a manner that one did not turn 
into a future candidate for afterworldly punishment? The problem was expli-
citly addressed in Summa Theologica.
As opposed to the large numbers of spectators at the Great Dionysia 
festival, few people at the time would have read Aquinas, or anyone else 
writing on divine justice. The Summa Theologica comprised four thousand 
pages, which were inaccessible to the vast majority, because of its style of 
writing, the limited literacy and the manual copying techniques. By itself, his 
treatise could not satisfy a wider audience. Similar observations apply to 
Dante Alighieri and his masterpiece the Divine Comedy completed in 1320. 
Its literary qualities escaped most people at the time, for reasons of literacy 
and copying techniques. His vision of hell was nevertheless part of the con-
temporary culture, and corresponded to widely spread notions on the after-
life (Morgan 1990). There were many routes through which the principles of 
divine justice being developed in the theological writings would reach and 
possibly satisfy an audience of ordinary people. Aquinas’s positions could 
count on institutional support from the Catholic Church (Chesterton 1943). 
The influence of the Church was unparalleled at the time, and, according to its 
written instructions, hell and divine justice were topics in the weekly sermons 
held throughout the European continent. As the church- goers listened to 
the preaching, they could contemplate the imminence of afterworldly pun-
ishment, while watching visual representations of the damned being boiled, 
impaired, or consumed by fire. In hundreds of medieval churches, the Last 
Judgement was portrayed in horrific detail on walls, windows and ceilings 
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was restricted to educated circles, visual art and sermons reached a larger 
audience. At the time, ordinary people may not have been familiar with all 
the twists and turns of the arguments, or with issues that strike modern 
readers of the Summa Theologica as rather particular, such as whether the 
worm tormenting those consigned to hell was corporeal or not, what the fire 
was like, or whether there was really place for everybody underground (ST 
suppl.- III, Q 97). Yet they must have been familiar with the fundamentals 
of afterworldly punishment. The originally Augustinian idea, that everyone 
deserved everlasting punishment, except for a small minority of individuals 
selected by God, remained influential (Talbott 1993). Many people may there-
fore have perceived themselves to be bound for punishment in the afterlife. 
The punishment was moreover thought to be self- incurred, in the sense that 
it was a consequence of the sins in life. During the Middle Ages, the idea of 
hell was supplemented with ideas on transitory punishment, which integrated 
popular beliefs about an intermediate place between heaven and hell (Le Goff 
1983). The dogma on the purgatory was officially adopted by the Catholic 
Church in 1274: incidentally, the same year as Aquinas passed away and left 
the manuscript of Summa Theologica behind.
In Treatise on the last things, at the end of Summa Theologica, Thomas 
Aquinas discussed the special enjoyment provided by the consumption of 
hell, from a safe distance. It was one of the many questions raised by the 
relationship between the two extreme states of paradise and hell. Both para-
dise and hell were expressions of divine justice, yet one was the place of per-
fect happiness and the other was the site of horrific punishment. The saints 
inhabited paradise, and Aquinas broached the matter of whether they were 
aware of the fate of their fellow Christian companions. Were the saints in 
paradise able to see the sufferings of the damned in hell? Was there a clear 
line of sight? The answer was emphatically yes. Since their existence in para-
dise was perfect in every respect, one might think that the blessed should be 
spared the inconvenience. Or as one objection read: ‘any deformity in the vis-
ible object redounds to the imperfection of the sight’ (ST suppl.- III, Q 94, 
A 1, arg. 2). But that would have contradicted the postulate of perfection. 
Aquinas held that they – alternately referred to as the ‘blessed’ and as the 
‘saints’ – must be able to see, precisely because their existence was perfect.
Nothing should be denied the blessed that belongs to the perfection of 
their beatitude / …/ [and] in order that the happiness of the saints may be 
more delightful to them and that they may render more copious thanks to 
God for it, they are allowed to see perfectly the sufferings of the damned.
(ST suppl.- III, Q 94, A 1, co.)
The saints should thus be allowed to watch everything in hell. They could 
see, if  they wanted to. Yet one might still ask: did they have to watch? Would 
they not pity the wretched souls, or be disturbed by their endless pain? No, 
Aquinas responded; there must be a clear line of sight to hell since watching 
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the torture and the torment enhanced the happiness of the saints. They had 
to watch, precisely for this reason. The souls of the righteous were able to 
draw pleasure from watching the exquisite sufferings in hell, thereby contrib-
uting to their state of perfect happiness. But the answer came with certain 
reservations, which showed that the theological problem was bound up with 
a moral one.
Punishment already generated pleasure in this world. It was a fact of life 
that ‘an angry man takes pleasure in thinking much about vengeance’ (ST I- 
II, Q 48, A 1, co.). This pleasure was morally problematic. Taking pleasure in 
the suffering of a fellow human could not be justified. It constituted a kind of 
hatred, which was contrary to the love of God and hence wrong (ST II- II, Q 
108, A 1). The same principle applied to the consumption of divine punish-
ment in the next world. The pleasure must not be tainted by passions such as 
hatred or pity. To enjoy the misery of the wretched souls in hell was a species 
of hatred, and ruled out as sinful. Nor could the pleasure involve compassion 
with the condemned since that would mean partaking in their unhappiness, 
and hence cease to be pleasurable (ST suppl.- III, Q 94, A 2 & A 3). At the 
same time, Aquinas noted, the Bible endorsed the pleasure of punishment; as 
it was written, ‘the just shall rejoice when he shall see the revenge’ (ST suppl.- 
III, Q 94, A  3, s.c.). How could such a pleasure be untainted by passion? 
Evidently, hell had to be enjoyed in a special way. At this point, Aquinas 
invoked the crucial distinction between direct and indirect enjoyment. To 
enjoy directly was to be carried away by emotions, whereas indirect enjoyment 
was intellectual: enjoyment mediated by reason. Only the latter provided the 
necessary safe ground. The distinction led Aquinas to deduce that God him-
self  took pleasure in the torments in hell: ‘God rejoices not in punishments 
as such, He rejoices in them as being ordered by His justice’ (ST suppl.- III, 
Q 94, A 3, ad. 2). The punishments revealed the full extent of the love of god 
and of the beauty of divine justice. What might have appeared as only human 
misery and excessive pain was in fact evidence of the opposite: the perfection 
of the underlying order. In the same vein, the blessed in paradise did not enjoy 
the torture directly; instead, their pleasure was mediated by reason. It was a 
kind of intellectual enjoyment that bore the mark of a private insight into 
the build- up of the world. Hence, ‘the saints will rejoice in the punishment of 
the wicked, by considering therein the order of Divine justice and their own 
deliverance, which will fill them with joy’ (ST suppl.- III, Q 94, A 3, co.). Some 
people were able to see beyond the pain and beyond the torments in hell to 
instead appreciate the order and perfection of everything – and that was the 
object of their satisfaction.
The philosophical distinction between direct and indirect enjoyment was 
linked to practical outcomes. Like everything else, the pleasure of punishment 
was subject to divine justice and part of the final equation. Given the dual 
prospects of heaven and hell, the problem of the pleasure in watching the pain 
of others has perhaps never been posed more radically. Everlasting happiness 
and eternal pain were separated by the fine line between virtuous and sinful 
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behaviour. The imposed suffering had to be perceived strictly through notions 
of divine justice; one could not be moved by the suffering as such, through 
pity or vengefulness, or through the sense of being better off  than those who 
suffered, in hell or elsewhere. If  the satisfaction of thumos more generally was 
a balancing act between worldly notions of social esteem and religious con-
demnation of pride, the pleasure of punishment involved a special balancing 
act. Derived in one way, the pleasure was a virtue, and derived in another way, 
it was a sin. If  tainted by emotion, what was an intellectual joy for would- be 
saints, the contemplation of a perfectly ordered universe, would slip into a 
mortal sin, reducing them to ordinary sinners and diminishing their prospects 
at the Last Judgement. Everyone, without exception, was at the same time 
invited to contemplate the principles of divine justice. Nothing stopped 
ordinary Christians – referred to as ‘wayfarers’ – from appreciating the fun-
damental order of the world and the redemption to be found in punishment, 
although it was a task that presented them with much difficulty, ‘because in a 
wayfarer the passions often forestall the judgment of reason’ (ST suppl.- III, 
Q 94, A 3, ad 3). The saints were seen to be better off  in this respect, as they 
were disposed to enjoy punishment through reason and much less likely to fall 
prey to passions.
The Divine Comedy belonged to a literature genre on the afterlife, which 
integrated popular beliefs with official Christian tenets. It presented a story 
about everlasting happiness and eternal damnation, and the ways to each 
according to the principles of divine justice. Dante was guided by the Roman 
poet Virgil through the long series of punishments in hell and in purgatory, 
before ascending to paradise. It was a demonstration of divine justice at work. 
The pain, in particular, was endorsed as an expression of divine justice, as the 
famous inscription on the gates to hell reminded the reader:
Through me the way to everlasting pain,
Through me the way among the lost.
Justice moved my maker on high.
Divine power made me,
Wisdom supreme, and primal love.
(Inf. III: 1– 6)
The institution of hell was in other words built on the same principles as the 
rest of the world:  justice, wisdom and love. The afterworldly punishments 
forcefully demonstrated these principles – in ways that Dante sought to recon-
struct from his horizon.
Whereas Aeschylus, in the Oresteia, had developed the implications of 
the Greek concept of justice simultaneously at the ontological and the inter-
personal level (Leão 2013), in Dante’s world the two kinds of justice were 
to be kept strictly separate. In Medieval Europe, the transcendent order 
was not conceived to intervene in the worldly business of punishment. The 
principles were of divine origin, and their import admittedly evaded human 
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comprehension. At the same time, Dante implicitly passed hundreds of 
judgements in the Inferno, and the apparent lack of system in this part has 
puzzled interpreters of the Divine Comedy. As opposed to the penances in the 
Purgatorio, the punishments in hell did not cohere to established theological 
principles. Many individual encounters have given rise to speculation. Why, 
for instance, did Dante suddenly encounter his friend and teacher Brunetto 
Latini in the middle of hell? Was it because he knew that Latini was secretly 
homosexual and foresaw the outcome of the judgement upon his death (Ruud 
2008)? Church doctrines at the time prescribed harsh penalties, and in some 
parts of Italy sodomy was punishable by death (Burgwinkle 2004). In add-
ition to being thought of as acts of divine intervention based on unknow-
able principles, the pain inflicted in hell also seems to have been grounded in 
the social morality of Italy in the fourteenth century. The incorporation of 
social morality was precisely what made them intelligible to contemporary 
audiences as punishment. Consequently, the Inferno conveys a rather stereo-
typical image of sinners. Although everyone in the Christian community was 
supposed to be a sinner, and thus a likely candidate for eternal damnation, the 
actual population of sinners in Dante’s hell – as well as, one might add, in the 
visual representations in the churches (Fudgè 2016) – were thieves, murderers, 
prostitutes, corrupt politicians, adulterers and heretics. They were punished in 
this world – and they were punished in the next world.
There are two answers to the central question, how the consumption of 
the envisioned punishments in the afterlife provided pleasure to contem-
porary audiences. One assumes that the audience were believers; that people 
who read Aquinas, or took part of the Thomistic framework via the weekly 
sermons, actually endorsed the cosmology and were able to fully appreciate 
the divinely ordered world. The other answer simply assumes that the audi-
ence were familiar with ideas of the inevitability of afterworldly punishment, 
and felt that there was little they could do about it.
1. Robin Kirkpatrick has argued that the Divine Comedy explored the 
ontological relationship between God and human beings in a way that turned 
the relationship into a personal one (Kirkpatrick 2004). To Dante, the cosmo-
logical order was not abstract, or indifferent to the strivings of individuals. 
The relationship was emphatically personal, as underlined at the very end of 
the Paradisio when Dante sees God face to face, and in a flash experienced the 
divine order in its entirety. He was overwhelmed by the immediate insight; ‘O 
how all speech is feeble and falls short of my conceit’ (Par. XXXIII: 121– 2). 
The relationship was reciprocal. In the face- to- face encounter, he not only 
saw God but he was also seen by God. Dante was recognized by God, as a 
full member of His creation. After the long wandering, he was finally satis-
fied; ‘the ardour of desire within me ended’ (Par. XXXIII: 48). The encounter 
in paradise was painted in the brightest of colours, and was accompanied by 
feelings of joy. Dante’s encounters in hell would not produce joy. They would 
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offer satisfaction of thumos. Following the inscription on its gates, one might 
discern the workings of God in the punishments in hell. They revealed a 
world shot through with meaning and emotional ties, entirely built on the 
principles of love and justice and wisdom. To see the punishments in that light 
may have provided satisfaction of the desire for recognition. The satisfaction 
required the indirect enjoyment advocated by Aquinas, and might in addition 
presuppose a particular vantage point, largely corresponding to the position 
of the saints in Aquinas’s cosmology. Having managed to reach paradise, 
and thereby occupying the only available safe position in universe, the saints 
could contemplate the cosmological order, as they watched the never- ending 
torments far below. To them, the punishments in hell need not be a personal 
concern but could satisfy their desire for social esteem:  the reassurance of 
their place – the best possible one – in a divinely ordered world.
2. To ordinary people, representations of hell were a reminder of what 
awaited. Their position in the enacted world had little resemblance to the 
saints’ situation. Ordinary people could not avoid to sin, as they were, on 
occasion, envious, proud, licentious, or enraged. The audience, for instance 
church visitors listening to the preachings, or looking at the paintings of 
people being punished in hell, were sinners destined for hell, and they too – or 
most of them – could one day be punished in a similar fashion. Yet precisely 
because punishment in the afterlife seemed next to inevitable, they may also 
have experienced the satisfaction of thumos. They might do penance in life, or 
other things to survive the Last Judgement, such as purchasing counterfeited 
relics (Fudgè 2016). The wealthy could buy letters of indulgence. Yet not even 
kings or popes could escape the scrutiny at the Last Judgement. The outcome 
lay in the hands of forces beyond their comprehension as well as their control. 
The Divine Comedy enacted that dilemma, of being a good Christian  – as 
good as anybody else – and of belonging to a community destined for dam-
nation. You were expected to be a good Christian and live a virtuous life, 
without sin. Yet that was impossible except for a select few, so, despite their 
strivings, most people were destined for hell, or purgatory. That was a shared 
dilemma – the expectation to be a good Christian and the eventual futility 
of that striving, as you were doomed anyway, according to both Church 
doctrines and widely held popular beliefs. Ironically, this involved a recogni-
tion of full membership of the community. You may not be a good Christian 
in the eyes of God – such recognition was reserved for the saints. But you 
were recognized by other people as a full and worthy member of the Christian 
community, since your predicament was the same as everybody else’s, on the 
road to damnation, yet leading a life in accordance with the social morality 
at the time, as far as anyone was concerned. In this way, the consumption of 
hell offered temporary satisfaction of the perpetual desire for social esteem. 
The wayfarers were recognized in their day- to- day struggle to manage the 
tension between the expectations of social morality and the expectations of 
the Catholic Church.
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Early- modern capital punishment: theatres of recognition
On 5 January in 1757, Robert- François Damiens attacked and lightly wounded 
the French King Louis XV. His execution some months later made a lasting 
impression on contemporaries and was captured in gruesome detail by Michel 
Foucault on the very first pages of Discipline and Punish. The reactions of the 
audience can be glimpsed in the account.
It is said that, though he [Robert- François Damiens] was always a great 
swearer, no blasphemy escaped his lips; but the excessive pain made him 
utter horrible cries, and he often repeated: “My God, have pity on me! 
Jesus, help me!” The spectators were all edified by the solicitude of the 
parish priest of St Paul’s who despite his great age did not spare himself  
in offering consolation to the patient.
(unnamed chronicler quoted in Foucault 1979: 3)
The torture was intended to end by Damiens being quartered. But the 
executioners were insufficiently familiar with the technique, and the horses, 
pulling each of the four limbs, failed again and again. The punishment was 
horrendous; unusually horrendous, in fact, as the crime was political and 
had been directed at the king. This was Foucault’s foremost concern:  the 
ceremonial cruelty. The shock effect of the opening scene made the reader 
appreciate the magnitude of the transformation which punishment undeni-
ably went through in the first half  of the nineteenth century. The protracted 
cruelty of the Paris execution differed markedly from the hidden pains of 
imprisonment. However, what the snapshot of Damiens and the priest also 
reveals is that the spectacle of cruelty was embedded in a story of possible 
redemption through suffering. The spectators were described by the unnamed 
chronicler to be edified. There was a moral lesson embedded in the spectacle 
of suffering. The lesson was not so much about what was right or wrong; 
rather, people were instructed what the world was like in the bigger scheme of 
things, and reminded of their own place in it.
Once again, the enacted world is the key to unlock the apparent paradox 
of how pleasure could be derived from the pain of others. David Hume’s 
famous formulation of the problem concerned ‘well- written’ tragedies: stage 
productions, where the experience of pain to some extent relied on the powers 
of imagination on the part of the audience, and not the contemporary penal 
practices. But the paradox of tragic pleasure is equally applicable to public 
executions. It may have been more socially accepted to draw pleasure from 
watching a tragedy. Yet the paradox itself  was merely underlined by the fact 
that the pain that confronted spectators at the execution was real, as opposed 
to the pain being enacted in the tragedies. The violence of early- modern pun-
ishment could be excessive, sometimes extending beyond death, when maimed 
corpses were put on display. Yet as indicated by contemporary observations 
to the effect that public executions reminded them of classic tragedies, desire 
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may have been satisfied in a similar fashion. It was not the kind of penal 
pleasure that most readily springs to mind: the intense arousal at the scene, or 
the eye- witness accounts of carnivalesque excitement. Instead, it was a relief  
of thumos, in the sense of fully belonging to a community. Witnessing an exe-
cution during the early- modern period could satisfy the spectators’ thumos by 
including them in a ritual, which demonstrated a shared existential predica-
ment. The public executions enacted a world in which the common people, 
who made up the overwhelming majority of the audience, experienced uncon-
ditional protection and extreme vulnerability. Caught between the two forces 
of the sovereign state and imminent death, there seemed to be little they could 
do about it.
At the beginning of the period, especially in the sixteenth century, 
European executions were shrouded in a dense web of religious symbolism. 
Even the extremely cruel executions contained aspects of redemption. As 
several historians have pointed out, the first- hand experiences of horrific 
punishments were framed within a cosmological order where pain had a 
deeper religious meaning (Cohen 1989; Merback 1999; Groebner 2003). To 
the contemporary audience, the ritual on the scaffold seemed to re- enact the 
Christian cosmology, in which they too were condemned from the outset, yet 
were miraculously offered the prospect of redemption through the suffering 
on the cross. For this reason, it has been argued, the public executions could 
be comforting (Merback 1999). Contemporary audiences may have been no 
less horrified, but were at the same time reassured. Where modern audiences 
might primarily see cruelty, in the floggings, the mutilations and the hangings, 
contemporary audiences could also discern purification of sin and appreciate 
a deep- seated order of the world, as argued by Valentin Groebner (2003). He 
recapitulated the story of one papal envoy, who was travelling from Rome to 
Northern Europe in 1517. Having passed through the Alps, the envoy noted a 
proliferation of execution sites, as well as an abundance of exquisite paintings 
and statuettes of the crucifixion of Jesus. To travellers, such as the papal envoy, 
the connection was obvious. The punished bodies along the roads reminded 
them of the punished body of Jesus on the cross. The visible remains of public 
executions represented criminals who had violated the worldly laws. Yet they 
were also embedded in a story of possible redemption through the sacrificial 
suffering of Jesus. Thieves and murderers were punished, just like He had 
been punished. They suffered like He had suffered. The elements of death and 
pain in punishment were seen in a positive, even eschatological light – pain 
was purifying, even a gateway to heaven.
Notions of divine justice would continue to shape the meaning of pain, 
and the experience of spectators. Yet the rituals of public executions were 
above all tied to the processes of state formation in Europe. Punishment was 
secularized and centralized, transferred from lieges and ecclesiastical bodies 
and incorporated in the violence monopoly of the evolving nation states. The 
transformation found support in theories of sovereignty, elaborated by Jean 
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seventeenth centuries. At bottom lay a claim to uncontested superiority, pri-
marily in matters of violence and coercion, to protect members of society 
from an even greater violence, eventually stemming from themselves. The sov-
ereign claim came to define the era, until delimited by countervailing notions 
of the Rechtsstaat, which insisted on equipping individuals with legal protec-
tion against the sovereign. The religious origins of the idea of unconditional 
power were commented on by Carl Schmitt (2009), who described the claim 
to absolute power as a theological remnant: the transfer of sacred aura to the 
secular state. In practice, the exercise of the sovereign prerogatives was heavily 
circumscribed by, among other things, lack of administrative capacity. Only 
a restricted number of law- breakers could be processed through the existing 
framework of criminal justice. The organizational weakness of the state was 
compensated for by an excess of ritual – excess of pain and of symbolism, 
and a large audience. The excess of pain as ‘the sovereign left his mark and 
brought down the effects of his power’ on the body of the condemned was 
part of the ritualized bid for absolute power (Foucault 1979:  109). In that 
moment when punishments were exacted, the endangered order was ritually 
reinstated, and the power of the state appeared uncontested, towering over 
the social body.
The early- modern execution may be seen as a tragedy. In the most obvious 
sense, it was a grim and sad story; someone had to face the ultimate punish-
ment for a horrific crime, or for the sake of a symbolic display of power. Yet 
the public execution might also have been a tragedy in the deepest sense of the 
word, enacting an existential dilemma of being caught between two impos-
sible options. In the Principles of Penal Law, Bentham invoked the spectre of 
classic tragedy when characterizing public executions in the late eighteenth 
century.
What is a public execution? It is a solemn tragedy which the legislator 
presents before an assembled people – a tragedy truly important, truly 
pathetic, by the sad reality of its catastrophe, and the grandeur of its 
object. The preparation for it, the place of exhibition, and the attendant 
circumstances, cannot be too carefully selected, as upon these the prin-
cipal effect depends. The tribunal, the scaffold, the dresses of the officers 
of justice, the religious service, the procession, every kind of accompani-
ment, ought to bear a grave and melancholy character.
(Bentham 1843: 404)
Bentham did not elaborate further on the observed similarities: the outward 
appearances and the meticulously staged character of the event. Yet by using 
the classic tragedy as the point of reference for an orderly execution, he may 
have been more accurate than he himself  imagined. The public executions, 
just like the Attic tragedies, constituted a community of spectators and 
underpinned specific interpretations of the social world in the dimension of 
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merchants, legal officials, soldiers, farmers, vagabonds, and artisans  – and 
the characters were expected to perform their roles in a rigidly hierarchical 
scheme, expressing their respective social standing and function, thereby 
enacting the entire social world, including the elevated status of the king and 
the symbolic subjection of the people, who had to watch. The element of 
carefully scripted display was significant. The condemned was expected to 
articulate remorse before death, asking for forgiveness. The priests, acting on 
behalf  of the worldly as well as the divine justice, received the confession and 
prepared the soul for the passage to the next world. Executioners administered 
the actual violence. Officials and members of the local elite oversaw the events 
and acted as substitutes for the sovereign. Armed soldiers stood between the 
events on the scaffold and the audience, as visible reminders of the violence 
monopoly and ready to intervene, should things get out of hand.
The key figure was the common people who represented the bulk of the 
audience. In the early- modern executions, Foucault argued, ‘the main char-
acter was the people’, who were ‘summoned as spectators’. They had to 
experience justice being done, at first hand; ‘not only must people know, they 
must see with their own eyes’ (Foucault 1979: 57f). The people had to watch, 
since the element of display was a crucial feature of sovereignty (Skinner 
1989). Display was also a crucial feature of early- modern public executions, 
whose core meaning was ‘the assertion, preservation and protection of the 
authority of the state’ (Garland 2010: 76; see also Smith 2008). The symbolic 
display of excess made little sense without an audience. It was the indispens-
able main character in the ritual. The spectatorship was massive for the era, 
on all accounts. People from all walks of life and of all ages were present, 
and may have been attracted by curiosity, by social needs, or perceived obli-
gation. Regardless of the spectators’ motives, their mere presence at the scene 
ensured them a vital role, which went beyond watching the events unfold 
at the scaffold. The audience made the public execution into what it was: a 
demonstration of state power. To participate in the ritual was to be included 
as one cog in the larger build- up of state power, just as Leviathan was fam-
ously illustrated. On the frontispiece of Hobbes’s original book, one finds the 
imposing figure drawn by Abraham Bosse, with a sword and a crown and a 
body made up of thousands of individuals, representing the protected yet 
disposable subjects of the king. Their attendance completed the sovereign 
ritual, at the same time as it turned the ‘theatres of cruelty’ (Evans 1996) into 
theatres of recognition, on the condition that they participated without inter-
fering in the display of sovereign excess.
Throughout the period, the public execution was informed by the 
Hobbesian tale of the violent state as the bringer of order to chaos. In the 
state of nature, there was no society. There could be no culture, no navigation, 
no law, no commerce, no art, no security and no viable social organization. In 
this state, everyone wanted the same things, just waiting for the opportunity, 
and lived in constant fear of one another, since there was no institutional 
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the condition (Hobbes 1996). The state of nature was not necessarily located 
in historical time, as it was perpetually looming over mankind, and threatened 
to bring pain and destruction to everyone. The postulated chaos, which 
required the deployment of unconditional power, may also have been derived 
from a religious framework of afterworldly punishments. The ultimate threat 
facing the audience was no longer understood as an otherworldly hell but as a 
this- worldly state of nature. Hobbes and other theorists of sovereignty could 
be seen to re- enact the medieval Catholic notion of hell in a secular setting, 
and in a much- diluted form. The rather concise account of the perpetual state 
of conflict and lack of personal security in the Leviathan did not compare 
with the elaborate images of hell in the Divine Comedy. Yet any shortcomings 
of the underlying vision were compensated for by the symbolism of the ritual 
itself. To purge evil and save social order from an imminent chaos has always 
been the promise of capital punishment (Smith 2008). Evil and chaos seem to 
be inherent in the very operation of the execution ritual – implied rather than 
explicitly stated. The very excess of punitive violence, it has been argued with 
respect to current conditions, gives rise to images ‘of an even greater violence 
outside, or before, the law’, thereby ‘fueling our worst fears and nightmarish 
beliefs about ourselves and one another’ (Sarat and Kearns 1993:  221– 2). 
Similar observations could apply to early- modern conditions. The excessive 
violence at the scaffold conjured up a more violent chaos, which called for 
potentially transgressive violence to restore order and protect the subjects of 
the king.
The audience of mostly common people were caught between uncon-
ditional power and uncontrollable chaos. They were protected by one, and 
threatened by both. The public execution enacted a world in which the 
spectators were protected albeit constantly threatened by violent chaos and 
utterly disposable to the sovereign. The witnessed violence on the scaffold 
founded the community, defined the spectators as subjects of the king  – 
subjects who were given protection by the violence on display. But while being 
offered protection, they were reminded that the state could turn on them. At 
any time, Leviathan, as the crowned guardian of the people, could shift into 
another incarnation of Leviathan, which was of a much older date: the bib-
lical sea monster and its unrestrained and entirely arbitrary violence (Ericson 
2007). As most likely would have been familiar to anyone living at the time, the 
monarchs could marshal people into conscript armies, they could wage wars 
on other sovereigns, or impose punishments after summary trials, in perfect 
accordance with existing theories of sovereignty. The subjects were offered 
protection against an imagined state of nature by a sovereign against whom 
they were wholly unprotected. The Hobbesian social contract could be seen to 
process that dilemma of vulnerability. The audience was trapped between the 
sovereign state, which enforced transgressions and enabled social existence, 
as the sole bulwark against imminent chaos, on the one hand, and a sover-
eign state that paid no attention to the individual subject, wilfully used them 
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on the other hand. The spectators participated in this ritual, which manifested 
the supremacy of the state and its powers to protect, but also its readiness 
to sacrifice without hesitation. During the early- modern period, or until 
the French revolution, there might not have seemed much to do about it. 
As subjects of the king, they could not escape the shared predicament that 
was being demonstrated at the scaffold, which paradoxically satisfied their 
desire for recognition. The spectators who were being reminded of their insig-
nificance could at the same time recognize each other as fully part of the 
community of subjects, precisely because their predicament was the same as 
everybody else’s, as protected by yet entirely disposable to machinations at the 
pinnacles of state power. In this way, witnessing public executions might have 
offered temporary satisfaction of the perpetual desire for social esteem. The 
spectators were recognized in their struggle to manage the tension between 
the experience of state protection and their own vulnerability, constantly 
threatened by the state of nature, or by the sovereign himself.
The problem of the pleasure of  watching the pain of  others has inspired 
discussion from ancient Greece and on to our days. In this chapter, I have 
revisited some of  these discussions to account for the spectators’ enjoy-
ment. In three historical settings, all of  them pre- modern, the key to the 
paradox of  tragic pleasure was seen to lie in the world- making aspects of 
punishment. The Attic tragedy, the medieval visions of  divine justice and the 
early- modern executions enacted a world in the dimensions of  justice and 
order, along with a shared existential predicament of  the audience, which 
was tragic in the original sense of  presenting people with impossible options, 
or expectations. The classic tragedies addressed an existential dilemma, 
shared by above all the male citizens in the audience: the necessarily private 
assertion of  social esteem while being at the mercy of  powers beyond their 
control. The consumption of  divine justice processed an existential dilemma 
for the medieval Christian community: the expectation to lead a life without 
sin and the futility of  all striving to avoid being punished in the afterlife. 
The early- modern execution, finally, addressed the dilemma of being caught 
between state protection and utter disposability. The spectators were in each 
case included in the enacted world and recognized as fully part of  it, as citi-
zens of  Athens, as members of  the Christian community, or as subjects of 
the king. The recognition was in a significant sense indirect. There was no 
message being communicated to the audience that they were worthy, or valu-
able. To the contrary; in the eyes of  the tragic heroes, in the eyes of  God, or 
in the eyes of  the king, the common people had little value. Instead, their 
recognition was mediated by the world and by the dilemmas that were being 
enacted. They all shared the same dilemma of being faced with impossible 
options, or expectations. For this reason, they could recognize themselves 
as inextricably part of  the enacted world, and other people in the audience 
could recognize them as fully part of  the community. To be recognized as 
fully part of  the community was fundamental. Yet what more can be said 
about the nature of  enjoyment? And which other kinds of  pleasures may be 
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at work in punishment? The next chapter will continue to discuss the enjoy-
ment being produced.
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5  Two paradigms of enjoyment
The key question is how punishment produces pleasure. Given the problematic 
of desire, the question can be formulated in terms of how desire is transformed 
into enjoyment through punishment. How does punishment operate to trans-
form distress related to social esteem – as an acutely experienced loss of status, 
a vaguely experienced sense of unease, or as unfulfilled ambition to distin-
guish oneself  over against others – into experiences which, on all accounts, are 
radically different, conceived under the broad heading of enjoyment? Plato 
and Aristotle represent the two available paradigms of pleasure in Western 
philosophy. There does not seem to be any third alternative (van Riel 2000; 
Schuster 2016). So, with respect to the pleasure of punishment, in the sense 
of the enjoyment being produced, there are basically two alternatives: relief  
of distress (Plato), or being absorbed in unrestrained activity (Aristotle). In 
the last chapter, the audience was seen to be provided with relief  of distress. 
Concerns related to the wish to be recognized as fully part of the commu-
nity were alleviated through the consumption of punishment. The satisfac-
tion was in essence Platonic: a temporary relief  of unease related to social 
esteem. But what about the signs of enjoyment that do not seem to fit into 
the Platonian account, for instance the chanting and the laughter noticed 
in early- modern execution crowds? It would be wrong to suggest that all 
pleasure of punishment was a matter of feeling relief. In this chapter, I will 
briefly present the two paradigms of enjoyment  – the Platonian relief  of 
distress and the Aristotelian absorbed excitement – and then go on to dis-
cuss the evidence of Aristotelian absorbed excitement in the same selection of 
pre- modern cases: the tragedies in ancient Greece, afterworldly punishment 
in medieval Europe, and the early- modern public executions. There is most 
evidence available on the early- modern executions, and the experiences of 
the audience can be interpreted as sublime, or alternatively as carnivalesque, 
depending on whether the executions were orderly or not. The final section 
of the chapter introduces the idea of dynamic. The transformation cannot 
be conceived as a one- time occasion. The recognition of being fully part of a 
group facing a shared dilemma, derived from watching a tragedy, consuming 
afterworldly punishment or attending a public execution, was a passing 




104 Two paradigms of enjoyment
concerns how punishment, seen as generic phenomena in any given society, 
is inserted into the dynamics of desire, which is perpetually moving back and 
forth from satisfaction. Hegel’s master- and- slave dialectic, as presented in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit, provides a brilliant account of the tension between 
desire and enjoyment, and how it plays out in a social context. My re- reading 
concentrates on the inevitable mismatch between desire and enjoyment, a 
better understanding of which may help elucidate how punishment operates 
in the gap between the two.
Between partial relief and absorbed excitement
In Gorgias, Plato illustrated pleasure with the satisfaction of eating. Pleasure 
could be the experience of eating a meal of food after being hungry. The 
experience involved relief  of distress. Considering a hungry person, it was 
obvious that the body was in a state of distress. The body was missing some-
thing. Such was the experience of desire. Desire was satisfied when one was 
no longer hungry. Bridging the gap between desire and enjoyment involved a 
transition from pain to pleasure: being hungry was painful, and eating when 
hungry was pleasurable. When the meal was over and one had eaten enough, 
the body was in a state of satisfaction. The food need not taste good, it just 
had to be sufficient to quell the hunger. After some time, the body became 
hungry again, and the process was repeated; once again, one must eat to be 
satisfied. The natural state was balance, or not being hungry. Consequently, 
satisfaction involved a return to equilibrium, by filling a lack (Gorgias 496– 7).
The paradigm was modelled after the satisfaction of bodily needs (van Riel 
2000). Pleasure in the context of punishment can be understood in the same 
manner. The satisfaction experienced while watching a classic tragedy, con-
templating afterworldly punishment or attending a public execution was con-
sistent with the Platonic notion of pleasure. In each case, punishment forged 
a community of spectators who shared the same predicament, and confirmed 
their place in the bigger scheme of things, caught between forces beyond their 
control and the necessity to gain recognition from their own community. 
While the worlds were markedly different from another, the dilemmas facing 
contemporary audiences appear to have shared some general characteristics. 
The spectators struggled with the impossible requirements of the enacted 
world. They strived to satisfy the desire for social esteem, derived from the 
prevailing social morality, while the satisfaction was elusive due to powerful 
agents of justice and other forces beyond their control. At the same time, they 
were recognized by other people in the audience as one of them, precisely 
because their predicament was the same as everybody else’s. The consump-
tion of punishment thus offered a temporary and partial relief  of distress. In 
terms of the nature of enjoyment, punishment was consistent with the para-
digm elaborated by Plato. The satisfaction of being recognized as fully part 
of the community meant a temporary relief  of distress, rather than a sense of 
exaltation or achievement of a positive state of happiness. A lack was filled, 
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worries disappeared, or a balance was restored. The spectators were more 
at ease. Satisfying the desire for recognition involved cessation of stress; for 
a brief  moment one stopped thinking about status. The audience was not 
included in the enacted world in any deeper sense; they were not necessarily 
empowered to do anything, or better off  in any more tangible respect, but 
they were a bit more at ease, since their desire for social esteem was satisfied, 
for the moment.
The satisfaction of punishment would thus correspond to the notion 
of pleasure as relief  of distress. In each of the three pre- modern cases, the 
pleasure was Platonic. But not all pleasures of punishment were necessarily 
Platonic, or involved a return to equilibrium. Each of the three pre- modern 
cases contains traces of another kind of pleasure. The early- modern execution 
may actually seem to provide firmer ground for arguments on Aristotelian 
pleasure. Evidence from different countries talks about shared expressions 
of enjoyment at the execution site, corresponding to intense excitement, or 
captivated arousal. Many first- hand accounts mentioned laughter, cheering, 
drunkenness, or other signs of excitement among the audience. As can be taken 
from the quotes reproduced in Chapter 1, some eye- witnesses used words that 
explicitly indicated enjoyment. Francis Grose likened an eighteenth- century 
execution to ‘a fair of merry- making’ against the backdrop of ‘solemn and 
dreadful scenes’, the French envoy in Stockholm was reminded of a ‘comical 
farce’, whereas Charles Dickens saw ‘nothing but ribaldry, debauchery, levity’ 
in a London execution of the mid- nineteenth century. One can find further 
evidence of shared excitement in the archives. The Quaker J. J. Gurney, for 
instance, reported ‘a feeling of pleasure in the excitement’ at an execution in 
1816 (quoted in McGowen 1986: 319). Such testimonies appear inconsistent 
with the Platonic return to equilibrium, and point toward the Aristotelian 
paradigm of pleasure.
Aristotle stood for a different conception of pleasure. In the Nicomachean 
Ethics, the Platonic model was criticized on the grounds that it did not assure 
pleasure a role in the good life. If  pleasure was part of the good life, it could 
not involve relief  of distress, and hence a change away from an undesirable 
state. It should rather be about attaining a positive, or more perfect state. 
Aristotle conceived of pleasure as a sort of perfection: the actualization of a 
natural state (Taylor 2008). His notion of pleasure left more space for inter-
pretation compared to the Platonic model. Admittedly, what offered relief  
of distress could be more or less anything, and hence open to interpretation. 
But the image of eating when hungry was easy to grasp, and relief  of dis-
tress was an everyday experience which everyone could relate to. On the 
Aristotelian model, on the other hand, pleasure was immediately generated 
by certain forms of activity. Pleasures were ‘species of activity’ as opposed 
to processes with a separate goal (Nicomachean Ethics 1153a). Pleasure was 
not a separate experience which involved a previous state of distress, or any 
process leading up to the experience. It was immediate and accompanied 
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‘an additional element’ of activities performed without impediment (van Riel 
2000: 2). Aristotle stressed the striving for perfection and intellectual enjoy-
ment, as rational activities represented the highest form of pleasure in life. 
Yet strictly speaking, pleasure was not necessarily tied to reason, or to the 
attainment of perfection. ‘Unimpeded’ is the crucial word (Nicomachean 
Ethics 1153a), and it simply meant the absence of any kind of obstacles: an 
absence which allowed the activity to unfold uninterrupted. Unimpeded 
activities could involve literally anything. One of Aristotle’s many examples 
involved manual labour. Under certain conditions, building a house afforded 
pleasure. If  the construction went uninterrupted, if  the builder was skilled 
and the work flowed smoothly, pleasure was generated (Taylor 2008). This 
pleasure could not be understood as a separate experience, like relief  of dis-
tress, but must be thought of as an experience that was intimately tied to 
the uninterrupted flow of activity. It may likewise correspond to an everyday 
experience which everyone can relate to: the experience of being carried away, 
for a moment oblivious of other concerns or commitments. Paul Moyaert 
(2010) has suggested that the rather formal delineation of pleasure as the add-
itional element of unimpeded activities should be conceived along the lines 
of abandon, enthusiasm, and absorption. The Aristotelian, piggy- backing 
approach to pleasure could thus involve more than one element: absorption 
and forgetfulness, as well as enthusiasm and excitement, depending on the 
experience- carrying activity. Hence there might be an alternative pleasure in 
the consumption of punishment. Not all pleasures of punishment would be 
reducible to the recognition of social esteem. In the scholarly literature on 
each of the three premodern periods, there are indications of abandon, enthu-
siasm, and absorption.
The Platonic relief  of distress may not have been the only kind of pleasure 
of punishment in ancient Greece. It has been argued, first by Friedrich 
Nietzsche and then in more recent times, most eloquently by Terry Eagleton, 
that ancient Bacchic cults provided the intense excitement of ritualistic cruelty. 
The cruelty was supposed to have performed religious functions, rather than 
punitive. It may not have been understood as punishment by contemporary 
audiences, and if  so, it is not a good example for that reason. In addition, 
many claims made about the ancient Bacchic rituals can been criticized for 
being speculative (Heinrichs 1984). The terror- induced enjoyment in the 
Bacchic cults may be no more than a tale. Yet it nevertheless played a sig-
nificant role in later discussions, as the Dionysic principle. In the Birth of 
Tragedy, Nietzsche wrote about the intoxicating mix of cruelty and pleasure 
as a universal aspect of human experience rather than as a specific historic 
event. It was the aspect of ruthless self- assertion. In the modern reception of 
Dionysus, the Greek deity represented the terrifying consequences of unre-
stricted enjoyment, what happened when collective self- assertion was followed 
to the bitter end. The violence that transgressed the boundaries of enacted 
laws gave rise to transcendence and assumed a sacred character. Utter terror 
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the character of the spectators’ enjoyment, apparent opposites merged, such 
as subject and object, pleasure and pain, law and excess (Eagleton 2005). The 
experience was conceived along the lines of the Aristotelian kind of pleasure 
as excitement, arousal, the loss of self  or unrestrained assertion. In the Will to 
Power, Nietzsche explicitly rejected the Platonic conception of pleasure as sat-
isfaction of lack. ‘It is not the satisfaction of the will which causes pleasure’, 
instead, ‘the cause of pleasure is the fact that the will presses onwards and 
prevails against all that stands in its way’ (Nietzsche 2017: 696, emphasis in 
original). In other words: desire stops at nothing, and will not disappear even 
if  a point of balance has been reached. Desire pushes forward beyond all 
boundaries, and pleasure occurs when the process of self- assertion is unim-
peded, or, in Nietzsche’s case, when obstacles are successfully overcome.
One and the same kind of event could generate both satisfaction of status 
concerns and excitement of being carried away by the activities. Great Dionysia 
may have been such an event. The Attic tragedies were performed during the 
five- day festival, which also included ritual processions and opportunities to 
drink and socialize. Great Dionysia could have been a venue for both kinds 
of pleasure, as revealed by the scholarly discussion on the nature of the event. 
There are two main positions: one emphasizing the orderly (Goldhill 1990; 
2000) and the other the rowdy aspects (Griffith 1995; Roselli 2011). As argued 
in the last chapter, the Attic tragedy constituted a community and enacted 
a social world in the dimension of justice and order, which offered recogni-
tion to spectators. In the rituals attached to the plays, a civic ideology was 
promulgated in a solemn fashion, overseen by high dignitaries (Goldhill 1990; 
2000). This generated one kind of pleasure, the Platonic relief  of distress, 
which was different from the intense excitement of the Aristotelian pleasure. 
At the same time, Great Dionysia could become carnivalesque, simultan-
eously transgressing and reinforcing social order in much the same way as the 
popular festivals of medieval Europe (Griffith 1995; Roselli 2011). While the 
festival was no doubt used to glorify the city- state, it was also, as suggested 
by the name, held in honour of Dionysus, who was the god of wine, theatre, 
fertility, suffering and excess, amongst other things. The audience could adopt 
several roles. Sometimes the spectators would be drunken participants in the 
festival, sometimes sober adjudicators of the plays. They could be taking part 
in heavily scripted expressions of the Athenian political regime, or the very 
opposite: exploring and subverting given social roles (Griffith 1995; Goldhill 
2000; Roselli 2011). Events could thus unfold both ways, questioning or re- 
enforcing given social conventions. Without choosing sides in the debate, it 
may be concluded that in each case, pleasure was guaranteed. An orderly tra-
gedy performance was likely to offer recognition, whereas the disorderly and 
carnivalesque was more likely to generate absorbed excitement.
The many representations of divine justice in medieval Europe may also 
have offered a venue for both kinds of pleasure. As argued in the last chapter, 
Dante and Aquinas articulated the expectation to be a good Christian as well 
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doomed anyway, which ironically provided a recognition of full membership 
of the community. If  that argument holds, the resulting pleasure was Platonic. 
Yet what about the other kind of pleasure, the intense excitement that the pun-
ishment may have generated? Was not the encounter with hell, even if  only in 
contemplation, likely to produce an intense existential awareness, or even an 
elevated arousal? Little is known about the actual response of the audience. 
Yet some scholars have argued that the intimate connection between suffering 
and transcendence gave rise to awe, reverence and excitement among the medi-
eval audience. Their evidence relies on preserved artistic representations and 
biblical plays rather than on eyewitness accounts. The suffering of Christ on 
the cross, as reproduced in paintings and mosaics, or as enacted in the passion 
plays, was seen to generate pleasure. In medieval visual art, the ‘punished 
body- in- pain’ articulated ‘certain kinds of pleasure’ – a religiously elevated 
pleasure, partaking in the suffering of Christ (Mills 2005:  202). The eleva-
tion of pain into pleasure relied on the basic assumptions of divine justice 
and beliefs about cleansing of sin through suffering. The joy was moreover 
perceived to be an effect of the mode of presentation. Dramatists intention-
ally reconfigured ‘the spectacle of brutality as joyful’ (Enders 1999: 172; see 
also Ciobanu 2018). The eschatologically coloured experience extended into 
the consumption of worldly punishment, above all in the public executions of 
law- breakers. Given the religious framework, there was a ‘feeling of kinship 
between the criminal on his way to the gallows and the saint in search of God’ 
(Cohen 1989: 409). On this line of reasoning, the ‘punished body- in- pain’ in 
medieval culture produced excitement, reverence and joy among the audience, 
which was entirely consistent with the Aristotelian notion of pleasure.
The early- modern executions may, likewise, have produced both recogni-
tion and enjoyment. As often noted, there was a tension between the tragic 
and the Dionysic in the public executions. Historians have discussed which 
element was the most predominant – whether early- modern executions were 
solemn theatres of  terror, or Dionysic carnivals of  popular debauchery 
(Garland 2010; Spierenburg 1984; Ignatieff  1978; Evans 1996; Lacqueur 
1989). The conclusions differed according to the sites being researched. The 
executions in London, for instance, seemed to have been rowdier than those 
in Amsterdam. The disagreement among historians also meant that both 
outcomes are well supported by empirical evidence; some executions were no 
doubt silent and orderly, and other executions were characterized by laughter 
and chanting, or public unrest. The findings are highly relevant for any dis-
cussion of  pleasure, since the orderly and the disorderly outcomes can be 
seen to correspond to different kinds of  pleasures among the audience. The 
tragic would correspond to Platonic pleasure whereas the Dionysic would 
correspond to Aristotelian pleasure. In the literature, only the Dionysic 
aspects have so far been discussed in terms of  pleasure. One kind of  pleasure 
(the collectively shared excitement) has dominated discussions on the early- 
modern executions over against the other (the recognition of  social esteem), 
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tacitly endorsed, or for more easily recognizable reasons. The visible and very 
audible signs of  enjoyment were difficult to ignore, whereas relief  of  dis-
tress – the silent recognition of  status – was less likely to catch the attention 
of  writers who happened to be part of  an execution crowd, with which they 
often felt little sympathy. One might even doubt whether it was at all possible 
to capture this kind of  pleasure phenomenologically. Given the assumptions 
of  the Platonic model, pleasure involved an absence rather than a presence, 
it was silent rather than audible, and the satisfaction was not necessarily con-
sciously experienced as such. It was a satisfaction that had to be inferred, 
rather than observed, from the world as people knew it, at the time. There 
were no self- evident exterior signs. Even silence and orderly performance 
were unreliable, since how do you interpret silence? Take for instance the 1802 
execution of  the colonial governor Joseph Wall, who was notorious for the 
cruel treatment of  the British soldiers he once commanded. Robert Southey, 
writing under the pseudonym of a fictitious Spanish tourist, distanced him-
self  from the crowd, which was reproached for being inhuman, unchristian 
and disgraceful. But in the moment of  hanging, its mood changed. He noted 
‘the sudden extinction of  that joy, the feeling which at one moment struck 
so many thousands, stopped their acclamations at once; and awed them into 
dead silence when they saw the object of  their hatred in the act and agony 
of  death’ (Southey 2016: 116). Yet it is not clear what are we to make of  the 
‘dead silence’ of  the audience. Was it a sign of  recognition and relief  of  dis-
tress, or was it a sign of  speechless awe and excitement? The silence was no 
doubt open to both interpretations.
The available evidence on ancient Greece and medieval Europe can be seen 
to offer leads for further research on absorbed arousal in the context of pun-
ishment. At present, however, it seems insufficient to warrant any conclusions 
that go beyond fairly reasonable assumptions. Only starting with the early- 
modern period, the traces of Aristotelian pleasure become more conclusive. 
The well- documented excitement and rowdy behaviour of early- modern exe-
cution crowds, which have served as the point of reference in many discussions 
of the pleasure of punishment, cannot be understood merely as relief  of dis-
tress. While the desire may have been the same, the nature of the enjoyment 
was markedly different from status recognition. The next section will move 
on from the immediate eyewitness accounts, while remaining with the early- 
modern executions. Recent historical accounts of a carnivalesque popular 
culture at the scaffold, in conjunction with the emergence of a philosophical 
discussion on the sublime during the eighteenth century, may further eluci-
date the shared pleasure as absorbed arousal among the audience.
Early- modern excitement: between the carnivalesque and  
the sublime
The eye- witness reports on popular expressions of enjoyment suggest a 
very different kind of pleasure from the Platonic relief  of distress. Yet how 
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should the broad category of Aristotelian pleasure of punishment be spe-
cified in an early- modern context? The experience can be approached from 
two angles: from the contemporary discussion of the sublime, in essence an 
intense excitement and a heightened existential awareness in the experience 
of power from a safe position (Burke 1997), or from latter- day discussions of 
the carnivalesque (Bakhtin 1968), an experience which came from momentary 
transgression of otherwise rigid rules and social hierarchies.
During the carnival season, behaviour that was otherwise prohibited was 
allowed, as people were singing and drinking and settling all sorts of scores 
in public, with abusive spouses or with local potentates. The world was tem-
porarily turned upside down (Hill 1972). The public executions presented one 
crucial venue for the carnivalesque, as they were designed to be pillars of the 
established order. Precisely because executions were an occasion for articulate 
display of official rank and social prestige, when overturned, the experience 
of liberation was powerful and captivating:  ‘the suspension of all hierarch-
ical rank, privilege, norms and prohibition’ (Bakhtin 1968:  10). In contin-
ental Europe, executions and other established rituals, such as sermons and 
weddings, were mocked and inverted. The figure of ‘Carnival’, often portrayed 
as a cheerful fat man, could be exposed to a mock trial followed by a mock 
execution, in one place by burning. In other places, pigs were ceremonially 
beheaded, mimicking the rituals of capital punishment, and invoking the 
entire symbolism of criminal justice (Burke 2009). In the protracted discus-
sion on the nature of early- modern executions, the carnival and the carnival-
esque have been invoked by writers who claimed that the sovereign exercise 
of power was often subverted by the crowd. Michel Foucault maintained that 
French executions in the eighteenth century encompassed ‘the whole aspect 
of carnival, in which rules were inverted [and] authority mocked’ (Foucault 
1979: 61). Public executions in Britain were explicitly addressed as carnival-
esque in Bakthin’s sense; scorn, laughter, defiance, violence and blasphemy 
were part of the ritual, as the crowd saw it (Lacqueur 1989). In a similar vein, 
Michael Ignatieff  referred to usurped execution processions through London 
as the ‘poor people’s carnival’ (Ignatieff  1978: 88; see also Linebaugh 1991). On 
such occasions, when solemnly designed rituals of justice were subverted and 
ridiculed by spectators, executions seemed to borrow traits from the medieval 
carnival. The carnivalesque may thus have captured the Aristotelian pleasure 
of disorderly executions. It was the excitement of transcending a deeply felt 
and rigidly unequal social order, mixed up with partying, aggression and vio-
lence, and a reawakened sense of collective power.
If, on the other hand, the executions proceeded as planned, without 
popular disturbances, the carefully scripted display of sovereign power may 
have produced intense excitement of a different nature  – while still being 
pleasure in the Aristotelian sense. It was the awe and the fascination in the 
face of unrestrained power. As generated by the safe consumption of terror, 
the excitement was in many respects the opposite of the carnivalesque. The 
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was sovereign rather than plebeian in orientation, involving shared power-
lessness rather than collective empowerment of the audience. As opposed 
to the carnivalesque, it was moreover a kind of intense excitement that was 
discussed as such at the time, although rarely in conjunction with punish-
ment. Contemporary philosophers analysed the experience in terms of the 
sublime to understand the impact on the audience.
The concept of the sublime was rediscovered at a point in time when public 
executions reached a peak in many European countries. In the late seven-
teenth century, the classic text On the Sublime was simultaneously translated 
into English and French (Albrecht 1975; Battersby 2007). The original text 
was written by an unknown author, often referred to as Longinus, during 
the Roman period. In antiquity, the sublime was a concept in rhetoric. It 
referred to the power of the orator to produce amazement and overwhelming 
emotional effects, rather than persuasion through reasoning, in the audience 
(Heath 2012; Porter 2016). The effect was inexplicable and irresistible. When 
the notion of the sublime re- appeared in the late seventeenth century, the 
extreme sensual impact on an audience, its sense of excitement, remained in 
focus but was no longer linked to public speech. Instead, terror was seen as 
the source of the sublime. The translation of Longinus’s text was followed 
by a string of British writers in the eighteenth century, starting with John 
Dennis, who characterized the sublime experience as ‘enthusiastic terror’, 
induced by, among other things, ‘gods, dæmons, hell, spirits and souls of men, 
miracles, prodigies, enchantments, witchcrafts, thunder, tempests, raging seas, 
inundations, torrents, earthquakes, volcanoes, monsters, serpents, lions, tigers, 
fire, war, pestilence, famine’ (Dennis 1996: 38). Witnessing or contemplating 
the various manifestations of terror produced absorbed elevation, admiration 
and wonder among the audience. The sensation was inextricably linked to 
the sacred, or the idea of a transcendent order manifesting itself  in hell, vol-
canoes, pestilence and miracles. The sublime captured the sacred dimensions 
within an evolving secular context. But at the beginning of the eighteenth 
century, the experience was embedded in a Christian cosmology. Referred to 
as the ‘great universal monarch’, God was the ultimate source of the sublime 
(Dennis 1996: 38).
In his highly influential Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas 
of the Sublime and the Beautiful, published in 1757, Edmund Burke discussed 
terror in what was essentially a phenomenological analysis. Terror was the 
power- house of the sublime. Due to its capacity to induce the strongest 
emotion, terror was ‘the ruling principle of the sublime’ (Burke 1997: 231). 
There was a shared excitement of being close to terror and unbounded vio-
lence, provided that it was experienced from a safe position. ‘When danger or 
pain press too nearly, they are incapable of giving any delight, and are simply 
terrible, but at certain distances’, he said, invoking everyday experiences, ‘they 
may be, and they are, delightful’ (Burke 1997: 217). Should one be directly 
exposed to violence, death or degradation, there is only fear and suffering, 







112 Two paradigms of enjoyment
was delightful. But the pleasure was never pure. The sublime was delightful in 
itself, yet the experience was mixed up with the seemingly contrary emotions 
of pain and fear. That was the paradox of the sublime, in Burke’s theory of 
sensory impression. It was the classic problem of the pleasure of watching the 
pain of others, compounded with a further opposition: between degradation 
and a sense of elevation. The early- modern sublime was built on this twin 
contradiction. It articulated a kind of absorbed arousal with transcendent 
implications. The audience were on the one hand absorbed in the unfolding 
scenes, experiencing an almost irresistible attraction to violence, death or deg-
radation, while at the same time experiencing a kind of elevation: awe, rever-
ence, and respect.
In the aesthetics of the eighteenth century, the sublime represented a 
different approach to the paradox of the pleasure of watching the pain of 
others, compared to previous interpretations through the lens of tragedy. The 
pleasure was first of all seen to be different. The encounter with terror, or 
unrestrained power, produced intense arousal rather than satisfaction. It was 
the Aristotelian kind of pleasure – absorbed excitement, not the relief  of the 
desire for recognition. There was moreover no space for reason, or for ritual 
enactment of dilemmas: mechanisms that were crucial for tragic pleasure. The 
overwhelming sensory arousal bypassed conscious thought to produce a sense 
of elevation and higher meaning. This aspect was stressed most explicitly by 
Immanuel Kant, who argued that the sublime was per se unintelligible. It 
was a totally overwhelming sensation, which escaped the understanding, and 
constituted a mix of pleasure and pain. The breakdown of representation 
was intensely exciting as well as deeply disturbing (Kant 1914; Lyotard 1994). 
Transcendence was inherent in the experience. The sense of elevation was a 
product of the excitement induced by terror. A  system of religious beliefs 
was never called for. Instead, from the safe position of the spectator’s seat, 
the encounter would by itself  produce an intense existential awareness and 
pointed toward something larger than life, underlying the experience.
During this period, the sublime was mainly discussed in relation to the 
vastness of nature, exceptional art, or beauty (Battersby 2007; Eagleton 2003). 
But the constitutive experience of terror could be grounded in anything. John 
Dennis’s list encompassed everything between outbreaks of pandemics and 
of volcanoes. At heart, or as an early- modern theory of the sensory impact 
on an audience, its basic principles were just as applicable to punishment as 
to art, although rarely done. The sublime could thus describe sensations far 
beyond what we today consider to be the domain of aesthetic experiences. In 
one short passage in the Enquiry, Burke argued that a public execution was a 
more powerful source of the sublime than a classic tragedy. To prove the point 
which pleasure would prevail, if  put to the test, he designed a thought experi-
ment. Imagine, he suggested, an audience in a theatre as they are watching a 
tragedy. During the show, they are being told, presumably from the stage, that 
a well- known criminal was about to be executed in a nearby square. What 
would happen; would the audience stay and watch the stage performance to 
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the end or would they leave the theatre? He was confident – everyone would 
rush out immediately; ‘in a moment the emptiness of the theatre would dem-
onstrate the comparative weakness of the imitative arts’ (Burke 1997: 223). 
The terror in real life was superior. On this line of reasoning, one might think 
that punishment as a source of the sublime would automatically qualify as a 
topic in his aesthetics. The very point of the amalgam of ritual and cruelty 
at the scaffold was intimidation. But for some reason, punishment was not 
a topic in the Enquiry. Decades later, however, Burke would make use of his 
theory of sensory impression in discussions of the death penalty. Following 
the Gordon Riots in London, June 1780, more than one hundred people 
appeared for trial, facing the risk of execution. The trials went on all summer, 
and eventually 62 people were sentenced to death (Rudé 1956). In a short 
text written during the trials, Some Thoughts on the approaching Executions, 
Burke argued against mass executions of rioters based on his aesthetic theory. 
A limited number of rioters should, he suggested, be singled out based on a 
full investigation of the events, and then be executed one by one:
Six, at the very utmost, of the fittest examples may then be selected for 
execution, who ought to be brought out and put to death, on one and the 
same day, in Six different places, and in the most solemn manner that can 
be devised.
(Burke 1996: 613)
Awe and terror could be derived from the singular event, especially if  the 
execution was staged to achieve that end. Mass hangings, on the other hand, 
tended to produce a numbing effect and sensory overload; ‘the sense of Justice 
in Men is overloaded and fatigued with a long series of executions’ (Burke 
1996: 614). More people than one could be executed, but not at exactly the 
same time and place. If  the primary concern of his aesthetics was to secure 
the emotional grounding of political power (O’Neill 2012; Eagleton 1995), 
the proposed punishment made sense. To watch malefactors being hanged, 
one by one, ‘in the most solemn manner that can be devised’ might produce 
an intense excitement that reinforced the bond between the audience and the 
state. Individual guilt was secondary, and large- scale terror was ruled out 
on political grounds. As to how many were appropriate, he came up with 
the figure of six before the trials were finished. The execution of six people 
appeared to strike a balance within the context of the Gordon Riots. It was 
not a massacre, Burke emphasized, and anyway fewer than the 25 people who 
were eventually hanged, after all appeals had been made. At the same time, the 
law lost nothing of its terror in the minds of the population. On the contrary, 
the one- by- one approach to hanging promised to be quite effective, since ‘the 
execution of one Man fixes the attention and excites awe’ (Burke 1996: 614).
During the nineteenth century, the focus on terror faded, and was replaced 
by an interest in natural phenomena and the ‘romantic sublime’ (Brady 
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were likewise seen as sources of the sublime. David Nye (1994) has written 
about the ‘technological sublime’ in the United States. The new inventions 
inspired awe and wonder among the audience, and seemed to retain a link to 
the otherworld despite being man- made. The awe which they expressed was 
also an awe at the progress and the promises of science, far from the sub-
lime experiences of terror derived from uncontrollable natural events such 
as earthquakes and volcanoes in the preceding century. The technological 
sublime was an experience of transcendence based on inventions made by 
scientists and engineers. The visual effects of electricity impressed audiences 
unfamiliar with bright lights of different colours. During light- shows in the 
big US cities, spectators were reported to fall on their knees, as if  the elec-
tric lights were from another world. Electricity allowed the creation of phe-
nomena that widely surpassed gas lighting, and appeared, perhaps more than 
any other invention, to incorporate elements of the supernatural and the inex-
plicable (Nye 1994; 2018).
At the end of the nineteenth century, the technological sublime was per-
fectly illustrated by the electric chair, located as it was at the intersection of 
natural wonder and supernatural power (Martschukat 2002; Ruddick 1998). 
The original argument for the electric chair was scientific and humanitarian. 
It promised a swift and painless death in a controlled environment, against the 
background of growing public concern about unnecessarily painful hangings. 
After years of experimenting and following an intense discussion of the 
benefits of electrocution, the state of New  York decided to use the electric 
chair. William Kemmler, a 28- year- old vegetable peddler from Buffalo, would 
be the first one ever to be officially electrocuted. In the legal process before the 
decision, medical experts had ascertained that his death would be instantan-
eous and painless. On the evening of 5 August 1890, a crowd of people gathered 
at the gates of the Auburn prison. The execution was to take place inside the 
prison, the following morning. Jürgen Martschukat (2002:  917) quoted one 
reporter who was present and captured the mood of the audience. ‘ “There was 
no noise. There was no loud talking / …/ Everybody spoke in a subdued way 
as though a feeling of awe had settled upon them.” ’ Expectations were high 
on the wonders and the deadly powers of electricity. In the early morning, 
Kemmler was strapped to a chair powered by an AC dynamo that supplied 
up to 1680 volts (Ruddick 1998). How events evolved would hugely surprise 
witnesses, according to the following day’s account in the New York Times.
At 6:42 A.M.  the electricity was turned on for seventeen seconds, and 
afterwards no one doubted the death of the experimental object. But 
Kemmler had not died. The current had to be switched on again; the care-
fully controlled situation gave way to chaos. / …/ According to the press, 
the witnesses, “horrified by the ghastly sight,” could not turn their eyes 
from the obviously suffering man in the agony of death. / …/ The elec-
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under the electrodes burned, “the stench was unbearable,” and people 
collapsed.
(Martschukat 2002: 918)
The operators lost track of time after the electricity was turned on the second 
time – estimates vary between one minute and four and a half  minutes – and 
when the body was finally proclaimed dead, witnesses left the room ‘weak- 
kneed and nauseated’ (Ruddick 1998: 85) Electricity, the powerful symbol of 
modernity, merged with the arcane symbolism of death. What was expected 
to be a triumph of science and civilization turned out as yet another ‘spec-
tacle at the scaffold’, a repetition of the ritualistic cruelty of the early- modern 
era. Given the expectations of a fully controlled, swift and painless death, 
which would leave the body of William Kemmler unscathed, the outcome 
came as a shock to everyone present: all the blood, the smell, the visible pain, 
the disorder of operators losing control and people collapsing. Subsequent 
investigations revealed that the execution was botched due to technical 
failure; the electric pressure from the dynamo was heavily reduced and the 
electrodes moreover failed to make full contact with the body. The protracted 
agony was entirely unintended. But if  Edmund Burke had been concerned 
by sensory fatigue and lack of novelty when people were hanged collectively, 
the execution certainly did not fail to impress the audience. Judging from the 
journalistic accounts, the audience consumed the scenes of terror with intense 
excitement; the immediate eye- witnesses were unable to turn their eyes from 
the agony, watching the extraordinary and unexpected effects of electricity 
from a safe distance.
A year later, the electric chair was used again in another New York prison. 
Everything went according to plan, and the public response was enthusi-
astic; some were celebrating the execution as one of the most humane of all 
times (Martschukat 2002). The sublime at Kemmler’s execution turned out 
to be somewhat of an anomaly. What was the first time in one sense might 
have been the last time in another sense. The electric chair was inaugurated 
on the threshold of modernity, when the conditions for pleasure were chan-
ging, including those associated with intense terror- induced excitement. In 
the accounts of Kemmler’s execution, little suggests that the response of the 
audience was considered inappropriate. The absence of shame was typical of 
the early- modern sublime. Edmund Burke discussed the delight in the face 
of terror without second thoughts, or without mentioning that it could be 
shameful or inappropriate. The excitement in the encounter with terror was 
embraced, as overwhelming and ennobling, as it brought the spectators into 
contact with the sacred, or allowed them to catch a glimpse of a transcendent 
reality. Terror- induced arousal was the source of the sublime  – and not a 
source of shame. But at the end of the next century, this kind of absorbed 
arousal had become problematic, and evolved into a different experience. 
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electric chair was adopted as an execution technique. Despite the etymological 
kinship between the two terms, the sublime and sublimation, the corresponding 
experiences were miles apart (for the opposite view, see Civitarese 2016). The 
sublime was the innocent excitement of the unmediated encounter with sov-
ereign terror, whereas sublimation involved its denial and transformation into 
something else. Shame and prohibition induced by social morality refashioned 
the enjoyment. Immediacy, absorption and abandon – central elements in the 
early- modern sublime – were disrupted by prohibition. The fin de siècle social 
morality was rendering shared excitement and absorption increasingly diffi-
cult. Punishment was enjoyed in the company of others only on condition 
of its public disavowal. The Freudian concept of sublimation captured the 
transformation. The experience of the sublime was being supplanted by the 
mechanisms of sublimation, thus encapsulating the problematic character of 
the pleasure of punishment as a modern experience. Obscene enjoyment came 
to incorporate the Aristotelian features of abandon, absorption and arousal, 
and replaced the sublime, as well as replacing the carnivalesque experience of 
the audience. The nature of that particularly modern pleasure will be further 
discussed in Chapter 7.
Punishment in the gap between desire and enjoyment
Essentially two kinds of pleasure are available to any audience, with respect to 
punishment. It is either Platonian (relief  of distress) or Aristotelian (absorp-
tion and excitement). They may be seen as different satisfactions of the same 
family of desires centred on social esteem. The two kinds of enjoyment 
would, on this analysis, be expressions of a desire which is inherently dual-
istic, shaped by social morality and by calculated concern, and predisposed 
to conformity and to excess. After having provided provisional answers to the 
questions ‘what kind of desire?’ and ‘what kind of enjoyment?’, we are now in 
a position to approach the dynamic: how desire transforms into satisfaction, 
through actions and interventions, and then recedes into desire. What needs 
to be understood is the relationship between desire and enjoyment, and how 
the consumption of punishment operates in the gap. Hegel’s master- and- slave 
dialectic offers one account of the tension between desire and enjoyment, and 
how it plays out in a social context. My re- reading concentrates on the vola-
tile nature of desire and the precarity of satisfaction, a better understanding 
of which may help elucidate how punishment operates in the gap between 
the two.
The short section in the Phenomenology on the struggle for recognition 
between Master and Slave must be among the most well- interpreted in the 
history of philosophy. Hegel’s immediate concern was to account for a stage 
in the evolution of self- knowledge (Hegel 2018). From within the problematic 
of subject formation, it has been seen as a decisive stage in the evolution of 
the autonomous subject (Honneth 1992; Habermas 1963; Taylor 1975; Butler 
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interpretations. But the section can also – given the problematic of desire – be 
read as a story about the predicament of already constituted subjects who 
try to acquire recognition from one another. That is also my concern in this 
section. The master- and- slave dialectic shows the predicament of people who 
are moved into action by the incessant tension between ambiguous status 
concerns and an always partial and precarious recognition. Satisfaction was 
at best a passing state. No one caught the contradictory dynamics – the desire 
that pushed for relief  and what the satisfaction momentarily entailed, the 
impossibility of full recognition, and hence the renewed distress, renewed rec-
ognition, and so on – better than Hegel.
It started as an encounter between two parties, both of whom were fig-
ures of the same consciousness, who desired the same thing: to be recognized 
by the other for what they were, or aspired to be. As opposed to the first 
version, in the Phenomenology the struggle for recognition was presented as 
already ongoing, fraught with tension and distress yet triggered by nothing. 
Both of them just wanted to be recognized by the other. The struggle was 
not a response to any specific status anxiety, such as the fear of falling in 
social terms; nor was it a response to concrete status violations, such as the 
theft which triggered the struggle in System der Sittlichkeit. Hegelian desire 
(Begierde) cannot be identified with a specific source. It was rather an exist-
ential condition, which necessitated action. None of the two parties could 
refrain from taking part in a struggle that was anyway inevitable. At stake was 
the entire social being. To be acknowledged as fully part of society was more 
precious than one’s life. Hence both parties put their lives on the line to gain 
full status. The two parties took turns vindicating their claims for recognition 
and ended up in a struggle for life and death in which both parties do their 
utmost to assert themselves over against each other, through determination, 
violence, sacrifices, and a readiness to risk everything. This phase is necessary, 
as ‘it is through a life and death struggle that each proves its worth to itself, and 
that both prove their worth to each other’ (Hegel 2018: 111, emphasis in ori-
ginal). They seek to prove themselves, motivated by the desire to be recognized 
by the other as a full and worthy part. Out of the life and death struggle, 
there emerged a Master and a Slave, or more closely defined social roles. The 
Master acquired the privileges of power and had the capacity to make the 
Slave work and fulfil the Master’s wishes. Yet none of them were successful in 
gaining recognition. The Slave did not acquire recognition, despite working 
hard, and the Master did not acquire recognition, despite being apparently 
able to realize every wish. The desired recognition eluded them both. For my 
purposes, the failure of the Master is the most instructive, as it includes the 
position of power and consumption. The Master was said to satisfy desire 
through Genuss, which carried the double meaning of both enjoyment and 
consumption. The Master could enjoy whatever the Slave produced. But no 
amount of coercion could secure recognition. The Slave could be forced into 
submission, and the Slave could be forced to acknowledge the superior social 
status of the Master. But it was a recognition that failed to satisfy, since it did 
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not mean anything. The act of recognition did not confer any social esteem, 
since the Slave had no esteem to offer. Everything had been devalued through 
the one- sided assertion of the Master.
The Master and the Slave remained caught in a struggle for recognition, 
and their unfulfilled desire continued to push them beyond existing restraints. 
None of them were successful, and none of them could escape the mutual 
dependence. Enjoyment was inextricably dependent on the other, who granted 
recognition, or, alternatively, withheld it. To gain recognition, one had to 
match the expectations and the demands of the other, who could offer recog-
nition while at the same time being the antagonist against whom the subject 
proved his worth. The other had the contradictory role of being both poten-
tial provider and antagonist. This line of reasoning was adopted and further 
elaborated in Lacanian psychoanalysis. Jacques Lacan suggested that enjoy-
ment was altogether ‘of the other’. Just as ‘desire is the desire of the Other’ 
(Lacan 1977: 235), enjoyment is of the other. The subject feels compelled to 
comply, according to what is perceived to be the expectations of others, and 
undertake actions which may generate satisfaction, or recognition of social 
esteem, as they satisfy these expectations. The satisfaction need not be con-
sciously experienced as such. People may enjoy without being aware of it. 
Enjoyment can – but need not – include a state of conscious happiness, or 
sense of relief. It can also be a brief  and partial break from a state of distress. 
Conscious satisfaction may be accidental. Enjoyment can even be seen as the 
price to be paid for conformity (Freud 1931). It can be the very opposite of 
joyous feelings. As Slavoj Žižek pointed out, ‘to enjoy’ is rather ‘something we 
do as a kind of weird and twisted ethical duty’ (Žižek 2006: 79). Desire has 
been satisfied. But it does not feel satisfying but rather as a fulfilment of duties, 
as something we have to do: the compulsion to satisfy moral expectations and 
the awkward sense of relief  when these expectations are being met.
The precarious nature of recognition has been seen as central for the spe-
cifically modern experience of recognition. The two central strands in the 
re- articulation of the Hegelian concept of recognition in the early 1990s, the 
communitarian reading of Charles Taylor and the recognition- oriented refor-
mulation of German Critical Theory made by Axel Honneth, both offered a 
historicizing interpretation of the master- and- slave dialectic. On their ana-
lysis, the Phenomenology, published in 1807, indicated that a change was 
under way. Recognition could no longer be taken for granted. ‘What has come 
about with the modern age’, Charles Taylor argued, ‘is not the need for rec-
ognition but the conditions in which the attempt to be recognized can fail’ 
(Taylor 1992: 35; see also Taylor 1989). Recognition had turned into an indi-
vidual project without definite end in sight. The traditional sources, based on 
estates, birth- right, or a piece of land, were called into question, and status 
anxiety became a generally shared experience, traceable to the emergence of 
capitalism and the disintegration of stable estates. As a consequence, rec-
ognition had to be achieved, or actively secured; it was no longer an auto-
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Another influential line of reception, starting with the reading of the master- 
and- slave dialectic developed by Alexandre Kojève in his 1930s lectures, and 
later elaborated in a psychoanalytic direction by Jacques Lacan, offered an 
existential reading of the same section. The struggle for recognition was seen 
as indicative of what it meant to be human, and thus not tied to a specific 
historic situation. Recognition was precarious because each individual desire 
operated defensively. There is, in any society, a multiplicity of desires, ‘each 
of which wants to negate, to assimilate, to make its own, to subjugate, the 
other Desire as Desire’ (Kojève 1969: 40). Everyone desperately wanted to be 
desired by another desire, in an environment where everyone else was just as 
anxious, creating constant distress and making recognition inherently diffi-
cult to attain. On this analysis, Hegel did not articulate a specifically modern 
experience. To the contrary, recognition will be precarious and fundamentally 
uncertain in any society – in ancient Greece, or in medieval Europe – in which 
people are motivated by a desire for social esteem.
Punishment is conceived to operate right in the middle of this dynamic, 
in the gap between desire and satisfaction. Unlike the Slave in Hegel’s tale, it 
has the power to provide recognition. Inserted in between desire and enjoy-
ment, punishment could offer relief  of the status concerns of an audience 
which experienced just a slight sense of unease or, alternatively, a pervasive 
awareness of being denied acknowledgement. The audience is driven by a 
desire to be acknowledged as fully part of society, or to assert their status over 
against other groups, and when they are successful in any of these respects, 
when recognition is momentarily provided through punishment, it involves 
a relief  of distress, which is precisely pleasure in the Platonic sense. Nothing 
was direct. With respect to the three pre- modern contexts, the penal rituals 
did not communicate that the spectators were valuable; if  anything, pun-
ishment was a reminder that they were no more than cogs in a world that 
proved them to be expendable. As opposed to the Aristotelian exaltation, the 
pleasure was mediated by conceptions about the world and by the dilemmas 
that were being enacted. The world and its existential dilemmas were central, 
underlined by the witnessed pain and suffering. The early- modern executions, 
for instance, enacted the predicament of being entirely disposable and at the 
same time entirely protected subjects of the king. By being part of the ritual, 
everyone’s desire for belonging was satisfied, since they recognized themselves 
as being in the same position, squeezed between vulnerability and protection. 
The spectators recognized themselves as part of the enacted world, and they 
moreover recognized each other as fully part of a group with a common pre-
dicament. In this way, punishment latched on to the desire for social esteem 
and bridged the gap to enjoyment.
While conveyed by other people in the audience, the recognition was essen-
tially institutional, embedded in institutionalized social practice. To catch 
sight of it requires an abstraction from the interpersonal focus of the master- 
and- slave dialectic, which was tailored around face- to- face interaction:  two 
actors who try to gain recognition from each other. In his later work, in the 
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Philosophy of Right, Hegel employed an institutional perspective, which might 
include punishment. On this analysis, there was by and large congruence 
between the lived morality and social institutions at any given time. Habits and 
ideals which were valued within a community were seen to be institutionalized 
in existing social institutions – punishment, education, religion, family – which 
in turn could satisfy the desire for recognition (Hegel 1952). The basic congru-
ence made people susceptible to what the institutions had to offer, in terms of 
recognition. Desire and satisfaction were shaped by the available institutional 
provision. In a modern context, there are a range of different institutional 
providers, which can provide other kinds of recognition, beyond the primor-
dial recognition of status. Axel Honneth has, most notably, distinguished three 
modes of recognition, each tied to a particular social sphere. The family satis-
fied the desire for recognition by offering love and emotional support, whereas 
the state offered recognition by providing equal opportunity and respect for 
legal rights and safeguarding the sanctity of individuals. Recognition of social 
esteem was attributed to the institutions of civil society, which acknowledged 
individual achievements and conferred social status (Honneth 1992; 2011; 
Honneth et  al. 2013). Punishment may offer recognition of social esteem 
(although primarily located within the state). Like a number of other social 
institutions, punishment may bridge the gap between the desire for social 
esteem and the satisfaction of this desire. Education and religion, the family 
and the workplace may, likewise, activate the desire for status recognition 
and offer opportunities for its satisfaction. In several respects, punishment 
resembles other social institutions. Like them, it embodies rituals, morality and 
beliefs, and is engaged in ‘ways of world- making’ (Goodman 1978).
Punishment was also uniquely positioned to satisfy specifically the desire 
for social esteem. The world was laid out particularly in the dimension of 
justice and moral order. The performative function of penal practices was 
brought out in the programmatic statements on punishment as a social insti-
tution made by David Garland in an overlooked article from 1991, and at 
the end of Punishment and Modern Society. Elaborating on Durkheim’s idea 
of punishment as symbolic communication, he argued that penal practices 
shape worlds by enacting basic moral and social distinctions (Garland 1991). 
Punishment can ‘tell us where to locate social authority, how to preserve order 
and community, where to look for social dangers and how to feel about these 
matters’ (Garland 1990:  252/ 3). It provides answers to questions that are 
moral and existential. How are we, or the penal spectators in any given com-
munity, rectified or safeguarded, and where is our place in the total scheme 
of things? It is not simply a matter of who is the criminal, or a statement on 
how order and community are best preserved. It is also about the compos-
ition of what is being defended: the social hierarchies, the underlying order, 
and the spectators’ own position. Punishment is never a sideshow; it enacts 
a whole world in the key dimensions of order and morality. The enacted 
world is moreover authoritatively underlined by pain and ritualistic violence. 
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may be prohibited in other areas of life but is in this specific context backed by 
social morality. Punishment may for these reasons be uniquely positioned, to 
activate a desire, which from the outset has been defined by vengeful passions, 
prevailing notions of justice and standards of social esteem, and to satisfy this 
desire, in addition. Potentially everyone was included. Punishment manifested 
a shared social world and lived morality, which was liable to provide recogni-
tion to individuals who had been and continued to be immersed in that world 
and that morality. Because of the congruence, any member of the community 
could effortlessly partake in the consumption of punishment and access the 
shared world which was being enacted in the dimensions of order and mor-
ality. The dependence on specific others appeared to vanish, allowing them to 
recognize themselves in that order, as full members. On the face of it, it was 
recognition for free. One just needed to be part of the audience.
The argument just advanced, that punishment provided satisfaction by 
enacting a world in the dimensions of justice and moral order, which made 
individuals in the audience recognize themselves as fully part of a group, is 
open to discussion and numerous objections can be made. The enacted worlds 
and their interpretations will always vary, historically, across social divisions, 
and otherwise, and the pleasure of the audience – as an actual experience – 
will always, in the final analysis, elude any attempt to reconstruct it. With 
respect to the early- modern period, Bentham above all saw the repeated tra-
gedy. Yet that may not have been how everybody experienced the public execu-
tion, regardless of how events unfolded in other respects around the scaffold. 
Some people may not have seen their own utter disposability and instead felt 
the power and the protection of the sovereign – the sublime experience – or 
experienced the absorbed arousal of the carnivalesque. In that case, their 
pleasure would probably have been different, less a relief  of status concerns 
and instead the absorbed excitement of terror at a safe distance, of popular 
acts of defiance, or the enthusiasm of self- assertion. In addition, punishment 
may not necessarily have provided pleasure at all. To some people in the audi-
ence it was a discomforting experience. Several contemporary observers of 
the early- modern executions were appalled, or morally alienated. There is no 
necessary pleasure, and any attempt to reconstruct the mechanisms carries a 
tentative character, including this one.
How is punishment to be situated with respect to pleasure’s seemingly 
incompatible duality, stretched out between the desire for recognition and its 
elusive, uncertain and always partial satisfaction? I have argued that punish-
ment operates in a specific way, as an intervention bridging the gap between 
desire and enjoyment. The consumption of punishment promises to satisfy the 
incessant and never satisfied desire for status recognition, at the same time as 
it provides enjoyment, by recognizing spectators as fully part of the commu-
nity or, alternatively, through the excitement of taking part in collective self- 
assertion. With respect to the character of experience, these are very different 
kinds of enjoyment. On one account, punishment offers relief of distress by 
shaping social worlds in the dimension of justice and order. On the other 
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account, punishment creates immediate excitement through an unrestrained 
display of violence and morality. So far in the book, the examples have been 
exclusively pre- modern, and it is now time to start discussing the pleasure of 
punishment in a modern context. As traceable in Nietzschean philosophy 
and Freudian psychoanalysis at the end of the nineteenth century, with the 
passage to modernity, the conditions for the consumption of pleasure were 
transformed. Shared excitement and immediate absorption were rendered 
increasingly difficult at the scenes of punishment; there was a shift of focus 
from anger to pleasure as the prime disruptive element in punishment; and 
social prohibitions changed, which necessitated sublimation of the enjoy-
ment. All these changes have been covered so far. In addition, the evolution 
of the state- administered criminal justice system seemed to support the novel 
idea of punishment as something representing the audience (Durkheim 1997; 
Lenin 1965). During the early- modern period, the audience must have felt that 
the justice being done was not theirs, but rather a justice representing either 
gods or monarchs. But the evolution of modern police forces and correctional 
services, in combination with the gradual evolution of democratic practices, 
placed punishment within reach of the audience. Punishment could be their 
punishment, used for rehabilitative ends, or as an expression of their terror.
These changes fundamentally affected the modern experience of pleasure, 
both as the Platonian relief  of distress and as the Aristotelian absorbed excite-
ment. The Platonian pleasure will be treated in the next chapter. The recog-
nition which had been readily accessible in the consumption of the world 
and the shared dilemmas of impotence being enacted now evolved into res-
sentiment, as status hierarchies and status expectations were unsettled, and 
the idea of punishment as a representation of the popular majority gained 
ground. The last chapter will discuss Aristotelian pleasure. The carnivalesque 
excitement and the sublime abandon evolved into obscene enjoyment, due to 
the difficulties of expressing unrestrained excitement in public, and the pos-
sibility of terror as an expression of the social morality of the group. There 
were also other dislocations, which justify the choice of presenting the spe-
cifically modern Platonian and Aristotelian pleasures in separate chapters. 
The division corresponds to different experiences of punishment, but also to 
different kinds of punishment. With respect to pre- modern conditions, one 
and the same type of punishment could provide different kinds of enjoy-
ment: sometimes unconscious satisfaction and sometimes visible exaltation. 
The desire for social esteem could find satisfaction in the collective recogni-
tion of social worth or, alternatively, develop into excitement and absorption 
in excessive punishment, in the consumption of Attic tragedies, afterworldly 
punishment and public executions. With the passage to modernity, however, 
the two kinds of pleasure appeared to be provided by different kinds of pun-
ishment:  punishments which moreover have been discussed separately, in 
different strands of research. Ressentiment, which provided recognition of 
social esteem through an imaginary revenge in the projected world of order 
and morality, relied mainly on ordinary punishment, or punishment that was 
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legitimate in the Weberian sense. Obscene enjoyment, on the other hand, the 
intense excitement of asserting desire without paying heed to conventional 
normative constraints, was considered as the domain of excessive or illegit-
imate punishment.
References
Albrecht, William (1975) The sublime pleasures of tragedy: a study of critical theory 
from Dennis to Keats. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
Aristotle (1976) Nicomachean ethics. Trans. by J. Thomson. Harmondsworth: 
Penguin.
Bakhtin, Michail (1968) Rabelais and his world. Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press.
Battersby, Christine (2007) The Sublime, terror and human difference. Abingdon: 
Routledge.
Brady, Emily (2013) The sublime in modern philosophy: aesthetics, ethics, and nature. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Burke, Edmund (1996) The writings and speeches of Edmund Burke. Vol. 3, Party, par-
liament, and the American War, 1774– 1780. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Burke, Edmund (1997) The writings and speeches of Edmund Burke. Vol. 1, The early 
writings. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Burke, Peter (2009) Popular culture in early modern Europe. Farnham: Ashgate.
Butler, Judith (1987) Subjects of desire: Hegelian reflections in twentieth- century France. 
New York: Columbia University Press.
Ciobanu, Estella (2018) Representations of the body in Middle English Biblical drama. 
Cham: Springer International Publishing.
Civitarese, Guiseppe (2016) On sublimation. International Journal of Psychoanalysis 
97: 1369– 1392.
Cohen, Esther (1989) Symbols of culpability and the universal language of justice: the 
ritual of public executions in late medieval Europe. History of European Ideas 
11: 407– 416.
Dennis, John (1996) The grounds of criticism in poetry. In A. Ashfield and P. de 
Bolla (eds.), The sublime:  a reader in British eighteenth- century aesthetic theory. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp 35– 39.
Eagleton, Terry (1995) Heathcliff and the great hunger. London: Verso.
Eagleton, Terry (2003) Sweet violence: the idea of the tragic. Oxford: Blackwell.
Eagleton, Terry (2005) Holy terror. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Enders, Jody (1999) The medieval theater of cruelty: rhetoric, memory, violence. Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press.
Evans, Richard (1996) Rituals of retribution:  capital punishment in Germany 1600– 
1987. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Foucault, Michel (1979) Discipline and punish:  the birth of the prison. New  York: 
Vintage Books.
Freud, Sigmund (1931) Das Unbehagen in der Kultur. Wien:  Internationaler 
psychoanalytischer Verlag.
Garland, David (1990) Punishment and modern society: a study in social theory. Oxford: 
Clarendon.
Garland, David (1991) Punishment and culture: the symbolic dimensions of criminal 
justice. In A. Sarat and S. Silbey (eds.), Studies in law, politics and society. Vol. 11. 
























124 Two paradigms of enjoyment
Garland, David (2010) Peculiar institution: America’s death penalty in an age of aboli-
tion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Goldhill, Simon (1990) Great Dionysia and civic ideology. In J. Winkler and F. 
Zeitlin (eds.), Nothing to do with Dionysos? Athenian drama in its social context. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. pp 97– 129.
Goldhill, Simon (2000) Civic ideology and the problem of difference: the politics of 
Aeschylean tragedy, once again. The Journal of Hellenic Studies 120: 34– 56.
Goodman, Nelson (1978) Ways of worldmaking. Hassocks: Harvester Press.
Griffith, Mark (1995) Brilliant dynasts: power and politics in the Oresteia. Classical 
Antiquity 14(1): 62– 129.
Habermas, Jürgen (1963) Theorie und Praxis: sozialphilosophische Studien. Neuwied 
am Rhein: Luchterhand.
Heath, Malcolm (2012) Longinus and the ancient sublime. In T. Costelloe (ed.), The 
sublime. From antiquity to the present. Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press. 
pp 11– 23.
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1952) The philosophy of right. Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press.
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1998) System der Sittlichkeit. Gesammelte Werke, 
Band 5. Schriften und Entwürfe (1799– 1808). Hamburg: Meiner.
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Fredrich (2018) The phenomenology of spirit. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Henrichs, Albert (1984) Loss of self, suffering, violence: the modern view of Dionysus 
from Nietzsche to Girard. Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 88: 205– 240.
Hill, Christopher (1972) The world turned upside down: radical ideas during the English 
revolution. London: Maurice Temple Smith.
Honneth, Axel (1992) Kampf um Anerkennung: zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer 
Konflikte. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
Honneth, Axel (2003) Redistribution as recognition. A response to Nancy Fraser. In 
N. Fraser and A. Honneth. Redistribution or recognition?: a political- philosophical 
exchange. London: Verso. pp 110– 197.
Honneth, Axel (2011) Das Recht der Freiheit:  Grundriss einer demokratischen 
Sittlichkeit. Berlin: Suhrkamp.
Honneth, Axel (2013) Recognition and Critical Theory today: an interview with Axel 
Honneth, by Gonçalo Marcelo. Philosophy and Social Criticism 39(2): 209– 221.
Ignatieff, Michael (1978) A just measure of pain: the penitentiary in the industrial revo-
lution, 1750– 1850. London: Macmillan.
Kant, Immanuel (1914a) Kritik der Urteilskraft. Immanuel Kants Werke. Band V. 
Berlin: Cassirer.
Kojève, Alexandre (1969) Introduction to the reading of Hegel. New  York:  Basic 
Books.
Lacan, Jacques (1977) The four fundamental concepts of psycho- analysis. London: 
Hogarth.
Laqueur, Thomas (1989) Crowds, carnival and the state in English executions, 1604 – 
1868. In A. Beier, D. Cannadine and J. Rosenheim (eds.), The first modern society: 
essays in English History in honour of Lawrence Stone. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. pp 305– 356.
Lenin, Vladimir (1965) The state and revolution: Marxist teaching on the state and the 























Two paradigms of enjoyment 125
Linebaugh, Peter (1991) The London hanged: crime and civil society in the eighteenth 
century. London: Allen Lane.
Lyotard, Jean- François (1994) Lessons on the analytic of the sublime: (Kant’s Critique 
of judgment, §§ 23– 29). Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Martschukat, Jürgen (2002) ‘The art of killing by electricity’: the sublime and the elec-
tric chair. Journal of American History 89(3): 900– 921.
McGowen, Randall (1986) A powerful sympathy:  terror, the prison, and humani-
tarian reform in early nineteenth- century Britain. Journal of British Studies 25(3): 
312– 334.
Mills, Robert (2005) Suspended animation: pain, pleasure and punishment in medieval 
culture. London: Reaktion Books.
Moyaert, Paul (2010) What is frightening about sexual pleasure? Introducing Lacan’s 
jouissance into Freudian psychoanalysis via Plato and Aristotle. In E. Dorfman 
and J. de Vleminck (eds.), Sexuality and psychoanalysis:  philosophical criticisms. 
Leuven: Leuven University Press. pp 21– 33.
Nietzsche, Friedrich (1967) The birth of tragedy. New York: Vintage Books.
Nietzsche, Friedrich (2017) The will to power. London: Penguin Books.
Nye, David (1994) American technological sublime. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Nye, David (2018) American illuminations:  urban lighting, 1800– 1920. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press.
O’Neill, Daniel (2012) The sublime, the beautiful, and the political in Burke’s work. In 
K. Vermeir and M. Funk Deckard (eds.), The science of sensibility: reading Burke’s 
Philosophical Enquiry. Dordrecht: Springer. pp 193– 221.
Plato (1959) Gorgias. Trans. by E. R. Dodds. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Porter, James (2016) The sublime in antiquity. Cambridge:  Cambridge University 
Press.
Roselli, David (2011) Theater of the people: spectators and society in ancient Athens. 
Austin: University of Texas Press.
Ruddick, Nicholas (1998) Life and death by electricity in 1890: the transfiguration of 
William Kemmler. Journal of American Culture 21(4): 79– 87.
Rudé, George (1956) The Gordon Riots:  a study of the rioters and their victims. 
Transactions of the Royal Historical Society  6: 93– 114.
Schuster, Aaron (2016) The trouble with pleasure:  Deleuze and psychoanalysis. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Southey, Robert (2016) Letters from England:  by Don Manuel Alvarez Espriella. 
Abingdon: Routledge.
Spierenburg, Pieter (1984) The spectacle of suffering:  executions and the evolu-
tion of repression:  from a preindustrial metropolis to the European experience. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Taylor, Charles (1975) Hegel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Taylor, Charles (1989) Sources of the self:  the making of the modern identity. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Taylor, Charles (1992) The politics of recognition. In A. Gutmann (ed.), 
Multiculturalism and the politics of recognition. Princeton:  Princeton University 
Press. pp 25– 74.
Taylor, C. C. W. (2008) Pleasure: Aristotle’s response to Plato. In Pleasure, mind, and 

























126 Two paradigms of enjoyment
van Riel, Gerd (2000) Pleasure and the good life: Plato, Aristotle, and the Neoplatonists. 
Leiden: Brill.
Welskopp, Thomas (2013) Anerkennung  – Verheissung und Zumutungen der 
Moderne. In A. Honneth, O. Lindemann and S. Voswinkel (eds.), Strukturwandel 
der Anerkennung. Paradoxien sozialer Integration in der Gegenwart. Frankfurt am 
Main: Campus. pp 41– 73.





Moral elevation through punishment
As indicated by the Hegelian master- and- slave dialectic, satisfaction of desire 
was precarious, passing, partial, potentially harmful, socially conditioned and 
dependent on others. Under modern conditions, desire was no less persistent 
than before, while recognition appeared more elusive. The reinforced tension 
between the desire for social esteem and its satisfaction was explicit in the the-
ories of ressentiment by Friedrich Nietzsche and Max Scheler. They formulated 
the idea of a general societal condition, which shaped the very experience 
of satisfaction, after the passage to modernity. Ressentiment changed the 
conditions for pleasure, affecting everyone, although some were more affected 
than others. In certain respects, the difficulties in acquiring recognition were 
compounded. The tension was acutely experienced among significant sections 
of the population, painful and pervasive, as a result of the combined impact 
of destabilized status hierarchies and the new contradictions of capitalism. 
Punishment, along with other institutions, could no longer provide recogni-
tion by re- enacting a world in the dimensions of order and morality, since 
that world had lost some of its ontological weight. Due to socio- political 
changes conceived of as historical injustices of monumental proportions, the 
world had to be radically restored, or reshaped. Not even punishment could 
be trusted, and had to be reinvented. In one respect, however, recognition 
of status was facilitated. Recognition through punishment was direct. It was 
no longer mediated through the other spectators, as a shared predicament, 
but immediately provided by a punishment which audiences felt to be their 
own. In all these three respects, ressentiment constituted an adaptation to 
the changed conditions for the experience of pleasure in the late- nineteenth 
century.
In the Genealogy of Morals, Friedrich Nietzsche offered a ground- breaking 
analysis of ressentiment as a mechanism for self- valuation through proxy, or 
a way to access recognition of status in a situation when recognition was 
perceived to be actively, durably and unjustly denied. Once again, the issue 
was how pain was transformed into pleasure. As opposed to most later 
commentators on ressentiment, Nietzsche accorded a central role to punish-
ment. To him, it was a central mechanism that would transform the spectators’ 
pain into pleasure. It had the power to release the accumulated tension and 
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provide pleasure to angry and humiliated spectators. All of a sudden, the 
tension would be released. The transition was affected through a revenge, 
which was not of their own making but administered through the criminal 
justice system of the state. Still, it was perceived to be their revenge and, in the 
process, spectators were morally elevated – in their own eyes and in the eyes of 
the fellow members of the group. The transformation appeared paradoxical. 
On the one hand, there was a pervasive sense of powerlessness, a fair share 
of culturally devalued feelings such as bitterness and envy, as well as the less 
than reassuring belief  that the world was crumbling at the seams; on the other 
hand, there was a sense of relief, the experience of being rectified and seen 
as being the backbone of society, in the key dimensions of order and mor-
ality. How could embittered observers of a crumbling order be transformed 
into esteemed pillars of a restored order through punishment? This apparent 
paradox will be approached in the same way as the problem of tragic pleasure, 
the popular representations of Hell, and the satisfaction of public executions. 
Instead of focusing on the promised blood, one should direct attention to 
the world being enacted. In this chapter, I will discuss ressentiment as a con-
temporary experience. Criminological research on the evolution of criminal 
justice in the post- 1960s Western world offers a wealth of examples on both 
the build- up and the release of tension, which can be used to shed light on 
how punishment operates in the gap between desire and enjoyment, under 
conditions of ressentiment. As before, the relationship between the audience 
and the world projected through punishment provides the key to the trans-
formation of pain into pleasure.
The build- up of tension: way of life and no way out
The idea of  ressentiment as a general condition, which shaped the very 
experience of  satisfaction, emerged with the modern period. In The Present 
Age, originally published in 1846, Søren Kierkegaard used the French term 
ressentiment to describe a psychological reaction of  envy and the denial of 
distinction (Kierkegaard 1962). The reaction was conceived of  as a gen-
eral mood, shared by many, and rooted in the contemporary experience of 
status uncertainty and lack of  recognition. Max Scheler later elaborated the 
experience phenomenologically in Das Ressentiment im Aufbau der Moralen, 
published in 1912. He treated ressentiment as an inner- psychological mech-
anism, which some people were more prone to adopt than others, because 
they were more exposed to the tension between rising status expectations and 
existing relationships of  power. From the outset, ressentiment was driven by 
pain: the simultaneous experience of  injustice and the inability to make it go 
away. Desire for status recognition could not be satisfied, and pressure was 
mounting. The injustice was deeply felt and rectification beyond reach. The 
experienced dilemma was accompanied by a host of  emotional reactions. 
Bitterness, envy, schadenfreude, malice, hatred, and jealousy were typical 




Like Kierkegaard before him, Scheler saw ressentiment as an expression of 
the age, in this case Europe before the First World War. The experience was 
described as something specifically modern, widespread, and unthinkable 
in pre- modern times. The feelings of  bitterness and impotence ironically 
presupposed hope and privileges. The causes were located in the dissol-
ution of  old hierarchies. Ressentiment grew out of  perceived powerlessness, 
combined with unfulfilled status expectations, and was set in motion by 
the French revolution, which had affected the horizon of  expectations. The 
expectations among broad sectors of  the population were severed from rigid 
status hierarchies and moved slowly upwards as they became citizens with 
rights as well as obligations in a nation state, while they at the same time 
were being squeezed between unlimited goals and general expectations and 
the limited means at disposal, a contradiction that was foregrounded by the 
advent of  capitalism. The raised expectations could not be matched. The 
result was experienced as durably denied or even as actively withheld recog-
nition, with little prospect of  change in sight (Scheler 2017). Satisfaction is 
in one sense always uncertain, potentially harmful and dependent on others’ 
gratification; it may be endemic in the modern condition (Taylor 1992; 1989), 
or even be part of  what it means to be human, as suggested by Kojève (1969). 
Yet this was different; the lack of  recognition was acutely experienced, and 
ever more so. As tension was mounting – there was no outlet of  desire, no 
bridge to enjoyment  – the situation became unbearable. Scheler called it 
‘psychological dynamite’ (seelisches Dynamit) which threatened to detonate 
(Scheler 2017: 25).
The idea of ressentiment as a general condition has recurred several times 
during the modern period. Each time, the main objective was to understand 
the allure of political movements which came across as problematic, rather 
than the impact of punishment. Max Scheler was deeply concerned by the 
progress of the labour movement in the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
and accorded a role to the criminal law only at the margins of his account. The 
focus on political mobilization has characterized most analysis of ressentiment 
in social science and cultural theory. In the 1990s, Wendy Brown discussed 
ressentiment from a Left- wing perspective, and keenly diagnosed its pervasive 
impact; ‘starkly accountable yet dramatically impotent, the late modern lib-
eral subject quite literally seethes with ressentiment’ (Brown 1995: 69). It was 
exemplified with the identity politics that was being articulated on behalf of 
oppressed groups, influential at the time, spreading from Western universities 
and beyond. The experience of living in an age of ressentiment was articulated 
once again in the 2010s (Dolgert 2016; Tomelleri 2017). This time, writers tended 
to see ressentiment as one main cause for the rise of authoritarian populism, 
organized around a core of predominantly white working- class males on both 
sides of the Atlantic (Dolgert 2016; Harper and Schaaf 2018; Oudenampsen 
2018; Gidron and Hall 2017). The mobilizations were linked to shifting polit-
ical agendas and social compositions. Yet they were all informed by the idea 










of frustration and perceived status infraction blended with existing narratives 
to the effect that recognition was being actively withheld, as opposed to just 
missing. The powerful idea of historic injustice, which had to be avenged, was 
the hallmark of ressentiment. The idea of injustice did not seem to be wedded 
to any particular values. In this sense, ressentiment was politically colour- blind. 
But it was inevitably political. Each mobilization was powered by political 
demands for justice, and was successful to the extent that it articulated the 
wish of significant sections of the populations to be recognized and rectified as 
victims of injustices (Brown 1995; Dolgert 2016; Elgat 2017).
Some of the more prominent narratives in the post- 1968 era have been 
organized around crime – as a shorthand for the key drivers of ressentiment – 
with punishment as the natural counterpoint. Individual acts of crime made 
the denied recognition intelligible, as they were inserted in a wider tale of 
breakdown of socio- moral order. On the 5 November 1972, a man on his 
way home from a Birmingham pub was attacked and knocked to the ground 
by three young men. The event – and the wider phenomenon of which it was 
allegedly part: mugging – was given much publicity in national British media 
in the ensuing months. As a result, Stuart Hall et al. argued, a new figure came 
to life, unifying a nation marked by widening class divisions;
Young, black, bred in, or arising from the ‘breakdown of social order’ in 
the city; threatening the traditional peace of the streets, the security of 
movement by the ordinary citizens; motivated by naked gain, a reward 
he would come by, if  possible, without a day’s honest toil; his crime, / …/ 
impelled by an even more frightening need for ‘gratuitous violence’, an 
inevitable result of the weakening moral fibre in family and society, and 
the general collapse of respect for discipline and authority.
(Hall et al. 1978: 160)
‘Young, black, bred in’, the criminal personified the active denial of hard work 
and responsibility: someone who inverted the values of family and tradition. 
By implication, one key actor responsible for the perceived injustice had been 
given a name: the mugger. Equally important, there was another story within 
this story. Beneath the heavily prejudiced notions of the dangerous classes, 
the ill- concealed racism in the media coverage, and other disturbing elements 
in the portrayal of the criminal, there was the desperate cry of its counter-
part: the ordinary citizens. The ordinary citizens – tacitly white, British and 
hard- working – could not live; the life they expected could not be lived for a 
combination of tangible and less tangible reasons, associated with physical 
security and the breakdown of moral order. Even the most basic expectations 
of life were unfulfilled. Ordinary citizens were unable to walk the streets 
without risk of being attacked. There was moreover the imminent risk of a 
‘general collapse of respect for discipline and authority’. The fundamental 
order and morality of the world was being subverted and had to be restored – 




that order for recognition. This story has been retold many times since, and 
would become common property in the politics of criminal justice in many 
Western countries throughout the post 1968- era (Flamm 2005; Camp 2016; 
Murakawi 2014; Gottschalk 2006; Beckett 1997).
Crime was the ultimate proof of ordinary life becoming unliveable. It was 
never only about crime as concrete acts of transgression, however disastrous 
the consequences were at the personal level for those who were immediately 
affected, in terms of violence, addiction, or feelings of being aggrieved. As 
others have observed, public views on punishment tended to be embedded 
in a moral view of social order (Beckett 1997). Of course, not everybody 
supported harsher punishment. It was easy to find support for lenient senten-
cing in surveys, where the overarching moral concerns were supplemented by 
information on the circumstances of the specific act (Jerre 2013; Gottschalk 
2006). Yet supplementary information on the realities of crime and senten-
cing was not always relevant. Those who believed that the moral order was 
endangered were also those who wanted harsher sentences, in any case. To 
significant sections of the populations in many Western countries, ideas on 
punishment were heavily influenced by concerns of moral decline and by the 
perception of living in a dangerous world (Tyler and Boeckmann 1997; King 
and Maruna 2009; Cheliotis 2013; Gerber and Jackson 2016). Crime became 
a symbol for the direction in which society seemed to be heading. Hence, 
members of the public would ‘endorse punishment in a symbolic attempt 
to defend social order and moral cohesion’ (Gerber and Jackson 2016: 131). 
Crime was taken to demonstrate that the moral principles of the world were 
being violated, by others and with disastrous consequences. It made life 
unliveable, along with other occurrences, which were likewise perceived to 
affect the world in the dimensions of order and morality, although not neces-
sarily related in other ways. In a letter written in June 1968, a white father of 
five from North Carolina let his heart out. He has had it.
I’m sick of crime everywhere. I’m sick of riots. I’m sick of “poor” people 
demonstrations … I’m sick of the U.S. Supreme Court … I’m sick of the 
lack of law enforcement …. I’m sick of Vietnam …. I’m sick of hippies, 
LSD, drugs, and all the promotion the news media give them …. But 
most of all, I’m sick of constantly being kicked in the teeth for staying 
home, minding my own business, working steadily, paying my bills and 
taxes, raising my children to be decent citizens, managing my financial 
affairs.
(quoted from Flamm 2005: 12)
The letter- writer was sick of many things, ranging from Vietnam to 
demonstrations, from hippies to the Supreme Court, and the list could prob-
ably have been extended with other visible signs of disorder, or political 
change. Michael Flamm, who found the letter in an archive, interpreted it as 











many white Americans a pervasive sense that the basic fundaments of society 
were coming apart. It came to be articulated as a problem of order, where 
order was threatened by a combination of street crime, state- administered 
reforms, and political mobilization (Flamm 2005). Yet the perceived threat to 
moral order was merely one aspect of the letter. Implied in the brief  analysis 
of the state of the nation, captured in the quote, was a testimony of a personal 
crisis of recognition. It was not only society that was coming apart at the 
seams, but also his identity as a white father of five, living in North Carolina. 
He did not recognize himself  or his values in the papers he read, or in the tele-
vision news; instead hippies and drug users got promoted. He was working 
hard, payed his bills and raised his children to be the same – for which he was 
‘constantly being kicked in the teeth’. He did what was expected of any respon-
sible citizen, yet experienced no appreciation in return. Instead of gaining the 
usual enjoyment of the other for conventional investments – going to work, 
paying the bills, or raising children – there was the suspicion that others enjoy 
a good life, on his behalf, due to the erosion of existing institutions. He was 
losing his sense of direction in life, and articulated the personal despair as a 
breakdown of law and order. The two aspects came together in a paradoxical 
situation from which there was no escape. The personal crises could not be 
solved by being afforded recognition through existing institutions, since these 
institutions were unable to provide such recognition, while he, on the other 
hand, could do nothing but watch this happen, due to personal impotence.
In Zarathustra, Nietzsche described the ‘angry spectator’. It was someone 
who was unhappy and impotent, ‘impotent against that which has been  – 
it is an angry spectator of everything past’ (Nietzsche 2006:  2.20). Angry 
spectators were backward- looking and attached to historic wounds, preoccu-
pied with the injustice. Fundamentally, however, the spectators were angry 
because they were torn between an entrenched desire for a certain way of 
life and the experience of being unable to fulfil that desire (Reginster 1997). 
The desired way of life was the one which conferred enjoyment of the other. 
It was the way of life that one had grown up to expect. But it was out of 
reach, and this produced bitterness, envy, schadenfreude, malice, hatred, and 
other symptoms of frustrated thumos. The perception of being cornered, and 
unable to lead the kind of life one grew up to expect, was central. It was a 
crisis of recognition, which was only acerbated by dwindling resources and 
opportunities, deep- seated economic and social changes. With respect to a 
Louisiana right- wing constituency in 2010s, Arlie Hochschild has described 
how it had become ‘a struggle to feel seen and honored’ (Hochschild 2016: 144; 
see also Cramer 2016; Lamont 2018). Many respectable citizens, it was felt in 
Louisiana right- wing circles, had to stand back, while others enjoyed recogni-
tion and other benefits, illicitly. Their experiences were embedded in shared, 
more or less implicit narratives, which endorsed the socio- economic hardship, 
while accounting for personal powerlessness and lack of recognition as effects 
of the activities of hostile others. The narratives narrowed down respon-







and criminals were seen to actively disrupt the world in the key dimensions 
of order and morality, with the conscious assistance of more established 
institutions, such as civil rights organizations, universities, federal govern-
ment, or the liberal press (Hochschild 2016). Their way of life appeared 
impossible, everyday experiences of withheld recognition were reinforced, and 
pressure was mounting.
On Scheler’s analysis, desire for vengeance was the initial response. Those 
responsible must be punished. The injustice experienced called for immediate 
redress, but that was impossible due to the impotence of the subject. What 
could the white North Carolinian letter writer do other than write letters, 
complain and vote for a right- wing candidate? Hence, the desire for ven-
geance was pushed back into the imaginary (Scheler 2017). The more the 
desire for revenge was pushed back into the imaginary, the more object- less 
it became, eventually transforming it into a durable way of relating to the 
world. Yet desire did not go away; on the contrary, it kept mounting, as new 
signs of everyday infractions of social esteem were encountered, reinforced 
and reinterpreted through existing political narratives. Over time, pressure 
was accumulated, building an almost insurmountable gap between desire and 
enjoyment. There seemed to be less and less that could bridge the gap between 
desire and enjoyment. Even the conventional rewards of work, family and pro-
priety were becoming less capable of providing satisfaction. Just as the Slave 
in Hegel’s dialectic was unable to provide recognition, because the recognition 
being offered had lost its meaning, existing institutions were devalued and 
had a reduced amount of esteem to offer. Ever more tension was building up, 
which could not find an outlet. There was no way out – yet pressure continued 
to mount on the subject, until it finally became unbearable. Hence the refer-
ence to ‘psychological dynamite’ which threatened to detonate. The tension 
was literally explosive.
The release of tension: the late- modern prison and death penalty
Revenge was the default option, but since the desire for revenge was repressed 
and unavailable, people turned instead to punishment. Punishment became 
an important instrument to defuse status concerns and temporarily restore 
social esteem to the ‘angry spectator of everything past’. To Nietzsche, there 
was a marked difference; punishment was the weapon of the weak, for those 
who were unable to take revenge, because they were simply not strong enough 
(Nietzsche 1989:  I § 10). Hope of retribution was consequently deferred to 
other actors. The criminal justice apparatus seemed capable of carrying out 
the revenge which the angry spectators would only dream of exacting them-
selves. Still it was their revenge, a revenge through proxy. The criminal justice 
system of the state could produce their revenge. In one sense, this constituted 
an adaptation to the modern condition. Before the nineteenth century, such 
an idea would have been inconceivable, or utopian, or confined to the domain 






ordinary people could place their hope for general redress, as opposed to the 
punishment of specific crimes. With the passage to modernity, however, it 
became possible to imagine a state that could step in and act on behalf  of 
groups of ordinary citizens. The emergence of a criminal justice apparatus, 
with modern police forces and a network of correctional facilities, in com-
bination with the gradual spread of democratic ideas and electoral practices, 
may first of all have been bulwarks of the capitalist order. Inadvertently, the 
new state institutions also represented potential instruments of the audience. 
In the latter part of the nineteenth century, prisons located in the middle of 
cities and uniformed police officers patrolling the streets were highly visible 
manifestations of power, which made the state appear as a possible instru-
ment for popular revenge. Paradigmatically, Durkheim (1997) launched the 
idea that punishment was exacted for the sake of the audience, channelling 
their vengeful passions, whereas Lenin (1965) would outline how the people 
should take control over the repressive apparatus of the bourgeoise state and 
use it for their own ends. In both cases, punishment came forth as representa-
tive of ordinary people.
Thus, instead of feeling impotent and forgotten and nurturing private fan-
tasies of violence, the criminal justice system seemed to present an opening. 
The desire for revenge, which had been pushed back into the imaginary, was 
given an outlet, through the state: a legitimate outlet, moreover. In the current 
period, the observable rise of the ‘penal state’ (Garland 2013; McLennan 
2001; Rubin and Phelps 2017) presented itself  in the same way, as a vehicle 
for popular revenge on racialized groups, while being administered by the 
apparatuses of criminal justice. What has been argued with respect to the 
US situation in the ‘age of colour- blindness’, namely that the advances of 
the civil rights movement during the 1960s could not be confronted head on 
(Alexander 2010), may by extension apply to several other Western coun-
tries; ethnic minorities and non- citizens are grossly overrepresented in prisons 
everywhere. Vengeance had to come in a less than straightforward way. At the 
end of the twentieth century, it was not feasible to question the improvements 
in rights and status along the lines of gender, race, or sexuality in electoral pol-
itics. Civil liberties, sexual rights, equal opportunity and gender equality were 
embraced on the streets, in parliaments and in the courts. Instead, the revenge 
was exacted by the criminal justice system in a perfectly legitimate manner on 
individuals, not because of their newly acquired rights, but because they had 
violated the criminal law (Gottschalk 2006; Tonry 1995; Camp 2016).
The penal state promised rectification for the angry spectator:  a release 
of the built- up tension, accompanied by the ever- present suspicion of being 
betrayed, even by the criminal justice itself. The release of accumulated 
tension and the lingering suspicion of betrayal can be traced in the response 
to convictions in high- profile cases, which fit perfectly with the stereotyp-
ical image of violent racialized men. On 10 August 2015, an Eritrean man 
grabbed a knife from a shelf  in an IKEA store, just outside of Västerås, and 








denied asylum in Sweden, and was arrested on the spot, and tried during the 
autumn, as the refugee crisis dominated public discussion, following images 
of large numbers of people moving through Europe (Barker 2018). The trial 
was broadcasted live by public- service television. As the guilty verdict was 
announced, a series of new postings were added to an already 1,000- page- long 
thread on a large, publicly accessible website, which on a regular basis attracts 
all sorts of comments under the guise of colourful usernames. I have chosen 
postings associated with three different usernames (IMBILDEN, Kingstown 
and MorkaKrafter) which might be taken to illustrate the kind of satisfac-
tion that the verdict provided to people under conditions of ressentiment. The 
postings were made within hours after the official announcement, made at 
11.10 am, 30 October, and will be taken to exemplify how the communicated 
punishment was received by angry spectators. One may distinguish three 
different elements in the comments: (i) the temporary release of tension, (ii) 
the suspicion of the other’s continued enjoyment despite the punishment, 
and (iii) the guilty verdict was a reminder which, contrary to appearances, 
reinforced the idea that existing institutions cannot be fully trusted.
First and foremost, there was the immediate release of tension. The accused 
man was not acquitted, as might be suspected, but instead sentenced in the 
severest possible way, in legal terms. The verdict was thus experienced as a 
welcome surprise.
Have to say that I was positively surprised when the sentence fell. It turned 
out exactly as I had hoped. Life imprisonment, and after that: extradition.
(IMBILDEN, posted at 8.40 pm; www.flashback.org/ t2605798p898)
The release of tension should be real  – the accumulated tension found an 
outlet in the announced verdict. Assuming the slowly accumulated tension, 
described by Scheler, the person under the anonymous username might escape 
the nagging bitterness, inferiority and hatred, and for a brief  moment experi-
ence peace of mind. The satisfaction caused by the verdict may not last very 
long. Still, it was relief  of distress, and as such, as temporary relief  of distress, 
it was likely to reinforce the desire for more. The revenge was not enough. In 
fact, it might not be a revenge at all. The initial satisfaction could be accom-
panied by thoughts that the convicted man would enjoy the stay in prison.
Commit murder and be allowed to stay in paradise Sweden. In prison, 
you will get TV, a bed, food, activities, medicine, health care, yes even 
education if  you like. Swedish women will write letter to you if  you are 
lucky, and you can get married and have sex.
(Kingstown, posted at 7.32 pm; www.flashback.org/ t2605798p897)
Despite being punished, the convicted man was suspected to enjoy life more 
fully than people in the audience. A foreign murderer would have everything, 
beginning with TV and food, and ending with marriage and sex. Between the 
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lines, it was suggested that he would be allowed comforts which were denied 
some of the native Swedes who were honest and hard- working. Hence, they 
fear being let down by the very institution in which they placed their hopes 
for rectification. Finally, for some of the commentators there was a pervasive 
sense that those who were really responsible had escaped justice, this time 
as well.
This entire story is like an allegory over the sick Swedish society. Some 
lunatic from Africa is allowed to come here and murder two entirely inno-
cent Swedes, and the sanction is that he gets to stay and will be supplied 
with food and accommodation for indefinite time. I  just wish that the 
disgusting political and journalistic elite, who are responsible for these 
murders …. one day will suffer themselves. I  wish you all unfortune, 
misery and suffering.
(MorkaKrafter, posted at 1.57 pm; https:// www.flashback.org/ 
t2605798p895)
The verdict offered little release of distress and instead served to reinforce 
tension. It was nothing but a reminder of the ongoing injustice. Within the 
context of a narrative, which was widely shared among sympathizers of right- 
wing populist parties at the time, the court proceedings represented a kind of 
a cover- up, or further proof of betrayal. As indicated by the response, it was 
less about the actual punishment than about the bigger picture; less about the 
pain and the censure imposed on the Eritrean man than about concerns for a 
by- gone world in the dimensions of order and morality. The sense that justice 
was being done was consequently illusionary, and the release of tension was 
postponed unto an uncertain future. Someday, the commentator hoped, the 
real perpetrators would be called to justice, yet without confidence that this 
wish would come true.
Angry spectators suffered from the radical tension between desire and satis-
faction of social esteem, and doubted the robustness of the world in precisely 
those respects that might offer release of tension. The spectator’s social status 
as well as the underlying stability of the moral order were called into question. 
As in previous historical periods, punishment was one way to satisfy status 
concerns. But satisfaction presumed a moral order with ontological clout. 
So, the world in the dimensions of order and morality had to be restored, or 
reshaped. For the spectator to be recognized by the enacted Other, the Other 
had first to be restored. Punishment seemed well positioned to do so. In a situ-
ation when many established institutions – science, politics and journalism – 
were perceived to be unreliable, criminal justice appeared relatively unscathed 
and capable of establishing certainty and authority (Ericson 2007). The death 
penalty, above all, seemed exceptionally well suited in this respect. The basic 
script of the public execution was to cleanse ‘that which is evil, restore order 
from chaos, and celebrate the moral and sacred authority of the law’ (Smith 




state, which enforced transgressions and enabled social existence by defying 
the state of nature. Capital punishment would remain tied to the early- modern 
script. But new elements were incorporated. In a US context, from the 1970s 
and onwards, capital punishment came to represent the front line in conserva-
tive politics; it stood for the return to an imagined world of responsible individ-
uals, reliable institutions, and a well- ordered economy. Vestiges of illegitimate 
popular revenge were simultaneously transformed into criminal justice. The 
US courts made capital punishment more consonant with the rule of law, in 
an attempt to shrug off the mark of lynching and gain wider legitimacy, at the 
same time as it evolved into a cherished symbol, which communicated a range 
of political positions stretching far beyond issues of law and order (Garland 
2010; see also Connolly 1999; Sarat 1999). To support capital punishment was 
to be part of the general backlash against civil rights, the welfare state and the 
counter- culture of the 1960s. It was a political statement, immediately rooted 
in a definite vision of the world in the dimensions of order and morality. The 
archaic penal script of the violent state as the bringer of order to chaos was 
thus reinvigorated by a modern, conservative vision of order restoration, and 
updated to reflect modern legal norms, to disassociate itself  from the spectre of 
lynching and the spectacle of suffering. The script communicated absolute cer-
tainty and dedication – annihilation of moral evil, and definitive justice – while 
at the same relieving itself  of the uncivilized and the unlawful. In the eyes of its 
supporters, capital punishment thus safeguarded the endangered moral order 
more effectively than other institutions.
The prison is the culturally dominant form of punishment in most parts 
of the Western world and currently far less associated with partisan politics. 
Following the stigma of the preceding ‘Nothing works’ period (Martinson 
1974), the prison went from being outmoded to becoming a ‘seemingly indis-
pensable pillar of late modern social life’ (Garland 2001:  199). The prison 
grew in size, embracing more and more people, mostly male, mostly racialized 
and mostly working class, throughout the Western world – consonant with 
the stereotypical image of the criminal as ‘young, black, bred in’ (Hall et al. 
1978:  160) and partially satisfying the desire for recognition, by providing 
evidence of the omnipotence and the determination of the state, which was 
hoped to rectify anything through its institutions of criminal justice, among 
those who felt represented by it. In most Western countries, the prison was 
the ultimate punishment – in the absence of capital punishment – to dem-
onstrate moral certainty and to uphold existing principles of status. It was 
a de- politicized revenge through proxy, which corresponded to a less activist 
stance among the spectatorship, compared to the death penalty. Themselves 
relatively shielded from criminal justice interventions, they could sit back and 
enjoy the overflow of prison iconography. The prison, as consumed through 
official statistics or through popular culture, may thus have provided relief  of 
the accumulated tension, by enacting a world in which the audience – a core 
of affluent white people and beyond – felt protected and other people, mainly 






The satisfaction provided by imprisonment may not be reducible to the 
visible revenge on disadvantaged groups, who were thought to be unjustly 
favoured by other sections of the state apparatus. The current prison simul-
taneously enacts a different world, a world in which the revenge is organized 
around science, rehabilitation and risk management rather than around 
hypostatized moral categories. The danger which each inmate constituted 
should be defused during the prison stay, and upon release reinserted in 
society, all the time drawing on the original penal script of redemption. 
Prisoners in the nineteenth century were to pass through a stage of civil death, 
only to be reborn in the hands of designers, reformers and managers. By 
stripping the prisoner of rights, through solitary confinement, in a cell with 
only the Bible to read, the old identity should be erased, followed by a process 
through which the prisoner was requalified to become a model citizen in the 
community upon release (Smith 2009; Dayan 2011). This idea of redemp-
tion, or rehabilitation, set the prison apart from earlier penal practices, and 
remains entrenched in the basic fabric of the institution. While rehabilita-
tion has to a large extent lost its religious connotation, it continues to inform 
current metanarratives of the prison. The institution was given a renewed 
moral- scientific rationale with the introduction of the cognitive behavioural 
programmes and the tools of risk assessment. At the turn of the century, 
Cognitive Skills was one of many similar cognitive- behavioural programmes 
for prisoners’ rehabilitation. According to the manual, ‘you can distinguish 
between successful and unsuccessful individuals through the fact that the 
former master a set of thinking and reasoning skills’ (KVV 2000: 17). The 
teachers were instructed to convey the idea that the prisoners could learn to 
cope with extremely problematic social circumstances and become successful 
simply by using skills that they would acquire by participating in the pro-
gramme. The parallel message was that prisoners would have to do most of 
the work themselves. The role of the prison service was to facilitate the trans-
formation. Like neoliberal reform more generally, the emphasis was on indi-
vidual responsibility, personal aspirations and a lack of external restrictions 
(Davies 2014; Rose 1999; Dardot and Laval 2013). Yet prospects for change 
were bleak. The large majority of prisoners were trapped at the margins of 
social life and would never turn into the good citizens intended by authors 
of the programme, not to speak about the prospects of ending up as winners 
in a rigidifying social stratification. The horizon of expectations was defined 
by employment opportunities in the low- wage sector, managing disruptive 
relationships, following the instructions of superiors and enduring abuse – all 
of which composed ‘cognitive skills’ in the scenarios in the training provided 
(Hörnqvist 2010). Compared to the golden age of social engineering, there 
was moreover the dwindling belief  that change was at all possible. But offi-
cially, the prison clung to the promises of personal change and redemption, 
and explicitly denied the impasse of reinforced structural inequality. The dis-
junction between mandated agency and structural impasse was experienced 






if’- character: many people in and around the institution – the prisoners, the 
staff, and the regulators – acted as if  change was possible, although they no 
longer believed in it (Carlen 2008).
From its inception, the prison had been an enclosed space, unavailable 
to the general public, and few people knew about what happened behind 
the walls. Yet some of the things that happened inside the prison were part 
of other institutional encounters at the time, associated with unemploy-
ment, social insurance, health issues, disabilities and addiction (Castel 2003; 
Lødemel and Moreira 2014). Large groups of people, considered to be 
socially excluded, were approached in a moralistic fashion by state agencies 
or private subcontractors, which stressed their personal agency and closely 
monitored their behaviour. Alternatively, in a workplace setting, employees 
in all positions, workers and managers, were exposed to detailed regulation, 
close monitoring, performance measurement, audits and techniques of quality 
assurance (Power 1997; Moore and Robinson 2016). Hence, most people in 
the audience would, unbeknownst to the prisoners’ treatment programmes, 
have had everyday experiences that were in some respects similar, confronted 
with inflated requirements and diminished prospects, followed by intensi-
fied supervision. They may not be locked up, yet their behaviour was closely 
monitored and they felt unable to change their situation, despite trying. The 
prison thus enacted the neoliberal structure- agency problem with which most 
people were already familiar. Under pre- modern conditions, the enactment 
of a shared dilemma might provide recognition to audiences, according to the 
analysis presented in previous chapters. Yet was it sufficient to dissolve the 
accumulated tension under the conditions of ressentiment? Maybe to some 
people in the audience. For angry spectators looking for rectification, on the 
other hand, anything that happened inside the prison which did not involve 
straight- forward imposition of pain would fail to satisfy. The mechanisms of 
ressentiment required suffering and degradation of the other.
Self- revaluation and world restoration
Given that pain was transformed into pleasure through the consumed punish-
ment, how could something as base and culturally devalued as the imposition 
of pain on others be instrumental in transforming a group of humiliated and 
embittered observers of a crumbling order into elevated pillars of a restored 
order? Nietzsche pointed to the mechanism of revaluation:  what was once 
bad became good. Revaluation was central in his treatment of ressentiment 
in the first essay of the Genealogy of Morals, which also contained the most 
elaborate discussion on the topic. The wider objective was to account for the 
origin of social morality, including notions of justice, good and evil, and of 
good and bad. The revaluation affected the standards according to which 
people and actions were judged to be good or bad (Kaufmann 1968; Reginster 










In his treatment in the Genealogy, one specific actor – referred to as the 
priests – was attributed with the role of effecting the revaluation. In Nietzsche’s 
conception of social space, the priests were part of the ruling class. Unlike the 
other part, the warriors, they were prone to ressentiment. The priests were 
weak, but strong enough to initiate the revaluation and create new values. On 
one interpretation, the priests relieved the angry spectators of guilt and pain, 
by sanctifying their decadent instincts and making them partake in a higher 
justice. The spectators’ misfortunes were located in a third party, which was 
pinpointed by the priests as the cause of injustice and as the carrier of immoral 
qualities (Deleuze 1983). The role of the priests has been debated (Loeb 2018), 
as well as ignored (Ridley 2006), by Nietzschean scholars. Although peda-
gogic, the idea of an external agent may be redundant. Essentially, revalu-
ation was a matter of one group defining itself  in relation to another group, 
bereaving it of moral value. The collective self- revaluation was inherent in the 
logics of ressentiment: a way to keep the world in moral order and assert social 
worth in a rigidly hierarchical environment, when the desire for status recog-
nition was frustrated. The ‘angry spectators’ may not be able to change their 
situation or achieve the goals they had expected in life, despite the fact that 
they have worked hard and done everything right, as they saw it. Hence, they 
clung to what no one could take away from them: their own moral virtue and 
the bygone world assumed to have provided recognition. Yet the other was 
indispensable. Recognition of status was pursued and produced through the 
devaluation of others. It worked by negating all kinds of otherness, everything 
that was different from oneself, ‘and this “no” is its creative deed’ (Nietzsche 
1989:  I §10, emphasis in original). The perceived subordination was subtly 
transformed into a sense of superiority confirmed by the degradation of 
others. As the ultimate devaluation of the other, punishment was central. It 
was a self- revaluation through proxy, as the angry spectators depended on the 
state to exact the revenge. Punishment consequently provided the audience 
with a vehicle of moral self- transformation capable of bridging the widened 
gap between desire and enjoyment.
As often noted, the collective self- revaluation may involve an element 
of self- deception. Nietzsche as well as Scheler considered, on very different 
grounds, the resulting revaluation to be a normative distortion. Both of 
them made use of the metaphor of poison to express their stance. Nietzsche 
wrote that everything good about the other was misperceived ‘through the 
poisonous eye of ressentiment’ (Nietzsche 1989: I §11). To Scheler, ressenti-
ment was a poison that affected the ability to detect what was in itself  good 
and bad, regardless of the observer (Scheler 2017). On both accounts, the 
ability to reinterpret pain was central. At the core of Nietzsche’s and Scheler’s 
accounts of ressentiment was the idea that suffering and subordination in 
existing social structures were reinterpreted in moral terms. The way of life 
of the consumers of punishment, their concerns, tastes and aspirations were 
elevated, and reattached to the order and morality of the enacted world. Take, 







Lamont’s classic study on the Dignity of Working Men. He presented himself  
as a caring, responsible, hard- working man. As the backbone of society, he 
was suspicious of managers, who were minding their own careers, and con-
temptuous of the ‘undeserving’ parts of the US working class who could not 
provide for themselves. Ben also adopted a moral stance to punishment and 
thought that the death penalty should be used much more, a position that was 
underlined by his expressed willingness to physically abuse rapists and drug 
dealers who were detained in the local jail (Lamont 2000). Evidently, his wish 
to punish more, and harder, was one element in his self- representation as a 
caring, responsible, hard- working man. It was also a way of locating himself  
in a moral universe where he was placed far higher than his position on the 
social ladder. Ben rearticulated customary sociological divisions, the bound-
aries between social groups being separated by wealth and education and 
other assets, into a moral hierarchy, in which he emerged at the very top. His 
‘positional suffering’ (Bourdieu 1999) was refined and given a higher meaning. 
Ben’s readiness to communicate his views on the death penalty, displayed in 
the interview situation, also indicated one further characteristic of how pun-
ishment operates as a vehicle for revaluation. Just as one does not need to be 
physically present – in the courtroom or in the correctional facilities – to con-
sume punishment, one does not have to be physically present at any specific 
site in order to show support. One can display support in social interactions 
in everyday life, with like- minded members of the community. One can more-
over expect other people to be engaged and interested. Given that support 
for more severe punishment is to take part in the defence of a moral world 
(Beckett 1997; Garland 2010), to say things such as ‘they should use the death 
penalty much more’ is to take active part in a ritual, which is simultaneously 
a ritual of world restoration and a ritual of self- revaluation. By participating 
in the ritual, the angry spectators can re- enact themselves as elevated pillars of 
the world being restored. In the process, the experienced pain is transformed 
into pleasure, following the release of tension.
While ressentiment can find outlet in revenge, the revenge cannot be described 
as revenge. It must not present itself  as such, as revenge, to a wider audience; 
‘what they are demanding is not called retribution’, Nietzsche argued, ‘but “the 
triumph of justice” ’ (Nietzsche 1989: I §14, emphasis in original). The desire 
for vengeance must be cloaked as justice. In one sense, this was an adjustment 
to the establishment of a state- administered system of criminal justice, and the 
modern concept of punishment, clearly separated from vengeance, over the 
course of the nineteenth century. The revenge had to be administered through 
the apparatuses of criminal justice; for spectators plagued by their perceived 
lack of influence, there was no real alternative. But it was more than merely the 
lack of alternative. In the context of ressentiment, legitimacy was crucial. As the 
revenge was authorized by the state, the violent rectification became legitimate, 
more or less by definition, in the Weberian sense of being manifestly legit-
imate in a community. Yet while the revenge may have been cloaked as justice, 






the proposed punishments could not be openly discussed and defended 
in the community. The moral force evaporated – and punishment degenerated 
to simple vengeance, or unlawful action, and one had to keep quiet about 
what happened, even if  many people secretly celebrated it. The process of 
revaluation would be disrupted. If, on the other hand, the punishment could 
be explicitly endorsed, then one could take active part in the punitive ritual 
of world restoration, like Ben, the US electrician who supported the death 
penalty, and reap the satisfaction of moral superiority in the community 
of co- sympathizers. The revenge was thus shaped by social morality and 
by the procedural requirements that came with the Rechtsstaat. But it was 
not necessarily restrained. The basic condition of legitimacy did not neces-
sarily restrain the violence, or the scope of the revenge. Instead, the charge 
was proportionate to the accumulated tension, and indicated the magnitude 
of the revenge. Justice was totalizing in character, not reducible to a singular 
event or minor reform, but rather a long- sought purge. The promise was 
‘that the world become full of the thunderstorms of our revenge, precisely 
that we would regard as justice’ (Nietzsche 2006: 2.8). This was also the secret 
promise of criminal justice. The state was expected to put things right again, 
by means of all the violence it took to do so; hence the prospects of a world 
swept clean by the ‘thunderstorms of our revenge’. It was never the individual 
act of punishment that provided release of distress, but rather the envisioned 
world, a world filled with thunderstorms of revenge. To the embittered 
and humiliated spectators, only a world purified in the dimensions of order 
and morality might offer relief of distress.
Read against the background of the Hegelian master- and- slave dialectic, 
ressentiment represents a continuation of the story of the dark side of recog-
nition. As an expression of acute lack of status, or even obsession with status, 
ressentiment belongs to the thumos- spectra of desire. The desire for status 
recognition is, as discussed in Chapter 3, volatile, fundamentally ambiguous, 
torn between emotional responses to acts of disrespect and the overarching 
striving for social esteem in the community. It can be satisfied in several 
ways. Punishment may be wholly irrelevant for the satisfaction of desire. 
Under modern conditions, most people seek recognition of status through 
achievement- oriented institutions. Social status is to a large extent derived 
from formal merits and labour- market position (Weber 1972, Goldthorpe 
1980; Sennett 2003) and translates into life chances, with respect to housing, 
health, and income, and is typically displayed through lifestyle and consump-
tion (Bourdieu 1984). In other words:  acutely felt status anxiety does not 
necessarily translate into a yearning for punishment. Instead, the punitive 
turn of thumos, discussed by Fukuyama (2012) and Sloterdijk (2010) as the 
defensive assertion of social morality, is implicated in the dynamics of desire, 
as one among several options. Thumos was in one sense blind, and there was 
no immanent logic according to which either direction  – the bright or the 







rather an outcome, influenced by external conditions. On a Nietzschean ana-
lysis, these were above all related to power asymmetries. The satisfaction of 
desire was always precarious, as well as jeopardized by lived inequality. There 
was a constant friction between acquired expectations and lived inequality. 
It was felt by all members of society, yet more by some than by others. The 
everyday workings of power threatened to thwart acquired expectations to 
be fully part of society, or rise above it. Following the analysis of the will, 
presented in the famous paragraph 19 in Beyond Good and Evil, this friction 
was the basic motor of social life. It could be channelled into the pursuit of 
conventional goals  – a good education, prestigious home, gainful employ-
ment, fine reputation, the expected life- style, or consumption – in the hope 
that these goals would be achieved and confer social esteem on the individual, 
in the eyes of others. Yet the lived inequality might just as well, depending on 
the circumstances, channel desire in a punitive direction, toward collective 
satisfaction through punishment. This was more likely, on this analysis, if  
conventional, achievement- oriented goals appeared blocked. Everyday 
experiences of injustice and humiliation, derived from the prevailing power 
structure, tended to deflect desire into a defensive and potentially violent 
affirmation of social esteem.
Ressentiment unfolded on the dark side of recognition. There is no immanent 
logic of desire according to which any particular direction is predetermined. 
The desire for social esteem is inherently ambiguous and may change direction 
due to the everyday workings of power. Yet there also appears to be a tipping 
point, after which people become obsessed with social status, oriented toward 
historical injustices and predisposed to one- sided assertion on a more durable 
basis. Following the punitive turn, desire will continue to seek satisfaction 
through the devaluation of others, and ultimately in the degradation of others. 
Instead of the postulated Hegelian development toward increased freedom, 
tolerance and equal rights, satisfaction is provided by reinforced intolerance, 
violence, calls for justice, the discovery of new groups to persecute, and new 
forms of deviance to punish. No matter how much suffering and condem-
nation are being imposed on the other, lasting recognition of social esteem 
eludes spectators. They are angry, consumed by the idea of restoring social 
esteem, yet ultimately unsuccessful; despite the surge of revaluation, they will 
also be rewarded with renewed suspicion and bitterness. Staying within the 
context of ressentiment, there is no lasting relief  to be found. Instead, sat-
isfaction is trapped between the impotence of the angry spectator and the 
hopes for the powerful state, which could never efface the historical injustice, 
as Wendy Brown (1995) argued. In the Genalogy, the unbearable tension of 
ressentiment was eventually repressed, turned inwards and evolved into ‘bad 
conscience’, as a faculty of the soul (Nietzsche 1989). Alternatively, social 
morality could be transposed into higher values, associated with justice and 
morality. In that case, the obsession with individual status concerns would 




(Paskewich 2014), and continue to direct punitive anger toward the other. 
None of the possible routes are mutually exclusive. At one moment, the angry 
spectators will be beset by guilt and shame, without any genuine hope of 
change; at another moment, they will see themselves as champions of higher 
values, supported by a violent state, and occupying a central position in the 
enacted moral universe.
The underlying pleasure formula was Platonic. On this model, pleasure 
was essentially relief  from distress. There was hunger and the satisfaction of 
hunger (Gorgias); or the drive and the satisfaction of the drive (Freud 1915). 
Ressentiment covered both aspects: it accounted for the build- up of distress 
and the release of tension. Scheler’s phenomenological approach showed 
how pressure was mounting without finding satisfaction under prevailing 
conditions, whereas the pleasures of ressentiment were described in terms of 
release of tension. The vengeful impulses disappeared for a little while and 
the individual was freed from the agony of envy and hate (Scheler 2017). An 
assumed state of status recognition constituted the horizon of expectations 
with respect to ressentiment, just as Plato had conceived of pleasure as the 
return to equilibrium. The angry spectators were backward- looking and hoped 
to efface the historical injustice and thus extinguish the pain, when revenge 
had restored the world and their rightful place in it. The transformation was 
thus consonant with the Platonic paradigm: on the one hand distress and on 
the other hand relief  from distress. If  anything, it involved a radicalization. 
The imagined revenge on all those who obstructed their way of life was espe-
cially charged with enjoyment, precisely because of the underlying pain and 
impotence. Ressentiment radicalized both the build- up of tension – Scheler 
used the expression ‘psychological dynamite’  – and its eventual release. 
Nietzsche referred to a coming thunderstorm of revenge that would sweep 
over the world. Ressentiment could oscillate between despairing individual 
complaints and consumption of punishment exacted by a state- administered 
criminal justice system. In the latter moment, when partaking in the powerful 
rituals of criminal justice, is there not anything more to modern pleasure than 
relief  of distress? Under the conditions of ressentiment, the answer is – no, 
there is not. The satisfaction of punishment is relief  of distress: the passing 
revaluation of the spectators through the revenge exacted by others, in their 
place. But as Nietzsche would argue in the Will to Power, there is much more 
to satisfaction than relief  of status concerns; the one- sided assertion inherent 
in the ‘thunderstorms of our revenge’ could generate a sense of power, or a 
very different kind of pleasure. In several respects, the experience was the 
very opposite of ressentiment. This pleasure presupposed omnipotence rather 
than impotence: strength rather than weakness, and illegitimacy rather than 
legitimacy. It actualized the attainment of full satisfaction and transcendence, 
as opposed to a return to equilibrium, and corresponded to the Aristotelian 
paradigm: the excited absorption in activity. The next chapter deals with the 
other major form of pleasure, the obscene enjoyment of excessive punish-
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7  Obscene enjoyment
Between power and prohibition
In the Genealogy of Morals, Friedrich Nietzsche asserted that punishment 
could be festive: ‘in punishment there is so much festive!’ (Nietzsche 1989: II 
§6). The word ‘festive’ suggested the mood at a party where everyone was 
having a good time; the guests were really enjoying themselves, absorbed in 
conversation, dancing and drinking. The party was not ruined, if  interspersed 
with punishment; quite to the contrary, the mood was heightened. It was no 
doubt Nietzsche’s intention to conjure up associations to that effect. Published 
in 1887, the book was a testimony of the increasingly problematic nature 
of pleasure. The aphorisms, which are generally seen to be celebrating the 
pleasure of cruelty and deploring a bygone age of unrestrained assertion, can 
also be read as evidence that a certain kind of pleasure had come into con-
flict with modern sentiments and institutions. Instead of being an innocent 
sensation, which was the view of earlier philosophers, for instance Jeremy 
Bentham and Immanuel Kant, with the passage to modernity, in the con-
text of punishment, pleasure was conceived of as a disruptive passion that 
should be suppressed in public. Hence, by saying that punishment was festive, 
Nietzsche called attention to a contradiction in modern life, which affected 
the mechanisms through which the pleasure of punishment was generated. At 
the same time, his claim must be taken literally: there was much festive in pun-
ishment. Punishment could provide intense excitation, also after the passage 
to modernity. It may be festive, but not in the sense of joining- in with every-
body else, undisturbed by morality or shame, the passing of which Nietzsche 
seemed to lament in the Genealogy. Instead, what provided pleasure was the 
participation in something everyone knew was forbidden. The specifically 
festive character came from the breach of taboo. The spectator was complicit, 
together with other participants, and enjoyed it secretly. Psychoanalysis, 
which was being developed at the time by Sigmund Freud, captured the 
altered experience of pleasure. On his analysis, to enthusiastically take part in 
cruel punishments, along with other spectators, was festive precisely because 
of the violation of social conventions. Prohibition was constitutive of enjoy-
ment. As Freud would say in Totem and Taboo: ‘the festive feeling is produced 





Obscene enjoyment was the modern alternative, as unchecked expressions 
of excitement could no longer, or only under special circumstances, be 
acknowledged in public. The enjoyment was obscene  – secretly embraced 
and disavowed in public. It was ob skene in the original Greek sense of being 
off- stage. In the classic tragedies, offensive scenes, especially scenes involving 
fatal violence, occurred off  stage and were typically related by messengers 
(McKay 2010). Obscene enjoyment is assumed to differ from earlier forms 
of Aristotelian pleasure of punishment. The modern experience could not be 
understood as enjoyment in the Dionysic sense of immediate orgiastic loss of 
self  (Eagleton 2005), in the carnivalesque sense of turning the world upside 
down (Hill 1972; Burke 2009), or in the unreserved embrace of sublime terror 
(Dennis 1996; Burke 1997). These frames no longer seemed applicable. The 
central line of division was the relationship to social prohibition. The element 
of prohibition was integral to the pleasure. Due to prohibition, the enjoyment 
was privately enjoyed and publicly disavowed. Still and in fact more than ever, 
pleasure had to be taken seriously, since it seemed to have lost none of its dis-
ruptive force. At a time when vengeance appeared to have been separated from 
punishment, and when pleasure had replaced anger as the main driver behind 
transgression, Nietzsche, and after him Freudian psychoanalysis, picked up 
what had been sidelined in the historic cleansing of punishment, from Plato 
to Hart: the personal, the disproportionate, all the passions, and the illegit-
imate – and turned that into an area of investigation. All the forbidden parts – 
obscene pleasure, anger, excess and the desire for vengeance  – became the 
object matter for psychoanalytic approaches to law and punishment. In this 
sense, it was a return of the repressed. This chapter is entirely devoted to 
obscene enjoyment as a specifically modern pleasure of punishment. Each 
section is organized around authors who have stressed different aspects of 
the enjoyment; Lacan discussed the obscene enjoyment of being implicated 
in transgressive punishment; Žižek discussed the guilt- ridden enjoyment of 
guarding inglorious secrets, and Nietzsche the sense of power in partaking in 
unrestrained assertion, as spectator. I will elucidate the different aspects based 
on contemporary examples of transgressive punishments.
Obscene enjoyment of the other
In the Genealogy, Nietzsche had moved effortlessly from cruelty to punish-
ment, without pausing to consider the law. The imposition of pain on others 
was central, while the relationship between the pain imposed and official law 
was secondary. In modern psychoanalysis, on the other hand, law and legit-
imacy were crucial. Lacan discussed the specific pleasure at play in overstep-
ping the line to the domain of the forbidden and the irrational. The existing 
literature, which has explicitly addressed the pleasure of punishment, by 
using these exact terms in a modern context, is likewise centred on trans-
gression. Its objective is to understand the pleasure of transgression  – the 







violate rules and social norms. The focus on legal transgressions translated 
into the choice of empirical cases:  torture, lynching and excessive forms of 
physical punishment. Spectators have been seen to draw pleasure from visual 
representations of degrading punishments, for instance from the Abu Ghraib 
torture pictures, or from lynching postcards (Adler 2015; Eisenman 2007; 
Debrix 2006; Sontag 2003). Judging by the standards of contemporary mor-
ality, the punishment was illegitimate, and the pleasure was likewise illegit-
imate – which the spectators moreover were intensely aware of. The pleasure 
was privatized and could not be openly acknowledged. It was thus referred 
to as ‘hidden pleasure’ (Adler 2015: 2). The influence of morality intensified 
the experience of pleasure, but was also seen to provoke conflicting reactions, 
including shame and disgust.
In Lacanian psychoanalysis, jouissance is the central concept to describe 
the pleasures involved. Jouissance can be translated as ‘enjoyment’, but the 
French original is often left untranslated to stress that it used as a technical 
term, to designate a special kind of enjoyment. Although the term is defined 
variously in Lacan’s work (Miller 2000), it is typically used in the context of 
understanding the specific pleasures of transgression. Interestingly, it seems 
to have entered psychoanalysis by way of the master- and- slave dialectic, as a 
correlate to the Hegelian Genuss and its double meaning of enjoyment and 
consumption (Evans 1998). In one phase of the struggle for recognition, the 
fruits of the Slave’s labour were consumed by the Master, which meant unre-
strained enjoyment in this respect. The Master could extract anything from 
the Slave, except recognition. Jouissance indicated that one was in a position 
to extract enjoyment from the other’s body, by force and without permis-
sion (Lacan 1999), just as the Slave had been at the Master’s disposal. The 
element of transgression was constitutive of the experience. In Seminar VII, 
Jacques Lacan talked about ‘the jouissance of transgression’, excited by the 
fact that the subject knew that the action was prohibited (Lacan 1992: 195). 
I  take it to describe the specifically modern experience of obscene enjoy-
ment. The experience was distinguished by intense excitement, absorption in 
unrestrained assertion, awareness of prohibition, and mixed up with pain. 
At heart, it was a pleasure of the Aristotelian kind, characterized by enthu-
siasm or abandon, which accompany activities that are unimpeded. This may 
come across as counterintuitive, or far removed from the Aristotelian frame 
of reference. To Aristotle, pleasure was exemplified by the smooth construc-
tion of a house or, even better, by continuous contemplation (Taylor 2008). 
The experience depended on the uninterrupted flow of activity, which may but 
need not include excitement. If  the activity was ordinary, such as building a 
house without mishaps, the element of excitement was measured. Jouissance 
typically accompany activities located at the other end of the spectra: activ-
ities which are prohibited and more likely to generate excitement. Jouissance 
stemmed from activities at the borderline of social morality, involving for 
instance sex and violence (Fink 1995) or, one might add, witnessing punish-











unrestrained by normative or legal conventions, while the spectator at the 
same time was acutely aware of the conventions. The secondary literature 
on jouissance unequivocally stressed the ensuing intensity of excitement. 
Jouissance has been defined as ‘a mode of intensity, a type of arousal’, which 
came from being involved in activities that were not altogether legitimate 
(Hook 2017: 611), or as intense pleasure mixed up with pain, which ‘by its 
very nature is excessive’ (Dean 2006:  xvi). It is never pure enjoyment, but 
essentially a mix of pleasure and pain (Homer 2004; Fink 1995). Obscene 
enjoyment is entwined with physical pain, or with premonitions of disaster, 
in which the element of pain operates to intensify the experience. A future 
backlash, fatigue, the risk of exposure, shame or censure are constitutive of 
the experience.
While the experience was consistent with the Aristotelian conception of 
pleasure, the notion of jouissance effectively severed the link to individual 
well- being. On a classical analysis, enjoyment was thought to be some-
thing good, given certain basic qualifications. Present pleasures should 
not endanger future pleasures, according to Seneca’s (2016) dictum. Lacan 
brought attention to the complex nature of pleasure, and questioned the trad-
ition which assumed that pleasure was an index of the good. Ever since Plato, 
it was argued, ‘all the philosophers have been led to discern not true pleasures 
from false, for such a distinction is impossible to make, but the true and false 
goods that pleasure points to’ (Lacan 1992: 221). Whether ‘good’ referred to 
what was morally commendable or to what a good life was taken to involve, 
pleasure was by no means a reliable guide to the question about what was 
good, for individuals or for societies. The presumption in Lacanian psycho-
analysis was the very opposite: enjoyment was suspicious and unreliable, or 
even ‘a form of evil’ (Lacan 1992: 189). Enjoyment represented an inversion 
of the Freudian pleasure principle, which guided individuals toward a mod-
erate life built on the avoidance of pain (Schuster 2019). Jouissance stood 
for experiences of going too far, ignoring individual well- being, moral con-
siderations, or disastrous outcomes. Beneath the bias toward excess was the 
constitutive role of prohibition and the dependence on the other. Enjoyment 
was deeply moral and amoral at the same time. The basic coordinates were 
inescapably set by the other, as an incarnation of social morality and hence 
indifferent to individual well- being. Precisely because it was fundamentally 
dependent on the other, enjoyment was potentially harmful to the subject. It 
could make people accommodate to estrangement, life- denying conventional 
tracks, or provide an incentive to enthusiastically embrace demise, death and 
destruction.
Like Hegel before him, Lacan located the ground for transgression in the 
dynamics of desire. The dynamic is inherently transgressive – in the prosaic 
sense that it is dictated by dissatisfaction and lack, and prompts action which 
goes beyond the present state. Most of the time the transgressive dynamic is 
channelled in conventional tracks. The desire for social esteem is above all a 









any society. It is the urge to belong and escape the fear of being dismissed. 
But it does not stop there: the desire was from the outset linked to excess and 
transcendence. The winged thumos- horse in Plato’s parable on the chariot was 
presented in a discussion of transcendence, in which ‘god- sent madness’ was 
valued over ‘man- made sanity’ (Phaedrus 244d). Unless checked by reason 
and external conditions, the desire to belong evolved into the wish to distin-
guish oneself, within the same group, or to assert the group in relation to other 
groups, to gain a fuller satisfaction. Lacanian psychoanalysis would stress the 
latter aspect of desire:  the striving toward transcendence. Full satisfaction 
was strictly speaking unattainable. Satisfaction necessarily involved a stroke 
of disappointment (Braunstein 2003). Yet desire was inherently boundless, 
always ‘striving for something else or something more’ (Copjec 1994:  55). 
The injunction encore!  – more, more!  – would govern the consumption of 
anything (Lacan 1999), the consumption of punishment being no exception. 
Punishment provided partial satisfaction while promising complete satisfac-
tion, or a more satisfying satisfaction, which eluded the audience and intensi-
fied a craving for more of the same. The same dynamic could be seen to apply 
to all kinds of punishment, legal or extra- legal. Yet there may be an add-
itional quality to enjoyment derived from transgressive punishment, which 
reinforced the movement toward something more, or something else. Beyond 
the necessarily partial character of the enjoyment, it was also sustained by the 
element of transgression, the excitement generated by the breach of taboo, 
when the consumed punishment violated basic legal principles. The pain and 
suffering being imposed on others may be a necessary requisite. Yet due to 
the centrality of prohibition, obscene enjoyment was in a sense self- sufficient.
Starting with Lacan’s series of lectures in 1959– 1960, enjoyment was 
increasingly associated with transgression of moral rules and with intense 
excitement that endangered the subject (de Kesel 2009). The underlying con-
cern was to understand how people commit acts in the knowledge of the dis-
astrous consequences to themselves, or to others. One could be aware about 
all dangers, or be convinced that nothing good would come out of it, and 
still continue the course of action. In Kant avec Sade, Lacan discussed one of 
Kant’s examples on human motivation. The setting was altogether imaginary. 
Imagine someone standing outside a house, sexually excited. The object of 
desire was in the house, and the person was free to enter and have sex. Kant 
offered no further details. The prospect of sexual intercourse was not spelled 
out, but the implications were clear enough. Nothing stood in the way; it 
was a just small gap between desire and satisfaction. The door was open and 
the sex presumably consensual. Now, Kant introduced the death penalty as 
deterrence. Assume that gallows were erected on the other side of the house. 
The person was still free to go inside and have sex, but she or he would be 
hanged on the spot, upon leaving the house. Imagine that you were in this 
situation: would you still satisfy your desire despite facing a certain death? 
To Kant, the answer was self- evident, as it did not involve the moral law. The 






and pain. Hence, considering the dire consequences, the person would restrain 
whatever passions were in motion and refrain from rushing into the house 
(Kant 1914). But Lacan was not so sure; the prospects of a certain death 
could sustain rather than contain the movement of desire.
It is possible that a partisan of passion, who would be blind enough to 
combine it with questions of honor, could make trouble for Kant by for-
cing him to recognize that no occasion precipitates certain people more 
surely toward their goal than one that involves defiance or even contempt 
for the gallows.
(Lacan 2006: 782)
Under certain conditions, the punishment would not present itself  as pain 
and censure to be avoided at all cost, but in a different light. If  mixed up 
with notions of social esteem, and if  the expectations of others were taken 
into consideration, the gallows could turn into a challenge. The prospect of 
the gallows could incite the person to enter the house and have sex  – and 
then be executed. If  that were to happen, what made the option involving a 
certain death irresistible was not sexual excitation, or the fact that the night 
might have involved everything that person could possibly dream of in terms 
of sexual pleasure. Nor could the embrace of a certain death be attributed 
to an innate force, such as the Freudian death drive. Had it been simply a 
matter of choosing to be executed or not – there was no house, no sex and 
nothing to win – the person would probably just have walked away. Instead, 
if  the option turned out to be irresistible, it was rather because of a mix of 
social esteem and prohibition. In the quote above, Lacan interposed that the 
desire for social esteem was activated. In an earlier comment on the same 
thought experiment, he added another detail: that the desire was illicit. Kant 
had said nothing about that, merely that the person would be executed. On 
this basis, Lacan could insist that there was something wrong with how Kant 
had formulated the problem; ‘the night spent with the lady is paradoxic-
ally presented to us as a pleasure that is weighed against a punishment to be 
undergone’ (Lacan 1992: 189). This is a false paradox, since prohibition, pain 
and unrestrained assertion were constitutive of jouissance, and not opposed 
to it. In this case, the illicit character of the desire, the displayed defiance of 
death and the certainty of the punishment were part of the enjoyment of the 
one single night of sex.
Kant’s example was part of an argument on the moral law. In this context, 
the ‘have sex, then be hanged’ example illustrated the lack of obligation; the 
person could easily abstain and thereby avoid execution. It was juxtaposed to 
another example, which proved Kant’s point that under different circumstances 
one would have to choose a certain death, if  required by the moral law. In the 
second example, an individual was once again threatened with execution, this 
time by a wilful sovereign. There was only one way to avoid the impending 





person and had done nothing wrong (Kant 1914). In this case, the moral 
law was implicated, and the person would have to overcome any personal 
preferences and prepare to be executed. Truth must be told and the sovereign 
had to be defied, as it was a matter of moral obligation. The two examples 
were originally designed to contrast a sheer pleasure calculus with the force 
of moral duty. However, picking up on Lacan’s discussion, Slavoj Žižek 
argued that Kant’s two examples may not be that different. Just as ‘tell the 
truth, then be hanged’ activated the moral law and became a duty, so could 
‘have sex, then be hanged’ become an obligation which had to be performed 
regardless of the consequences. Rather than being tempered by the prospect 
of the gallows, desire was further reinforced and took on the character of 
duty; ‘true “passion” is uncannily close to the fulfilling of one’s duty in spite 
of the external threat’ (Žižek 1991: 239, emphasis removed). By entering the 
house and defying an imminent death, the person would be carried by the 
sense of fulfilling a moral duty. It was not a duty in any straightforward way, 
as envisaged by Kant, issued by a universal moral law. Instead it was a ‘weird 
and twisted ethical duty’ (Žižek 2006a: 79), shaped by social morality, and 
reassured only through the eyes of the other.
Lacanian approaches in the disciplines of cultural studies and psycho-
analysis have tended to dominate the analysis of the pleasure of punishment 
as jouissance (de Sutter 2015; Aristedemou 2014). The dominance was a nat-
ural consequence of the overwhelming silence on pleasure in social science. 
As pleasure was effectively historicized in the influential approaches of 
Durkheim, Elias and Foucault, psychoanalysis enacted a conceptual ‘return of 
the repressed’ and picked up what had been sidelined in the historic cleansing 
of punishment. Yet the return was partial and came with a qualification:  it 
strictly concerned the illicit pleasure of transgressive punishment. The quali-
fication was significant. Legitimate punishment was a non- issue – unless it 
violated its own principles and became transgressive. The day- to- day practices 
of imprisonment were not considered, or implicitly dismissed as unexciting, 
as they were governed by the regular law (Žižek 1991). The concept of punish-
ment, as something distinct from the arbitrary combination of violence and 
pain, had little place in this body of work. The imposed violence could, but 
need not, be understood as punishment by onlookers. What mattered was the 
element of transgression. It was the illegitimacy of the interventions that were 
seen to generate pleasure: the intense excitement of being absorbed in trans-
gression, mixed up with pain and the awareness of prohibition.
Nightly punishment – forging a community of spectators
Slavoj Žižek elaborated on the Lacanian analysis of obscene enjoyment. In 
particular two further characteristics, which shaped the audience’s experience, 
were brought to attention. First of all, the basic morality of transgression 
was emphasized. The punishment relied on notions of a higher justice, which 








never stated explicitly. It was not stated explicitly, because the punishment 
could not stand public insight, or legal investigation. Yet people sensed its 
underlying morality, in the full knowledge that it was a blatant legal viola-
tion. Punishments were meted out according to a nightly law, which operated 
parallel to the regular law and mandated transgression. It could turn into 
a manifest contradiction but normally the interplay between the two laws 
would produce obscene enjoyment. Secondly, Žižek discussed the subterra-
neous impact on community cohesion. The obscene enjoyment generated by 
transgressive punishment would turn into a lasting bond, which tied the indi-
viduals together as a community. Everybody knew but no one spoke about 
what happened, or how they felt about it. While being secretly shared within 
the community, it could not be openly acknowledged. Collective disavowal 
became a guilt- ridden requirement for full membership.
In The Metastases of Enjoyment, and scattered across Žižek’s work, one can 
find references to an ‘obscene “nightly” law’, which operated parallel to the 
existing legislation (Žižek 1994: 54; see also Žižek 1991; 1997). In some senses, 
it was like any other kind of law. The nightly law was first of all experienced as 
a law by people who were familiar with it. It issued commands, incentives to 
act, which were perceived as unconditional, law- like injunctions. The nightly 
law further resembled the regular law by being grounded in specific notions 
of justice. Although unwritten, it contained a string of conceptions which 
authorized and dictated punishment. But there, the similarity ended. While 
the regular law conferred qualities that were considered indispensable for 
ordered state administration and for keeping passion at bay, in the name of 
reason, impartiality and legitimacy (Hegel 1952; Hart 1959; Nozick 1981), in 
psychoanalysis, on the other hand, the law incorporated much more than the 
criminal code and assumed many of the characteristics which, since antiquity, 
had been associated with vengeance, such as passion, excess, and sacred 
duty. The nightly law would support the very opposite of rational punish-
ment: illegitimate, passionate and excessive punishment. It accompanied the 
regular law as a shadow, encompassing the ‘obscene unwritten rules’, which 
‘sustain Power as long as they remain in the shadows’ (Žižek 1997: 93).
The redoubling was seen to be inherent in the institution of law. The 
nightly law always accompanied the regular law as a shadow and mandated 
transgressions that could not withstand public light. Its law- like injunctions 
had a sacred character, and represented a higher and necessarily unacknow-
ledged justice, as opposed to punishment issued according to the regular law, 
which was restrained by notions of universality, of binding rules and respect 
for the rights of individuals. The nightly law could authorize transgressions, if  
the regular law was perceived to stand in the way, or if  it was perceived to be 
insufficient, according to the principles of the nightly law. In such cases, the 
punishment would be condoned or even mandated, while at the same time 
being strictly prohibited according to the regular law. The experience must, 
although Žižek never discussed the matter, be seen as decidedly modern. In 





the rational surface and the obscene underside of the law coincided at the 
scaffold. When cruel punishment was an intentional display of explicitly stated 
principles of power, there was nothing to expose, and no prohibited enjoy-
ment. Everything was carried out in broad daylight, and there was less space 
for a nightly law. But the establishment of the Rechtsstaat restrained certain 
kinds of punishment, which were not according to the law, at the same time as 
public expressions of enjoyment were rendered inappropriate at the end of the 
nineteenth century, all of which created the conditions for the nightly law, and 
hence obscene enjoyment, to emerge.
The law was literally nightly, and could not be exposed to the light of day. 
Bypassing rather than defying the enacted law, it thrived on secrecy and shed 
public scrutiny. As long as the nightly law remained tacit and underexposed, the 
authorized punishments involved no contradiction. The relationship between 
the two laws has been described as one of subtext and stated letter. Intuitively, 
members of the group understand that ‘there is more to law than its official 
face’, and that they know ‘that the official rules do not apply to them’ (Dean 
2006: 35). In response to the exposure of the Abu Ghraib photographs in 2004, 
the official response from the US Army was that no such orders had been issued. 
It was claimed that soldiers on the ground were not instructed to torture and to 
degrade prisoners. That may well be true, but it did not mean that the torture was 
a strictly private initiative of a group of wayward soldiers. As Žižek remarked, 
usually there are ‘no formal orders, nothing is written, there is just unofficial 
pressure, hints and directives are delivered in private’. The torture was not offi-
cially authorized. Instead, the Abu Ghraib prisoners were simply exposed to 
the ‘obscene underside’ of the publicly endorsed values of personal dignity, rule 
of law, and democracy (Žižek 2006a: 370). The nightly law was the obscene, 
impassioned underside, and the regular law was the rational surface, the prohib-
itions of which reinforced the enjoyment of seeing soldiers fighting for freedom 
and democracy in the Abu Ghraib prison. The illegality of torture did not enter 
into contradiction with military regulations, nor did it contradict self- conceptions 
of decency, but rather confirmed the sacred character of the fight. In a similar 
vein, it has been suggested that a large part of the audience deny and denigrate 
news reports on police brutality, or disclosure of prison violence, while secretly 
enjoying scenes of police brutality or prison violence as a deserved, additional 
revenge (Connolly 1995). The obscene enjoyment may be collectively shared and 
collectively disavowed, at one and the same time. Similar observations apply to 
hazing, lynching, domestic violence, ethnic cleansing and other illegal practices 
that were understood by the audience as punishment. To be implicated – as pun-
isher, or as witness – generated enjoyment, as long as it remained unacknow-
ledged (Žižek 1997; 2006b; 2015). If spelled out, everything – the practices, the 
silent endorsement, the obscene enjoyment – would be contradicted by the law, 
or by the self- understanding of the audience as law- abiding.
The two kinds of law can be separated in theory but co- exist in any legal 
context, one shadowing the other. Žižek’s most illuminating example is the 






soldiers, who are on court martial for murdering a fellow soldier by the name 
of Santiago. The script was inspired by an incident that took place a few years 
earlier on the Guantanamo Bay naval base, and long before it was turned 
into an infamous detention camp for alleged terrorists. On that occasion, one 
soldier had been blindfolded and beaten up – but not murdered – by a group 
of fellow soldiers, following rumours of a report being filed on military mis-
conduct. In the movie, Santiago, the murdered soldier, had broken the ethical 
code of the Marines Corps in a similar fashion. He had informed on one of 
the soldiers in his unit, who had fired into Cuban territory. Fenceline shooting 
was strictly prohibited in official military regulations, and it was obvious 
that the murder constituted a punishment for snitching. That was also the 
approach of the defence lawyer, in the attempt to shift the blame away from 
the two soldiers on trial. The murder was, the defence argued, an extrajudi-
cial execution based on the ethical code of the Marines and authorized by a 
higher- ranking officer, who was also the base commander. Everybody in the 
unit knew what had happened, and why it happened. It was in accordance 
with a higher law, in this case referred to as Code Red, which mandated the 
illegal punishment of a fellow soldier. But in the courtroom setting, none of 
witnesses wants to admit that the murder was a Code Red order. Nobody 
pretends to know, and nobody will say that the punishment was deserved. 
Witnesses even denied that there was such a thing as Code Red (Žižek 1994; 
see also Žižek 1997).
Normally, the two kinds of law coexist but are never brought into rela-
tionship with one another. The contradiction remains dormant, and provides 
a source of obscene enjoyment. In this respect, A Few Good Men is exceptional, 
since at the end of the movie, the nightly law was pulled out of the shadows 
and stated openly in the courtroom. The contradiction became unavoid-
able. The base commander was caught in a lie during cross- examination, and 
was, moreover, insulted on behalf  of his profession by the questions being 
asked. His final line of defence was to say that the killing of Santiago was 
deeply deplorable but had to be understood in the wider scheme of things. He 
invoked the world in the dimensions of order and morality, in which the US 
military kept everybody, including the lawyer, safe.
I have a greater responsibility than you can possibly fathom. You weep for 
Santiago and you curse the marines. You have that luxury. You have the 
luxury of not knowing what I know: That Santiago’s death, while tragic, 
probably saved lives. And my existence, while grotesque and incompre-
hensible to you, saves lives.
(Sorkin 1991)
Civilians and other people in the courtroom could not appreciate this version 
of tragic choice. Abide by the rules and the nation may perish, sacrifice one 
soldier and the nation will survive. As Agamemnon felt compelled to sacrifice 





The dilemma was unavoidable and he had to choose – in the light of that 
dilemma  – between saving the nation and Santiago’s life. Yet the defence 
lawyer insists; ‘did you order the code red?’ – to which the reply is, first, ‘I 
did the job you sent me to do’. When asked a second time, he makes the 
confession: ‘you’re goddamn right I did’ (Sorkin 1991). Bewildered, the base 
commander is arrested on the spot. Suddenly, he was not above the law. The 
nightly law had entered into contradiction with the ordinary legal system. 
Spelled out in the courtroom, it had little leverage, and the regular law took 
precedence.
A Few Good Men showed the basic morality of excessive punishment, and 
moreover illustrated Žižek’s second point about the subterraneous impact 
on community cohesion. The obscene enjoyment produced by the tension 
between illegality and Code Red strengthened the community. Members of the 
group were bound together by guilt- ridden solidarity. In the context of A Few 
Good Men, it was not the report on the fenceline shooting that was punished 
by death, but rather what the report indicated: that the soldier did not fully 
identify with the group and maintained a distance to the Marine Corps’ spirit 
and moral ontology. That was the inner meaning of Santiago’s crime. He had 
to be punished as he violated the principles upon which the group was built. 
To break the silence after the murder would have involved a renewed violation 
of the nightly law, not dissimilar to the one which mandated the original pun-
ishment. To fail to comply in the cover- up would be to distance oneself  from 
the group and everything it represented. The entire military base was involved 
in the cover- up, and no one would speak out in the criminal proceedings, 
testifying to the strength of its moral bond. At the same time, there was 
an awareness of prohibition and of the disproportionate character of the 
punishment  – a death penalty for snitching, covertly executed, was incon-
sistent with official self- representations, and charged compliance with guilt 
and shame. The primordial lie – nothing happened! – would thus found the 
community anew by forging bonds of ‘solidarity- in- guilt’ (Žižek 1994: 58). The 
transgressive punishment, which confirmed the sacred order of their world, 
also became the inglorious secrets which brought the community members 
together. Participation in collective practices of transgression and disavowal 
became a requirement for membership in the group (Aristodemou 2014). No 
member of the group could escape the legacy of the injustices committed for 
the group. Through the joint transgression of existing legal constraints, the 
whole community manifested its moral cohesion; internal social contradictions 
were replaced by bonds of obscene enjoyment (Finkelde 2018).
The idea of transgression as the source of social order was deeply rooted 
in psychoanalysis. While Freud located the foundation in a distant past, in 
the proverbial killing of the father, Lacan thought of social order as rooted in 
continuously ongoing practices of transgression and disavowal (Hook 2017; 
Glynos 2001). Excessive punishment may be disruptive in the lives of indi-
viduals, but a powerful stabilizing force in human history, as it binds people 








to take actual part in the punishment to have the enjoyment. The cover- up 
involved a continuous flow of activity, which generated absorbed arousal 
consistent with Aristotelian pleasure, unless interrupted by a criminal investi-
gation, or otherwise actively challenged. The pleasure was by no means pure, 
it was not the forgetfulness of being completely absorbed in activity. It was 
mixed with pain, shame and guilt as a result of being complicit in excesses 
that could not be openly justified. In return, the individual would be fully 
recognized by the group, which shared the same secret and the sense that they 
were all in this together. By partaking in the collective disavowal, members of 
the audience proved their worth, in the eyes of one another. It was the basic 
recognition of social worth: to be accepted as fully part of the group. Once 
again, thus, obscene enjoyment comes uncannily close to fulfilling a moral 
duty. It may also come close to relief  of status unease. As the excessive pun-
ishment passes into collective memory, there will be a point in time when 
the initially felt intense excitement has subsided. It would be a phase during 
which the obscene enjoyment of the inglorious secrets would change and turn 
into a recognition of being a worthy member of the community. What had 
happened would not change, or be forgotten; nor would the need to anxiously 
guard the secret change. But participation in the practices of disavowal would 
involve satisfaction of desire in the realm of ordinary status, decency and 
social conventions, as opposed to the obscene excitement at the time of the 
transgression and in the immediate aftermath. The obscene would transform 
into the ordinary, and the nature of satisfaction would change accordingly, 
into Platonic pleasure.
Žižek’s discussion of the nightly law and ‘solidarity- in- guilt’ rested on the 
idea that certain things  – the transgressive punishment, the accompanying 
enjoyment and the nightly law itself  – were necessarily unacknowledged. 
They could not be openly admitted or explicitly justified, as the ending of 
A Few Good Men demonstrated. When the nightly law was spelled out, the 
regular law prevailed. Yet a different ending is by no means inconceivable, an 
ending in which the base commander walked away from the court without 
being arrested, despite confessing to the murder. Transgressions are neces-
sarily unacknowledged only in relation to a specific time and place. Genocide, 
torture and extra- judicial killings are disavowed, and turn into solidarity- in- 
guilt, under certain conditions, depending on the prevailing relationships of 
power and on the strength of social conventions. In other times, the excite-
ment will be openly acknowledged, shared with others in the group, and even 
celebrated as a sign of status. To understand the openly acknowledged yet still 
obscene enjoyment of the audience, we must supplement psychoanalysis and 
return to Nietzsche.
The forward thrust of unrestrained assertion
To some extent, all punishment contains an element of collective assertion 
of status. Besides the defensive move, in defending one’s way of life, visible 
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in the Code Red murder of Santiago, or in the ressentiment- driven support 
for capital punishment, there is, in addition, the forward thrust:  the unre-
pentant assertion of social status, in relation to other groups. Under certain 
conditions, there are no second thoughts within the audience, no need for 
cover- up. Besides the awareness of the prohibition, there is just the excite-
ment of pulling it through. This is another aspect of the modern experience. 
The enjoyment of unrestrained self- assertion and the accompanying sense of 
invincibility were elaborated by Friedrich Nietzsche. In the Will to Power, he 
criticized the Platonic notion of pleasure as satisfaction of lack and argued 
for a conception of pleasure that corresponded to the Aristotelian paradigm 
of unimpeded activity.
The desire for more is of the essence of pleasure: it is the experience of 
power increasing, of the difference in power entering consciousness.
(Nietzsche 2017: 695)
This can be seen as a re- statement of the Lacanian dynamics of desire. The 
Nietzschean will is inherently transgressive and entails a similar kind of 
excitement as jouissance, an intense absorption in activity, which is oblivious 
to other concerns, including potential pain (Moyaert 2010; Reginster 2006). 
In the context of transgressive punishment, the enjoyment was obscene, as it 
was inevitably shaped by the awareness that basic legal conventions and the 
integrity of the other were violated. But as opposed to Lacanian approaches, 
prohibition was secondary for the generation of enjoyment. Instead, pleasure 
was explicated by reference to the experience of power. Although power and 
prohibition operated in conjunction, the main aspect to Nietzsche was the 
consciously experienced excitement of prevailing against resistances and 
hardship, in a social context marked by competition and inequality: ‘the diffe-
rence in power entering consciousness’.
During a rally at the Indiana State Fairgrounds in Indianapolis on the 
evening of 20 April 2016, the topic of waterboarding was brought up by 
Donald Trump. He was at the time campaigning to become the Republican 
party’s presidential candidate. Before a congregated audience of 4,000 people, 
Trump commented on an earlier debate with competitors for the nomination.
It was a question, ‘what do you think about waterboarding?’ … and 
he [Ted Cruz] gave a nothing answer; a weak, pathetic answer. Like we 
always give. They asked me:  ‘What do you think about waterboarding, 
Mr Trump?’ I said, I love it. [loud cheers from the audience: ‘Yeah!’] I love 
it – I  think it’s great. And I said, ‘the only thing is, we should make it 
much tougher than waterboarding’. And if  you don’t think it works folks, 
you’re wrong. [audible sounds of approval from the audience]
www.youtube.com/ watch?v=Yx1DQY5a8So (transcribed 
from a video- recording made by MSNBC, originally 




The short video- clip from the event, which was made public by the news 
channel MSNBC, captured the speaker and did not show the audience in view. 
Yet judging from the simultaneously recorded sound, parts of the audience 
appear to enthusiastically embrace the prospect of excessive cruelty. At the 
decisive moment, one can only hear sounds of approval. As Trump exclaimed 
‘I love it!’, the response from the Republican crowd was immediate. People 
cheered and yelled in return. So, he went on to promise aggravated techniques 
of interrogation; ‘we should make it much tougher than waterboarding’. 
Simply waterboarding was not fully satisfactory, and more was required.
To publicly confess one’s love of torture may seem perverse. But in con-
text, the remarks were not perverse. The issue – why not torture? – had been 
raised anew as part of the War on Terror. Waterboarding meant that a captive 
was restrained on a board, lying on his back and leaning slightly backwards, 
with a cloth covering the mouth and the nose. Water was then poured over 
the cloth to produce an immediate sensation of drowning. It was one of the 
techniques that had been most discussed by US advocates of torture (Luban 
2014). Hence, the presidential candidate did not express a love of torture for 
its own sake, or for his own personal pleasure. Instead, torture signalled his 
determination to stand up for the group. The excessive punishment defended 
the way of life of the audience against external threats. It was presented as a 
response to the violations of political Islamists in the Middle East. As many 
times as Trump repeated that he loved waterboarding in the recorded video- 
clip, he interposed statements about another terror, emanating from a group 
of people who were callously beheading Westerners, or drowning people 
in cages.
They can chop off  heads, they can drown people in steel cages, right, they 
can put people in steel cages, by 25 and 50 people, and drop ’em in the 
water, and pull ’em up an hour later. And we can’t waterboard… How 
stupid are we?
www.youtube.com/ watch?v=Yx1DQY5a8So (transcribed 
from a video- recording made by MSNBC, originally 
uploaded 21 April 2016, retrieved 21 October 2019)
The question ‘how stupid are we?’ was posed rhetorically. Torture was seen to 
be necessary in the face of an external enemy who was unsurpassed in ruthless-
ness and not restrained by legal conventions. But judging from the enthusiastic 
embrace of the need, torture was not anything that regrettably had to be done. 
It was a necessity happily endorsed. Clearly, it was a matter of the ‘jouissance 
of  transgression’; the sudden outburst of excitement is inexplicable without 
reference to prohibition. To publicly display enthusiasm at the prospect of 
torture was a breach of convention. Shouting ‘yeahhh!’ was triggered by the 
transgression inherent in ‘I love waterboarding’. The spectators knew that tor-
ture was wrong – prohibited by laws, by internal regulations, and human rights 
conventions. They moreover knew that it was highly inappropriate to say that 
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one loves torture with the TV cameras on, as opposed to admitting it amongst 
a close circle of friends. Hence, if  the largely Republican audience enjoyed 
the utterances by the presidential candidate, prohibition was one important 
source of the enjoyment. But the enjoyment was not necessarily unacknow-
ledged, and nor was the proposed waterboarding. It was all affirmed, on 
stage and in the arena. The enjoyment was no longer obscene in the original 
Greek sense of being off- stage. Instead of being publicly disavowed – ‘nothing 
happened!’ – torture was publicly embraced, in the full knowledge that it was 
forbidden. The enjoyment was obscene only thanks to the continued strength 
of the taboo. Immediately following the declaration of love of waterboarding, 
captured in the video- recording, came a stated awareness of the prohibition. 
‘But you know’, Trump reminded them, ‘there are laws, we have laws that we 
have to abide by’. Prohibition did not, however, operate to support a defen-
sive solidarity- in- guilt. Instead, the audience felt empowered, on the offensive, 
and could close ranks with their leader in spe, who had proven himself  as a 
leader by saying what was generally considered unutterable. The audience, for 
a long time better acquainted with the principles of the nightly law that could 
not stand public disclosure, no longer had to deny what was already being 
done in their name.
The self- conscious breach of taboo was thus one source of enjoyment. The 
political context suggested that power could be an additional source of enjoy-
ment. The presidential candidate promised to make the nation ‘great again’, 
in this way, by asserting the spectators’ social worth through punishment. This 
was the additional source of enjoyment: the assertion of status over against 
others. The spectators’ enjoyment also came from the unrestrained assertion 
of relationships of power contained in the defiant ‘I love it’ and in the subtext 
of ‘we have laws that we have to abide by’, namely: we’ll do it anyway. On 
a Nietzschean reading, the enthusiasm of the Trump audience was not due 
to relief  of distress, or the prospect of an imagined revenge, associated with 
ressentiment, nor was it the kick of doing the forbidden, associated with the 
‘jouissance of  transgression’. Rather, it was the basic sense of power, associated 
with the assertion of status, there and then, in the arena, together with every-
body else. The sudden outburst – triggered by ‘I love it!’ and ‘it works folks’ – 
represented the basic thrust forward, to be part of a collective which asserted 
its status, proving itself  over against other social forces, and transgressing all 
kinds of boundaries, including legal constraints and moral conventions. The 
sense of power corresponded to an Aristotelian understanding of pleasure as 
the additional element of activity. It was the excitement of overcoming resist-
ance. Pleasure stemmed from being able to act and prevail despite restraints – 
literally all kinds of restraints – and continue the activity without having to 
adjust. Whatever was in the way of the constant desire to assert oneself, as 
argued by Bernard Reginster (2006; 2018), was overcome, and that in itself  
generated pleasure. On this reading, it was the self- assertion over against 
others, rather than the interplay between the regular and the nightly law, that 
accounted for the enjoyment. The law constituted one kind of resistance, yet 
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there was nothing special about it. To overcome normative considerations, 
or fear of future sanctions, might generate intense excitement, but so could 
many other things, including toppling tyrants, or beating fascists. Resistance 
was a wider concept, covering all potential hurdles which had to be overcome, 
including conscious opposition, everyday inequality, or lack or resources, to 
generate pleasure as a conscious experience of power.
Nietzsche’s view on pleasure was a corollary of  his notion of  the will. 
Commenting on the apparent simplicity of  Schopenhauer’s notion on what 
prompts people to act, Nietzsche argued that willing was ‘above all some-
thing complicated’ (Nietzsche 1990: §19, emphasis in original; see also Leiter 
2009; Clark and Dudrick 2009). Rather than being a faculty of  human con-
sciousness, or a single drive, the will was made up of  a multitude of  emo-
tional responses, expectations and concerns, accompanied by sensations of 
success or failure. The expectations and the concerns were jeopardized in 
the encounter with the lived inequality and the everyday workings of  power. 
People were not always able to attain, what they expected for themselves 
and cared about, because of  the distribution of  resources or because of 
interventions to maintain or challenge privilege. So, they had to do some-
thing to satisfy desire. The all- pervasive friction between self- assertion and 
limited options was action- prompting, and propelled people to act, again 
and again, to overcome obstacles placed in their way by circumstances. 
Pleasure was thus dependent on successful management of  resistance, and 
inextricably tied to the social context. The achievement of  conventional goals 
which conferred social esteem no doubt generated pleasure. But pleasure was 
experienced most intensely when the assertion of  status was unimpeded, 
and went beyond imposed limitations. Consequently, when the audience was 
mobilized around a violence that transgressed legal safeguards, the sense of 
power was unsurpassed; ‘to practise cruelty is to enjoy the highest gratifica-
tion of  the feeling of  power’ (Nietzsche 1997: §18). By practising or being 
witness to cruelty, people will experience intense excitement and a heightened 
sense of  power, or even a brief  moment of  omnipotence.
As observed by the early- modern theorists of  the sublime, the experience 
of  terror from a safe position can produce the most intense sensations of  awe 
and excitement. In their case, it was an impersonal terror, which was capable of 
causing significant pain and destruction, exemplified by volcanos, monsters, 
or famine (Dennis 1996): eruptions of  violence which may be experienced by 
the spectators as stunning and powerful, but not as expressions of  their own 
power. The modern experience of  obscene enjoyment, on the other hand, 
assumes that the terror being consumed is one’s own terror, as opposed to 
being a force of  nature. The terror experienced from the safe position of  the 
spectator’s seat is felt to be consciously exerted by the group to which one 
belongs. This generates obscene enjoyment partly because terror is by def-
inition prohibited, and partly because of  the accompanying sense of  power. 
The latter aspect, the experienced boost of  power, can be interpreted in terms 






over against the other. Along one line of  interpretation, excessive cruelty can 
dissolve the boundaries between those who exact and those who witness the 
punishment. The experience of  our own terror ‘allows us to blend a joy in our 
own cartoon- like unkillability with the contrary pleasures of  being decentred 
and dissolved’ (Eagleton 2005:  44f). In that moment, the audience will 
identify with the agents of  punishment, who appear as omnipotent guardians 
of  the moral world of  the entire group. As such, the excessive acts are 
invitations to everyone who belongs to that world to partake not only in 
the defence of  its order but also in the celebration of  its greatness – and the 
accompanying feeling of  invincibility. A slightly different reading, acknow-
ledging the role of  resistance in the Nietzschean conception of  pleasure 
(Reginster 2006; 2018), stresses that the terror of  the other is crucial for the 
enjoyment of  one’s own terror. The audience at the Indianapolis rally were 
presented with the threat of  an external enemy who was ‘chopping off  heads’ 
and beyond that could subvert their own way of  life, assisted by the naivety 
of  influential groups who believed in the rule of  law. The challenge to their 
rightful place in the world was powerful, dangerous and treacherous, all of 
which were features that meant that the overcoming of  the challenge, through 
waterboarding and other demonstrations of  one’s own terror, promised an 
all the greater sensation of  pleasure, since, on Nietzsche’s analysis, pleasure 
was proportional to the resistance put up by the other. Hence, without neces-
sarily experiencing any unmediated identity with the aggressor, the audience 
would reap the enjoyment of  collectively asserting their status over against 
others.
Obscene enjoyment and ressentiment were rooted in the same desire. Yet 
the two modern pleasures of punishment were different from one another. 
Like the previous forms of Platonic pleasure, ressentiment offered tem-
porary relief  of distress of status concerns. At the same time, ressentiment 
raised the stakes and involved the restoration of both moral order and 
social esteem. Driven by the acute sense of impotence and injustice, angry 
spectators saw in the newly established system of criminal justice a powerful 
vehicle for ‘the thunderstorms of our revenge’ (Nietzsche 2006: 2.8), which 
could produce the experience of being rectified and acknowledge them as 
the backbone of society, in the key dimensions of order and morality. The 
state- administered punishment could be conceived as wholesale vengeance 
yet remained circumscribed in certain respects. It was essentially legitimate, 
and tied to existing legal bodies. In all these respects, the pleasure provided 
by excessive forms of punishment was the very opposite. Obscene enjoyment 
presupposed a position of strength rather than impotence, the illegitimacy of 
the entire undertaking, the illicit character of pleasure and the transgressive 
nature of punishment. The seemingly unrestrained assertion actualized the 
attainment of full satisfaction and transcendence, as opposed to the release of 
a tension accumulated by the basic squeeze between options and expectations. 
Sometimes, however, there was a fine line. The temporary relief  of distress 





an anxious and angry audience, may turn into the affirmation of themselves 
as cornerstones in a social order where they reign supreme: a moral universe 
where they join forces with the state to put things right again, by means of 
the violence it takes to do so. In the transition, feelings of impotence may 
pass into a sense of omnipotence, and relief  of status concerns may pass into 
the obscene excitement of transgression. Further down the road a transition 
can take place in the other direction, from intense excitation in the immediate 
aftermath of the exacted punishment to mundane relief  of distress: the rec-
ognition of being a worthy member of the community, as participation in the 
processes of disavowal becomes routine. From being triumphant, punishment 
transforms into a requirement for decency and acceptance as fully a part of 
the group. Žižek’s (1994) notion of solidarity- in- guilt comes uncannily close 
to the relief  produced by the fulfilment of moral duty.
Obscene enjoyment and ressentiment were part of a larger story, 
encapsulated in the Hegelian master- and- slave dialectic. A kernel of recogni-
tion was central to both kinds of pleasure. In the context of ressentiment, it 
was all about regaining recognition, through legitimate punishment. Yet there 
was an element of recognition also in the consumption of one’s own terror. 
Witnessing punishment being exacted in spite of legal safeguards, or in disre-
gard of the excessive pain imposed, can offer instant recognition, which unites 
the two sides of thumos: being accepted as part of the group and asserting 
oneself  over against others. Social morality and existing relationships of 
power supplied the basic coordinates in both cases. What came across as 
one- sided assertion, omnipotence and insularity may turn out to be heavily 
dependent on the other – in the shape of the big Other, or in the fine- tuned 
sensitivity of what presented social esteem in the eyes of others. Punishment 
operated in the middle of this dynamic with the capacity to provide recog-
nition. Inserted in between desire and enjoyment, punishment could offer 
relief  of the spectators’ status concerns, or, alternatively, it could produce 
obscene enjoyment of taking part in collective self- assertion. Yet as discussed 
throughout the book, desire is deeply ambiguous. The desire to be fully 
included or to distinguish oneself  over against others does not necessarily 
translate into a yearning for punishment, but can just as well turn into the 
achievement of conventional goals, or whatever happened to confer social 
esteem on an individual, as well as the collective endeavour of social justice, 
likewise driven by notions of morality and justice, albeit in a very different 
direction: toward extended rights, new standards of respect, and levelling of 
power asymmetries. The dynamic is inherently transgressive, pushing beyond 
existing conditions. But the direction of transcendence, whether the desire 
will develop into punitivity, into individual achievement, or into social justice, 
is not inherent in the dynamics of desire. The basic ambiguity of the desire 
for social esteem is at the same time a space for indeterminacy. Whether the 
progressive side or the regressive side of recognition takes precedence will be 
determined by external conditions, conscious actions and interventions. The 
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